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THE INDUSTRIAL INJURIES IN THE DAILY LIFE OF WORKERS OF THE METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY OF UKRAINE in the late XIX - early XX centuries

The paper deals with the problem of occupational injuries in the daily life of the workers of the metallurgical industry of Ukraine in the late XIX and early XX centuries. During this period, the tendency to increase the level of occupational injuries among Ukrainian metallurgists dominated. The analysis of accidents statistics at the mining enterprises showed 3 spikes of occupational injuries: 1897-1899, 1900 and 1904. This can be explained, first, by the opening of new enterprises, which led to an increase in the number of employees, and secondly, the adoption of new legislative acts, which regulated the complete registration of all accidents at industrial enterprises. The analysis of the periodicals in the early of the XX century, reports of physicians and official statistical sources helped to comprehensively analyze the main causes and types of occupational injuries. The nature of the injuries was varied. Most of them occurred due to falling or striking heavy objects. Burns and injuries due to faulty equipment were one of the most common causes of injury in the workplace. For example, in 1901, every 38-th employee suffered from a fall or strike with a heavy subject, every 114-th of the burns, and every 127-th was injured due to defective equipment at the metallurgical plant. Complex production processes at the new metallurgical enterprises, exhausting working conditions, inexperience, inattention of newly-arrived workers and neglect of their safety rules were the main causes of accidents at metallurgical plants of Ukraine in the late XIX and early XX centuries. The issue of medical care for Ukrainian metallurgists is inextricably linked with the theme of work. In order to regulate medical assistance, the government in 1866 adopted a resolution obliging business owner to take measures for timely medical care. The factories opened hospitals. This has had a positive impact on providing first aid to the victims and their further treatment.

Keywords: everyday life; occupational injuries; accidents; metallurgists of Ukraine.

Introduction

The life of workers in the metallurgical industry of Ukraine in period of the late XIX - early XX centuries a significant place was the question of the production of daily life: the length of the working day, the conditions at work, the system of remuneration, etc. A scarce page of industrial history remains the issue of occupational injuries among metallurgists of Ukraine. The development of technology, the introduction of new technologies for the manufacture of metal has led to a complication of the production process. The level of education of workers and knowledge of safety rules did not always meet the necessary requirements. As a result, there have been accidents. Since the end of the XIX century Statistical Bureau of the Congress of Miners' Industries of the South of Russia started the statistics of accidents in the mining industry. Fixation of occupational injuries and the publication of statistical data have influenced the development and implementation of safety rules for manufacturing and health insurance for all metallurgists.

The issue of occupational injuries among metallurgists of Ukraine in the late XIX and early XX centuries in the historiographical edition is illuminated fragmentarily. The question of the conditions of life and work of workers of the Russian Empire was considered by such scientists: E. Kru-

ze (1980), F. Los (1967), O. Parasunko (1963) et al. The evidence of occupational injuries among metallurgists in Ukraine is extremely fragmented. Question about the level of occupational injuries among metallurgists of Ukraine has not yet received a comprehensive coverage in historical works. Although the cases of modern occupational injuries are widely covered in the media, the scientific debate on this subject is rather poor. This can be explained by the fact that Ukrainian historic science at the present stage makes the first steps to highlight historical events by using new methods and approaches of scientific knowledge. For a long time, the tendency to rethinking the elements of macrohistory was dominant, while the microhistorical level, in particular the peculiarities of the everyday life of Ukrainian metallurgists, remained outside the scientific interests of researchers.

Separate facts from the history of occupational injuries among workers in the metallurgical industry can be found in the works of modern Ukrainian researchers, in particular: T. Vodotyka (2018) and V. Sugak (2014). Taking into account the insufficient degree of studying the problem, the **aim of the paper** is to cover industrial injuries of daily life of workers of the metallurgical industry of Ukraine in the late XIX and early XX centuries and determining its impact on their daily lives.

Methods

Scientific analysis of this problem became possible due to the use of the following methods: general scientific (analysis and synthesis, generalization, induction, deduction) and specially historical (chronological, historical-comparative, historical-system).

