A solution of a task of assessment and assurance of safety of critical Instrumentation and Control systems (I&C) by risks analysis is considered. A common taxonomy of risks of critical I&C is formed. An approach to compared risks analysis for I&C used new information technologies is proposed.

Due to technical reasons Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems have to be replaced to an increasing degree by computer-based I&C systems. For the development and implementation of safety-related computer-based I&C systems Integrated Tool Environments (ITE) are employed. Most of these ITE were not conceived originally for the implementation of nuclear specific applications. The quality of the ITE may be proven and certified for industrial applications but the qualification for the nuclear application has to be demonstrated. This paper proposes an assessment method and activities for the efficient and transparent qualification of ITE for the use in safety-related applications according to nuclear standards and state of the art. The assessment aims at a pre-qualification of ITE detached as far as possible from the safety functions implemented by them. The results of this pre-qualification shall assist and facilitate the safety analysis of the application software.

Two aspects of interconnection between nuclear power plants (NPP) safety and NPP instrumentation and control systems functional safety are describes: new systems which were designed by new requirements to functional safety; violations of NPP nuclear safety because I&C.

This paper gives an overview concerning the design as well as the verification and validation of Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) in German NPP which are applied to carry out I&C functions. The qualification procedures dealt with are restricted on ASICs without any microcontroller core. Thus these ASICs are implemented on the basis of a hardware configuration, generated by development tools. Presently, just that kind of ASICs are relevant for German NPP. Dependent on the different safety categories, recommendations concerning the qualification level and procedures are elaborated which have to be achieved for ASICs and FPGA. Requirements are also introduced for the implementation of ASICs and FPGA in I&C systems important to safety, which are in accordance with German and international regulations and guidelines as well as additional specific requirements. Additional, important aspects within the framework of the expert judgement for upgrading of safety relevant I&C by ASICs and FPGA are dealt with. These aspects are of general character and are mainly focused on suitability test procedures and robustness requirements of ASICs and FPGA.

Розглянуто основи інформаційної технології підвищення рівня функціональної безпеки, побудованої на принципах аналізу фізичних розмінностей, що дозволяє верифікувати програмний код під час його розробки, зменшити ризики некоректного використання вхідних даних, та контролювати відсутність функціональних відмов під час штатної роботи технічних систем. Наведено перелік операцій, що контролюються. Визначено межі контролю коду під час формальної верифікації, а також контролю обчислювальних процесів під час експлуатації систем. Приведено класи програмних дефектів та визначено ефективність методу, що для реального коду перевищує 80 %.

Field Programmable Gates Arrays (FPGAs) are used as components of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) safety systems since 1990s. During the last fifteen years FPGAs have recommended itself as reliable proven in use solutions which are able to increase safety of Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems. Research and Production Corporation (RPC) Radiy is a designer and manufacturer of FPGA-based I&C platform and systems for NPP. The present paper discusses features of FPGA-based Rod Control System (RCS) as an example of NPP safety increasing with using FPGA technologies.

Reliability assessment of instrumentation and control systems (I&Cs) is always one of the most important design and operation activities, especially for critical domains like nuclear power plants (NPPs). Intensive use of relatively new technologies like field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) in I&C which appear in upgrades and in newly built NPPs makes task to develop and validate advanced reliability assessment methods that consider specific technology features very topical. Increased integration densities make the reliability of integrated circuits the most crucial point in modern NPP I&C. Moreover, FPGAs differ in some significant ways from other integrated circuits: they are shipped as blanks and are very dependent on design configured into them. Therefore, special approaches should be used for comprehensive analysis of FPGAs. This paper summarizes our experience on reliability analysis of FPGA based NPP I&C produced by Research and production corporation Radiy (RPC Radiy). Both analytical and operational reliability analyses are covered.