This book is a venture in contemporary history, an effort to place in perspective developments that in some respects are not yet fully resolved. Its subject is u.s. foreign policy during the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, with a coda encompassing George W. Bush's first year as president. During this period, members of the foreign policy elite, breathing deeply the intoxicating vapors released during the annus mirabilis of 1989, concluded that history stood poised at a turning point. Bill Clinton interpreted the end of the Cold War as signifying "the fullness of time" - a scriptural allusion to the moment when God chose to transform history. The collapse of communism and the triumph of liberal democratic capitalism offered similar prospects for transformation, this time through human rather than divine agency. As the bloody twentieth century drew to a close, God's promise of peace on earth remained unfulfilled; it was now incumbent upon the United States, having ascended to the status of sole superpower, to complete God's work-or, as members of a largely secularized elite preferred it, to guide history toward its intended destination.

Daniel Byman's hard-hitting and articulate book is the first to study countries that support terrorist groups. Focusing primarily on sponsors from the Middle East and South Asia, it examines the different types of support that states provide, their motivations, and the impact of such sponsorship. The book also considers regimes that allow terrorists to raise money and recruit without providing active support. The experiences of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya are detailed here, alongside the histories of radical groups such as al-Qaida, Hizbullah and Hamas

The definitive volume on the sources of contemporary conflict and the array of possible responses to it.

Vol.1 : Chronology A - D. - 642 p.

With over 750 entries, the Encyclopedia of United States National Security is the first single, concise reference source to provide accurate and informative answers to the many challenging questions of how, why, when, and where national security has evolved. In addition to presenting historical facts and analyses, this two-volume encyclopedia is designed to provide a comprehensive introduction to some of the more complicated and abstract questions concerning world politics and national security. A thoroughly interdisciplinary work, this encyclopedia views national security from historical, economic, political, and technological perspectives.

This book, written for fellow peacemakers and peace campaigners around the world, is therefore not only a study but also an argument: my small but necessary contribution to what I see as the daunting but all-too-urgent project of global transformation – the fundamental change so desperately needed by humanity and our planet. Unless we take a more radical approach, we shall not get beyond fire-fighting and the seemingly endless task of reconstruction. Unless we transform the way we think about conflict, human relationships, and what it is to be successful, our very life as a species is under threat. Our field is going through a time of intensive self-scrutiny.6 The phase that began with the Soviet collapse has ended. For too many years we were caught up in the calamitous policies and actions that followed the events of 11 September 2001 in the US, and there were signs that a new Cold War was beginning. Then the advent of a new US president brought new hope. Our field can be credited with many important achievements, which should be recognised and set out. The value of its work will continue. At the same time, we have come to recognise our limitations.

This book explores the complex issue of international ethics in the two dominant schools of thought in international relations; Liberalism and Realism. Both theories suffer from an inability to integrate the ethical and pragmatic dimensions of foreign policy. Liberal policy makers often suffer from moral blindness and a tendency toward coercion in the international arena, whilst realists tend to be epistemic sceptics, incorporating Nietzsche's thought, directly or indirectly, into their theories. Mark Gismondi seeks to resolve the issues in these two approaches by adopting a covenant based approach, as described by Daniel Elazar's work on the covenant tradition in politics, to international relations theory. The covenant approach has three essential principles: policy makers must have a sense of realism about the existence of evil and its political consequences power must be shared and limited liberty requires a basis in shared values. "Ethics, Realism and Liberalism in International Relations" will be of interest to students and researchers of politics, philosophy, ethics and international relations.

This volume provide readers with analytically sound and well documented empirical information about the significant positive and negative effects mass immigration has on the Country's well being and that of their offspring.