General scientific methods of historical knowledge were used to highlight the main causes and types of occupational injuries. The chronological method gave the opportunity to investigate the events in time sequence. Historical and comparative method has helped to reveal the main bursts of the level of occupational injuries. Due to the historical and systematic method, the problems of occupational injuries in the daily life of the workers of the metallurgical industry of Ukraine in the late XIX - early XX centuries has been investigated.

Results

The growth of industrial production, the development of the metallurgical industry of Ukraine in the late XIX century have affected the increase in demand for a permanent contingent of the working people. The problem of providing metallurgical enterprises was very relevant, as evidenced by the reports of the Congress of Mining Industry South of Russia (*Otchet upoinomochennykh XXIII syezda gornopromyshlennikov, 1899*).

In general, workers from metallurgical enterprises were people or peasants who worked seasonally. The hard work was mostly landless and landless peasants (*Los et al., 1967*).

The worsening of the peasants' economic situation and the rapid development of the metallurgical industry have contributed to an increase in the number of mining workers. But the lack of necessary skills for work at the plant and safety knowledge were a threat to the lives and health of the new metallurgists. Industrial accidents occurred due to the following reasons: the imperfection of production equipment, the lack of special education, employee negligence, non-compliance with legislation on the length of the working day by employers, fatigue and, consequently, reduced attention.

In 1893 the Statute of industry was adopted. It regulated the relationship between the worker and the employer. Article 156 of this Statute has established restrictions on the length of the working day. For employees in daylight hours, working time should not exceed 11.5 hours a day.

And on weekends and holidays - 10 hours. For workers employed on work partly at night (when working with one change from 21:00 to 5:00; when working with two or more changes from 22:00 to 4:00), the duration of the working day should not exceed - 10 hours (*Balabanov, 1909*).

The working day lasted 12 hours when the plant was operated in two shifts (*Friedgut, 1994: 79*). At the Dnipro plant, the working time for all categories was considered as 12-hour shift. In the account book of the worker of the blast-furnace shop it was noted that on the day of re-change, the employees work without leaving the factory with two-shift work 18 hours (*Los et al., 1967*).

At the Iron and steel mill M. Nudelman in 1878, the working day lasted 10 hours, while at the Bellino Feneriha plant it was 10.5 hours, of which half an hour had breakfast, and one hour for lunch (*Sugak, 2014*). In April 1898, workers at the Kadiiv Metallurgical Plant were struck. Among the reasons for the strike, the Inspector of Slavyanoserbsky district indicated excessive working hours. "From east to sunset, with breaks for breakfast 0.5 hours and lunch - 1 hour". That is, the duration of the working day was almost 13 hours (*Parasunko, 1963*).

The workers sometimes neglected the lunch break. This was noted by the sanitary doctor N. Kontorovich, inspecting the Petrovsky plant. The reasons for this phenomenon are clear - the working hour during a lunch break cost more (*Otchet o deyatelnosti sanitarnogo vracha..., 1912*).

So, metallurgists worked a lot, often neglecting their own vacation. Such an exhausting work led to the overthrow of workers. Consequently, concentration was lost, and as a result of fatigue, the risk of an occupational injury increased.

The percentage of injuries in metallurgical enterprises was higher than in mines. The authors of the work, "The History of the Donbass Workers", noted among the reasons that many works that could be mechanized were carried out by the metallurgists themselves, for example blast furnace filling (*Los et al., 1967*).

The research by Professor T. Frigut confirms this view. In his view, the number of accidents in the metallurgical industry was lower than in the miner's, due to the smaller number of workers. The mortality rate was lower, and the level of injury was higher (*Friedgut, 1994*).

Accident statistics, demonstrates the dynamics of changes in the number of victims in the production from 1893 to 1908 shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Number of accidents on mining enterprises of Ukraine (1893 - 1908) *

Year	Total number of workers	The number of victims	
		Death	Mutilation
1893	15053	8	29
1894	17536	14	59
1895	16706	16	65
1896	15906	26	101
1897	32901	33	273
1898	45494	69	431
1899	49108	70	547
1900	53694	72	5376
1901	52341	61	4825
1902	44294	39	4972
1903	37959	39	5620
1904	40213	45	16443
1905	42998	42	15054
1906	43158	36	16177
1907	47442	46	12947
1908	46715	48	15364

* made by the author based on statistics of accidents in the mining and mining industry from 1901 - 1908.

