While we would like to believe that forensic science professionals are intrinsically ethical by nature, the reality is that these individuals have moral compasses as varied as those of any individual you may know. They confront ethical dilemmas every day, some with clear-cut protocols and others that frequently have no definitive answers. Ethics and the Practice of Forensic Science explores the range of ethical issues facing those who work in the field and highlights the complicated nature of ethical decision-making in this complex arena.

In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a comprehensive examination of what a plausible moral science would look like.Casebeer begins by discussing the nature of ethics and the possible relationship between science and ethics. He then addresses David Hume's naturalistic fallacy and G. E. Moore's open-question argument, drawing on the work of John Dewey and W. V. O. Quine. He then proposes a functional account of ethics, offering corresponding biological and moral descriptions. Discussing in detail the neural correlates of moral cognition, he argues that neural networks can be used to model ethical function. He then discusses the impact his views of moral epistemology and ontology will have on traditional ethical theory and moral education, concluding that there is room for other moral theories as long as they take into consideration the functional aspect of ethics; the pragmatic neo-Aristotelian virtue theory he proposes thus serves as a moral "big tent." Finally, he addresses objections to ethical naturalism that may arise, and calls for a reconciliation of the sciences and the humanities. "Living well," Casebeer writes, "depends upon reweaving our ethical theories into the warp and woof of our scientific heritage, attending to the myriad consequences such a project will have for the way we live our lives and the manner in which we structure our collective moral institutions."

By showing how to employ rather than compromise moral standards, this timely book provides a roadmap for achieving success by sticking to the high road, and for building a business career that is both personally and materially rewarding.

Americans cannot live with judicial review, but they cannot live without it. There is something characteristically American about turning the most divisive political questions - like freedom of religion, same-sex marriage, affirmative action, and abortion - into legal questions with the hope that courts can answer them. In Judicial Review in an Age of Moral Pluralism Ronald C. Den Otter addresses how judicial review can be improved to strike the appropriate balance between legislative and judicial power under conditions of moral pluralism. His defense of judicial review is predicated on the imperative of ensuring that the reasons that the state offers on behalf of its most important laws are consistent with the freedom and equality of all persons. Den Otter ties this defense to a theory of constitutional adjudication based on John Rawls's idea of public reason and argues that a law that is not sufficiently publicly justified is unconstitutional, thus addressing when courts should invalidate laws and when they should uphold them even in the midst of reasonable disagreement about the correct outcome in particular constitutional controversies.

This introductory book targets the reader who has the ambition to apply economic analysis but may be missing a technical introduction to its mathematical techniques or seeks a structured elaboration of its philosophical principles. The text juxtaposes economic analysis with moral philosophy, political theory, egalitarianism, and other methodological principles and then progresses to the details of methods such as model-building, derivatives, differential equations, statistical tests, and the use of computer programs.

Asymmetric conflict is changing the way that we practise and think about war. Torture, rendition, assassination, blackmail, extortion, direct attacks on civilians, and chemical weapons are all finding their way to the battlefield despite longstanding international prohibitions. This book offers a practical guide for policy makers, military officers, students, and others who ask such questions as: Do guerillas deserve respect or long jail sentences? Are there grounds to torture guerillas for information or assassinate them on the battlefield? Is there room for nonlethal weapons to subdue militants and safeguard the lives of noncombatants? Who are noncombatants in asymmetric war? What is the status of civilians who shelter and aid guerillas? And, do guerillas have any right to attack civilians, particularly those who aid and shelter members of the stronger army? If one side can expand the scope of civilian vulnerability, then why can't the other? To read and comment on Michael Gross's blog article on the UN Human Rights Council Report on Gaza

SEX, MORALITY, AND THE LAW, edited by Lori Gruen and George E. Panichas, is an interesting and innovative contribution to interdisciplinary literature focusing on the intersection of law and society. In this volume, the editors define the topical subject, "sex," to include same-sex activity, commercial sexual encounters, reproductive decisions, and sexual self-determination. Their primary concern is to produce a counterbalance to the irrational, contentious, and contradictory public discourse generated by a society all but saturated by sex. They seek to do by presenting "calmer, more careful assessments of matters of intimate concern".

This book explores the thesis that legal roles force people to engage in moral combat, an idea that is implicit in the assumption that citizens may be morally required to disobey unjust laws, while judges may be morally required to punish citizens for civil disobedience. Heidi Hurd advances the surprising argument that the law cannot require us to do what morality forbids. Moral Combat is a sophisticated, well-conceived and carefully argued book on a very important and controversial topic at the junction between legal and political philosophy. It will be of interest to moral, legal, and political philosophers, as well as teachers and students of professional ethics in law.

Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law argues that the law governing the ending of life in England and Wales is unclear, confused and often contradictory. The book shows that the rules are in competition because the ethical principles underlying the rules are also diverse and conflicting. In mounting his case Richard Huxtable considers some familiar and topical debates, including assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia, examining such situations as the Dianne Pretty litigation and Lord Joffe's Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill. The book also enters some important, but less well-charted areas, looking at the advent of 'death tourism' and the real status of involuntary and passive euthanasia in English law, in addition to clarifying the confusion that surrounds the use of powerful painkillers like morphine. Dealing with both legal and ethical issues, the text concludes that the time has come to more openly adopt a compromise position - one that more honestly recognises and accommodates the competing values, whilst also restoring a measure of coherence to the law.

"Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics" explores the foundations of early utilitarianism as well as the theoretical basis of social ethics and policy in modern Western welfare states. Matti Hayry shows how philosophers have misunderstood the very nature of utilitarianism since the turn of the 19th century and identifies the resulting problems in contemporary utilitarianism. Hayry argues that when the classical utilitarian principles of happiness, hedonism and impartiality are combined, the ensuing ethical theory may demand that we act immorally or unjustly. This is because the scope of the utilitarian theory has been extended too far. Hayry develops a more limited utilitarian theory based on the ethos of early British universal altruism. He argues that a limited version of liberal utilitarianism and the methods of applied ethics should be employed to define our moral duties and rights. This is an important book in current discussions on social ethics and policy. Hayry's accomplished defense of utilitarian morality is certain to provoke debate.

Vol. 1 : Abortion - Cognitive Dissonans. - 756 p.

Ethics pervades every human society and almost every human life. People deliberate about what they should do on specifi c occasions, about what is worthwhile, about the kinds of lives they should aspire to lead. In subtle ways, their everyday actions presuppose habits of conduct, roles and institutions current in their societies, endorsed sometimes after serious refl ection, often accepted without much thought. With the exception of those affl icted with psychological disruptions that profoundly limit their cognitive capacities or that cut them off from their fellows, we are all embedded in the ethical project. Yet for ordinary people, and for phi los o phers too, the status of our ethical judgments and practices is hard to fathom. What exactly do we mean when we praise someone for a correct decision? How could an evaluation like that be grounded? Bertrand Russell famously described mathematics as a subject in which “. . . we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true.”1 The impressive ability of mathematicians to reach agreement on conclusions that endure fosters confi dence in their power to acquire knowledge, despite the mysteries swirling around the content and grounds of their judgments. By contrast, the per sis tence of ethical debate reinforces a sense of unease about the status of ethical practice, often leading those engaged in public controversies to shy away from “value judgments,” as if any hope of reaching consensus were absurd.