When I was first approached in February 1996 to ask whether I would be prepared to take on a new, part-time job as the British government's Special Representative for Cyprus, I had some idea of what I was being let in for, but not that it would last for seven years. Although I had never actually set foot on the island, I had, like many other British diplomats, bumped into the Cyprus problem from time to time during the 36 years of my professional career in the Diplomatic Service, which had ended the year before with my retirement from the post of UN ambassador in New York. I had been involved in the negotiations for a trade agreement between the European Community and Cyprus when Britain joined the EC in 1973; I had subsequently participated in the negotiations that developed this agreement into a customs union and, more relevant than either of these two experiences, I had a ringside seat for the last major attempt by the United Nations to negotiate a comprehensive settlement in 1992 and the subsequent, equally abortive, effort to agree a major package of Confidence-Building Measures on the island which had finally run into the sands in 1994. So I could not be said to be unaware of the singular intractability of the problem, nor of the capacity of the main players to spin out any negotiation until the Greek Kalends, nor of their preference for playing the blame game over making any serious effort to get to grips with the core issues in an attempt to reach a settlement. Why did I say yes? Partly, I suspect, out of a reluctance to quit entirely the scene of international diplomacy in which I had spent the whole of my professional life. Partly also, like a mountain climber drawn towards an unclimbed peak, simply because it was there. The Cyprus problem was certainly an unclimbed peak, said by many - particularly by those who had tried to climb it and failed - to be un-climbable; so there was an element of irresistible challenge. And then there were less personal reasons. The commitment given by the European Union in 1995 to open accession negotiations with Cyprus, divided or not, within six months of the end of the Inter- Governmental Conference which was drawing up the Amsterdam Treaty (in 1997), meant that we were sliding towards a parting of the ways which might either consolidate the division of the island or lead to its entering reunited into the European Union. It also had the potential to lead to a serious crisis in the relations between Turkey and the European Union and thus to a threat to the peace and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. So the case for making a further determined attempt to reach a settlement was a serious one.

This book is written to convince you, the reader, that if our civilization – indeed, the human species – is to survive in this nuclear age, war of all types will have to be abolished and peaceful means found to solve disputes. Over the centuries it has been the common view that war is an acceptable way of settling conflicts of interest. That is not to say that it has always been seen as the most desirable way, but as one readily to be undertaken. The principle has been, if you cannot get what you want by negotiation, then try force provided you stand a good chance of winning.

This book sets out to explain the complex nature of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era, from the collapse of the USSR in December 1991 and the accession of Boris Yeltsin to the end of Vladimir Putin’s second year as President of the Russian Federation. The tale narrated in the coming pages is a messy one, beset by innumerable contradictions and flavoured by human personality to an uncommon degree. When Winston Churchill speculated that the key to understanding Russia might be ‘national interest’, he could little have imagined the extent to which, more than half a century later, the foreign policy of the largest of the post-Soviet successor states would so reflect the perversity of human nature. Far from exhibiting an underlying if specific pragmatism, Moscow’s relations with the outside world have been liberally streaked with irrationality – at least as we might understand it in the West – and dominated by fundamental dichotomies: continuity and change, consensus and conflict. Easy assumptions about a broader ‘national interest’ and common priorities have been challenged by the politics of sectionalism and personalities, with rationality and logic acquiring multiple, contradictory forms. We enter a realm of smoke and mirrors in which little is as it seems, and where illusion and mythmaking are as much a part of reality as ‘reality’ itself.

For fifty years European integration has been pursued according to an operational code based on rules which have never been publicly discussed. This book demonstrates the far-reaching consequences of the prioritisation of integration over competing values, fait accompli and other implicit rules of action. The willingness to sacrifice democracy on the altar of integration is demonstrated by the monopoly of legislative initiative granted to the non-elected Commission. Monetary union preceding, rather than following, political integration is a striking example of fait accompli, and the reason behind many holes in the EU system of economic governance. Until now, academics have avoided radical criticism; Giandomenico Majone argues that only an open acknowledgement of the obsolescence of the traditional methods can stem the rising tide of Euro-scepticism.