The above data shows the dominance of the tendency to increase the number of deaths and injuries among Ukrainian metallurgists. Analyzing the data of the table and

compiled on the basis Figure 1 (*Statistika neschastnykh sluchayev...*, 1909), we can see three significant surges of occupational injuries: in 1897-1899, 1900 and 1904.




Figure 1. Number of accidents at the mining enterprises (1893 - 1908).

The first surge can be explained by the discovery of new enterprises. In 1897 the Kerch Plant of the Bryansk Society, the Kremenchuk private factory of masters of the Krakts, the Nikopol-Mariupol factory of the Nikopol-Mariupol Mining and Metallurgical Society and the Petrovsky Russian-Belgian Metallurgical Society were opened. In 1898 - 1899, the Kadyiv Plant of the South Russian Dnieper Metallurgical Society, the Russian Providens of the Belgian Joint Stock Company, the Olkhov Iron and Steel Melting Plant of the Olkhov Metallurgical Society, Kramatorsk and Makeevka Metallurgical Works started their work. The appearance of new jobs and an increase in the total number of metallurgists at the end of the XIX century, mainly due to former peasants who did not have professional knowledge, led to an increase in the number of traumatized miners in the mining enterprises.

Subsequent bursts of accidents were observed in 1900 and 1904. In 1900, a new document with the same name was adopted in place of the old "Orders of the Factory Inspection". Formally, the reason for its adoption were the new structural changes, which turned the real institute of district inspectors from 1882 to 1894. The document has undergone even more serious changes, in particular, it resolved the issue of fixing accidents at work.

On June 2, 1903, a law on the remuneration of workers who received industrial injuries was put into effect. Since then, according to E. Kruze, more or less complete registration by factory inspectors of cases of deaths and injuries in industry, including metallurgical plants (*Kruze, 1980*).

So, to explain the spikes of occupational injuries can be, firstly, the opening of new enterprises, and as a consequence of the increase in the number of workers. Secondly, the introduction of new legislative acts regulating the issues of recording accidents and providing material assistance to the victims.

From statistics on accidents with workers in the mining and mining industry for the years 1901-1902 you can learn about the nature of injuries among metallurgists of Ukraine in the early XX century. The largest number of victims was observed due to falls and strikes with heavy objects (1901 - 1325 injured and 28 deaths, 1902 - 1406 injured and 9 deaths) (*Statistika neschastnykh sluchayev ...*, 1903).

From burns in 1901, 459 people were injured, including 4 deaths, in 1902 there were 494 injured, one of them death. From the damage to equipment in 1901, 403 people

were injured and 9 died, 1902 were injured, 189 were injured and 6 died. For other reasons, in 1901, 1155 people were injured and 13 were killed, in 1902 1,661 were injured and 15 were deaths (*Statistika neschastnykh sluchayev ...*, 1903).

In 1901 the number of workers was 52,341 people, then every 38-th worker was injured by the fall and strikes by heavy objects. Because of burns every 114th, and because of working with faulty equipment, every 127th metallurgist. In 1902, the number of workers was 44294 people. Every 31-st worker suffered from falls and heavy objects. Because of burns every 89, and because of work with the equipment, every 227 metallurgists. That is, analyzing the data on the total number of victims, the difference between 1901 and 1902 does not seem to be too significant. But, based on the fact that due to the economic crisis, early XX century the total number of metallurgists has decreased, it can be seen that due to the fall and impact of heavy objects and burns in 1902, the victims were significantly more than in 1901 (at the rate of 1 accident in the total number of workers).

In 1904 the Society of Physicians of Industrial Enterprises of the Katerynoslav Province was created. In 1908, 1286 workers were inspected. The largest number of workers was made up of representatives of the metallurgical industry, namely 374 people. In particular, 157 people from the Alexander's South Russian plant, 106 - from the Dnipro plant, 19 - from the steel mill (B. Ezau), 17 - from Verhnedniprovsky metallurgical plant, 17 - from Petrovsky plant, 14 - from Donetsk-Yurievsky plant, 9 - from Kramatorsk plant, 8 from Yuzovsky plant, 5 - from the Hdantsev Iron and Steel Works, 5 - from the plant "Russian Providence", 5 - from the steelworks of the General Society in Makeyevka, 4 - from the Druzhkovsky factory of the Donetsk Society, 3 - from the Kadiivsky metallurgical plant, 2 - from the factory of the Nikopol-Mariupol Society, 2 - from the iron and steel plant Leppa and Valman, 1 - from the casting plant of Moznaya in Alexandrovsk (*Otchet o deyatelnosti obshchestva vrachey...*, 1909). The largest number of workers is represented by two metallurgical giants, which were located in Ekaterinoslav and not far from the provincial center - in Kamiansky.

The issue of medical assistance to victims was regulated at the state level. In 1866 a law was issued on the provision of medical care to industrial workers.

According to it, at each industrial enterprise there should be an open hospital.

In 1874, the Society of Physicians in Ekaterinoslav was opened. The purpose of his activity was to unite medical workers, in order to solve complex issues. At the company of doctors there was an advisory bureau for the inspection of workers. The main objective was to certify industrial and other worker injuries. The level of occupational injuries indicates, for example, a description of the history of illnesses of workers who have been examined and treated. For example, in 1908 the 35-year-old metallurgist of the Bryansk plant was contacted by the Bureau. The history of his injuries at work is impressive. On July 5, 1899, he was crushed between two taps, resulting in damage to the chest. On February 14, 1905, during the casting of steel, he received burns of his right tibia and his right hand. On August 22, 1905 he received burns of the left eye with pig iron sparks. On July 5, 1906, a broken iron scrap hit a head and a left leg (*Otchet o deyatelnosti obshchestva vrachey...*, 1909).

In order to find out about injuries, Bureau employees demanded complete evidence of injuries sustained by a physician who worked at an enterprise (*Otchet o deyatelnosti obshchestva vrachey...*, 1909). Injured at the factories were sent for treatment to the factory hospitals. It is evidenced by archival documents. Thus, on May 22, 1907, at around 8 pm while working at the factory of the Novorossiysk Society in Yuzovka, seven workers received burns of varying degrees of gravity from the explosion that occurred on blast furnace number 5. Three of them were sent for treatment to the hospital. The other four received light burns and after the bandage immediately began to perform their duties (*Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv. Fond 313. Opys 2. Sprava 1431*).

Analyzing documents form 313 and form 2161, which are stored in the Central State Historical Archives in Kyiv can trace a picture of occupational injuries in 1910-1911 at individual enterprises. Thus, at the Kadyevsky plant in 1910 there were 172 accidents, in 1911 - 185. (*Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv. Fond 2161. Opys 2. Sprava 21*). Studying temporary disability benefits of less than 13 weeks for 1910-1911 at Kramatorsk and Druzhkivsky metallurgical plants can notice that 1639 people were injured in Kramatorsk in 1910, and in 1911 - 2002 a worker was injured (*Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv. Fond 2161. Opys 2. Sprava 21*). In Druzhkivka, in 1910, the victims of industrial injuries were 829 metallurgists, and in 1911 - 1027 people (*Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv. Fond 2161. Opys 2. Sprava 21*). The most injured were in the rolling shops. This is due to the difficult conditions of work and the complexity of the technological process.

Cases of occupational injuries in those days were actively covered in periodicals. On the pages of newspapers you can see the main causes of injury. For example, due to defective equipment in November 1915, an employee of the foundry shop at the Russian Providence plant was injured and died. During the work on him fell iron pomp weighing 200 pounds (approximately 3276 kg) (*Mariupolskaya zhizn*, 18.11.1915).

In the yard of the expeditionary department of the Donetsk-Yurievsky factory, during the ferry transportation of iron beams, from the crankshaft of the lifting crane jumps jolted, when they hit the head of the worker of Turovsky. As a result of injury, he fell into the rails. From under the locomotive was pulled dead (*Russkaya pravda*, 01.07.1914).

Failure to comply with safety regulations at work has

been a common cause of accidents. On May 17, 1914, a 36-year-old engineer at the Petrovsky Plant was shot down by a trolley with a brick. In severe condition, he was taken to a factory hospital. (*Russkaya pravda*, 25.05.1914). On June 1, 1914, the engineer at the Bryansk Plant conducted maneuvers with the train. When he began to detach in the course of the warehouse with a slag form, he accidentally fell between the buffers and pushed him to death (*Russkaya pravda*, 04.06.1914).

In April 1915 at the plant "Russian Providens" the clutch of the cars of the blast-furnace department A. Koshalev fell to the rails, the wheels of the trolley bucket cut off his arm and leg. The workers were taken to the factory hospital for treatment. But he died the next morning (*Mariupolskaya zhizn*, 29.04.1915).

Accidents also occurred due to the carelessness of the workers. During the repair of a tin furnace at the Dneprovsky plant in the Kamensky, the employee Romashov, finished work and went to sleep in it. Another worker flooded the furnace without knowing that Romashov was sleeping there. The employee was pulled out of the furnace in 10 minutes dead (*Russkaya pravda*, 29.11.1912).

On May 24, 1914, the worker of the Mariupol Plant "Russian Providans" was swimming in the factory basin and floated to the tunnel of the blast furnace department. He was dragged by a stream of water inside the tunnel, from where he was taken dead (*Russkaya pravda*, 30.05.1914).

There were accidents at the metallurgical plants, several people were victims immediately. In January 1911, in the marten shop of the Yurievsky plant during the casting of a ladle with molten pig-iron, bolts were torn off. The ladle slipped over and the mass of iron was poured from it, which poured 8 workers. They all received severe burns, for two injuries, they were incompatible with life. They all received severe burns, for two injuries were incompatible with life (*Russkaya pravda*, 29.01.1911).

Discussion

The paper shows the causes and level of occupational injuries among workers of the metallurgical industry of Ukraine in the late XIX - early XX centuries at the background of daily life. The production processes on newly created metallurgical enterprises, working conditions of workers and their social composition are described. The peak points of accidents and occupational injuries at metallurgical enterprises have been determined and grounded. In particular: 1897-1899, 1900 and 1904 years.

Based on reports in the press of that time and reports from medical companies, the nature of occupational injuries, the level of medical care provided to the victims and measures of the Russian government that regulated this assistance and brought under it the legislative framework were determined.

Thus, a new research of topic of occupational injuries is a look at the issues from the standpoint of the daily life of workers of metallurgical industry of Ukraine during the specified period. Consideration of the issue at the local level, analysis of individual accidents in the future helps to construct a coherent picture of the daily life of Ukrainian metallurgists in the late XIX and early XX centuries.

Conclusion

Research of the topic of occupational traumatism of the workers of the metallurgical industry of Ukraine in the late XIX century - at the beginning XX century in the context of the history of daily life has a rather urgent relevance in

novadays. This is due to several reasons: firstly, the lack of a comprehensive research by this issue, and secondly, the view from the point of view of the history of daily life allows us to reconstruct the sphere of daily life of metallurgists through the prism of general historical and special historical methods of cognition, and third, the research of past practices allows attracting the attention of the society to cases of modern occupational injuries at industrial enterprises of Ukraine.

The novelty of the research is splashes of industrial injuries have been analyzed at metallurgical enterprises of Ukraine at the first time. The causes of accidents at the factories, based on materials from periodicals of that time, were clarified. The further development of the research of the peculiarities of the daily life of the workers of the metallurgical industry of Ukraine has become further developed.

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ВИРОБНИЧИЙ ТРАВМАТИЗМ У ПОВСЯКДЕННОМУ ЖИТТІ РОБІТНИКІВ МЕТАЛУРГІЙНОЇ ПРОМИСЛОВОСТІ УКРАЇНИ в останній третині XIX - на початку XX ст.

У статті розглядається проблема виробничого травматизму в повсякденному житті робітників металургійної промисловості України в останній третині XIX - на початку XX ст. У зазначений період домінувала тенденція до збільшення рівня виробничого травматизму серед українських металургів. Аналіз статистики нещасних випадків на гірничозаводських підприємствах продемонстрував три сплески виробничого травматизму: 1897-1899, 1900 і 1904 рр. Це можна пояснити, по-перше, відкриттям нових підприємств, що призвело до збільшення кількості працівників, а по-друге, прийняттям нових законодавчих актів, що регламентували повну реєстрацію всіх нещасних випадків на промислових підприємствах. Аналіз періодичних видань початку XX ст., звітів лікарів та офіційних статистичних джерел допомогли всебічно проаналізувати основні причини та види виробничих травм. Характер отриманих травм був різноманітним. Більшість з них відбулися через падіння або удари важкими предметами. Опіки та травми від несправного обладнання були одними з найпоширеніших причин травм на виробництві. Наприклад, у 1901 р. кожен 38-й працівник постраждав від падіння або удару важким предметом, кожен 114-й від опіків, а кожний 127-й - отримав травму через несправне обладнання на металургійному заводі. Складні виробничі процеси на новостворених металургійних підприємствах, виснажливі умови праці, недосвідченість, неухважність новоявлених працівників та нехтування ними правилами безпеки були основними причинами нещасних випадків на металургійних заводах України наприкінці XIX - на початку XX ст. Питання медичного обслуговування українських металургів нерозривно пов'язане з темою роботи. З метою регулювання медичної допомоги уряд у 1866 р. прийняв постанову, яка зобов'язала власників підприємств вживати заходів для своєчасної медичної допомоги. На заводах були відкриті лікарні. Це позитивно вплинуло на надання першої допомоги постраждалим та їх подальшого лікування.

Ключові слова: повсякдення; виробничий травматизм; нещасні випадки; металурги України.

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VOLYN TRAGEDY IN CINEMA AND THEATRE

Cinema is rightly considered as a powerful socio-communicative channel of information space. Its significance is strengthened in a case of appealing to the ticklish topic. An overview of works of cinema and theater art devoted to the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in the years of World War II on the West of Ukraine are proposed in article. The attention is paid not only to the plot variety of the films, but also to the philosophical, hermeneutical, psychoanalytic opportunities and the requirement of their thorough study. Thus, an accent on the individualization of the Volhynian events through the person of witnesses, people who survived it, has become specific in particular to the chronicle-documentary and popular science-fiction films. The feature of documentary films about Volyn'43 is the inability to make them more aesthetic and distant. The ability to cause emotional empathy should be considered the main task of both cinematography and theater at the present stage. Today, cinema and theatre works are the elements of national self-identification and the formation of national memory. Documentary and especially feature films can restore and reinforce old stereotypes and create new myths. The more than seventy-years-old experience is becoming an experience of contemporaries through the means of modern art. It is concluded that both documentary and featured films and theatrical performances are one of the ways of international dialogue. Intensive discussions that are prompted in Ukrainian and Polish societies by such feature films as "Volyn" by Wojciech Smarzowski are the bright demonstration of its over-significance. At the same time, it should be understood that it is important to talk about topics that are painful to the society.

Keywords: *Volyn tragedy; theatre; documentary film; feature film.*

Introduction

Nowadays it is common knowledge that there is nothing like mass culture to help people with telling their stories, nothing like mass culture to effect on national historical memory. The spreading of cinema, the extension of its influence in different levels of social consciousness, in opinion of Ukrainian researcher Sergey Marchenko, bears a remote resemble of another phenomenon that was developing synchronically, the discovery of atom bomb: "Atomic scientist were searching for fundamentally new cheap energy, cineastes - means of influencing on the spectator..." (Marchenko, 2002).

The Ukrainian-Polish conflict at the time of World War II is the topic for active researches of Ukrainian, Polish, West European and American scientists. Today the basic areas within the boundaries of national historiographies (revisionists, traditionalists, extrascientists) are defined with specific variability, head researchers of problems are well-known. So, Tadeusz A. Olszański (*Łukaszów*, 1989), Andrzej L. Sowa (*Sowa*, 1998), Ryszard Torzecki (*Torzecki*, 1993) etc. can be named here. Among Polish historians we should mark out Grzegorz Motyka, the evolution of whose sights demonstrates predomination of radical course over liberal in modern Polish historical sciences (*Motyka*, 2016). Meaningful progress of Ukrainian scientists is demonstrated in studies of Bogdan Hud (*2018*), Volodymyr Vyatrovich (*2011*), Igor Ilyushyn (*2001*), Oksana Kalishchuk (*2016*) and others. However, complex analysis of reflection of the Volhynian events in cinema and theatrical art, which is actual due to qualitative and quantitative

changes in this sphere and their effect on the society, was neglected by specialists.

The purpose of the research is an analysis of the delicate topic of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in modern cinema and theatre. The task of the article is also to determine effects of cine and theatre products on the social discourse; to characterize the image of the Volhynian events in documentary and feature films; to highlight the evolution of cineastes' tasks of from informative tasks to the work with spectator's emotions.

Methods

Complex of research methods used in the article consists of general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis, periodization, terminologization, classification), interdisciplinary methods (method of psychological analysis) and socio-historical methods. Among other, there were used comparative method, problem-chronological, system, genetic, typological method. The analysis of reflection of Volyn tragedy in cinema and theatre required the use of interdisciplinary approach which allowed to reveal multidimensionality of the problem.

Results

In the case of experience of work with the difficult past the example of the Holocaust is considered to be most notable. Shoah is generally known through the mass culture. Jews should be commended here - they made hundreds of cine products for different audience. Among

them, there are documentary films that help with investigating the facts; arthouse that allows directors to reinterpret this event again and again; mass and popular films famous actors directed by remarkable directors. In response to "The Pianist" by Roman Polanski, "Schindler's List" Steven Spielberg, "Sophie's Choice" by Alan J. Pakula our contemporary not only knows, but also feels what happened to Jews in the years of World War II. Alison Lansberg, among other things, wrote about phenomena of history identification with its presentation in cinema as "prosthetic memory" (Landsberg, 2004: 2).

There is every reason to suppose that today people try to insert the topic of Volynia'43 in the overall tendency of *genocide studies* and *Holocaust Industry*, to use of similar approaches of popularization of knowledge about happenings of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in the years of World War II in Volynia, Eastern Galicia, Chełm Land and Podlachia. In particular, there is valid position of Ivan Patryliak, who states that in modern democratic Poland the plan for construction of classic "holocaust industry", which is destined to become one of foundation stones of Polish collective memory, is implemented (Patryliak, 2014: 149). It is important that the history of long past in such forms as documentary films is given to the younger generation and just at the time when young people' consciousness and the ability of analyzing is in process of forming.

The mastership of documentary lies in ability to get the spectator interested. First documentary films dedicated to the "Volhynian events" appeared in Poland as recently as the nineties of the twentieth century. In this time films "Wołyń 1943 - Kryptonim "Pożoga", directed by Wincenty Ronicz, "Wołyń 1943 - Bliscy a dalecy", directed by Anna Górna, Lubomir Zajac, Michał Tkaczuk appear. New explosion of interest was related to the sixtieth anniversary in 2003 ("Wołyń - zapis zbrodni", scenarist Jadwiga Nowakowska; "Było sobie miasteczko", directed by Tadeusz Arciuch, Maciej Wojciechowski) and seventieth anniversary in 2013 ("Szlakiem Wołyńskich Krzyży", directed by Marek Chapla, "Ukraiński rapsod", directed by Dariusz Marek Szrednicki, "Zapomniane zbrodnie na Wołyniu", directed by Tadeusz Arciuch). Also there should be mentioned such films from Ukrainian side as "Volhynia - 1943" by Ihor Chizhov ("Inter"), "Volhynia. Sign of trouble" by Alexandr Balaban and Alexander Radinsky ("First National"), "Volyn tragedy: sight from Ukraine" by Halyna Tereshuk. Among late works there should be named documental-publicistic four-episode "Memory Syndrome" (scriptwriters - Maxim Shapka and Olena Vavilova), "Volyn Tragedy. Memory. Sorrow. Reconciliation" (author - Maria Andrushenko, Volhynian television), "Лькаве Лудо-бójство" (scriptwriter and director - Andriy Smus).

Documentary films had not always elicited unambiguous reaction of spectators. After exhibition of the work of Agnieszka Arnold ("Purification", the first part which showed Ukrainian viewpoint on Volhynian events, at first and then "Forgiveness", the second part which presented Polish position) Ethic committee of media at the instigation of "kresovyatski" surroundings accused the author of disregard of journalism norms and only the court of law put the things right.

Worthy of special mention is film by BBC journalist Wanda Koscia "My Friend the Enemy" (pol. *Mój przyjaciel wróg*), based on eye witnesses' account, that tend to show positive experience in such touchy topic not through the mutual accusations, but paying attention to examples of rescue Polish neighbors by Ukrainian people. This film provoked noticeable comments and was admitted particularly interesting film, which gives much food for reflection,

by famous English historian Norman Davies (*Mój przyjaciel wróg... URL*). At another point, writer and journalist Neal Ascherson named it the part of mosaic which has been missing: "It is not only about what Ukrainian and Polish people did to each other, but also about all horrible events of war. This film represents more incomprehensible cruelty and moral confusion than numerous films and books about the Holocaust or massacres in French Oradour-sur-Glane, or about Warsaw. Neighbors, who can go against neighbors firstly, and then risk their lives for saving strangers in Jesus Christ' name..." (*Mój przyjaciel wróg... URL*). Not coincidentally, in opinion of John-Paul Himka, paying attention to survived people demonstrates the historical memory softly, though mightily; sparks of such humanity make possible wading through that dark times (*Mój przyjaciel wróg... URL*).

In terms of consideration documentary of films dedicated to Volynia'43, the related telepublicism genre should be examined. So, special issue on this topic were prepared by leading historical "Historical truth with Vakhtang Kipiani" and "Unclassified history" (the presenter - Oleksandr Zinchenko) and socio-political ("Opposite sight", "Ideologic choice" etc.) programmes. Even more the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in the years of World War II is present at Polish television ("Niedokonczony rozmowy", "Wideozłaz z historia" etc.). This is an additional demonstration of the relevance of the topic and the role of documentary in forming public opinion.

In general, over the past quarter of the century, many documentary films dedicated to Volyn'43 were screened. They were different in their artistic value, form, way of disclosing the topic, the position of the author, target audience etc. The text that accompanies the image in a documentary film (sometimes, on the other hand, the image accompanies the text) performs informational, propagandist and aesthetic functions. It is also important to note that over the last years, the syncs with witnesses are losing their auxiliary appointment regarding to the author's text and they become the main source of emotional information and content. While the first films, as qualitative publicism and rather historical journalism, performed primarily informational and educational functions, now, when much has been written and said about Volyn'43, more important is not what is said, but how it is said. With increasing frequency we can find examples of deep artistic reflections on the traumas of the past and the challenges of modernity (another question is how strongly we agree with them).

The demonstration of the importance of documentary films for forming the memory about Volhynian events is organizing the special viewings on this topic by the Institute of National Remembrance. Thus, within the framework of the 70th anniversary during one of such viewings in Lodz, four films were offered ("Skrawek piekła w Podolu", "Zapomniane zbrodni na Wołyniu", "Było sobie miasteczko", "Wołyń wpożodze").

A special, if not an exceptional place among the artistic cinematographic works belongs to the "Volyn", the first and, so far, the only feature film dedicated to Volyn tragedy, which sparked a wide response even before the release (*Kalishchuk, 2016: 53-54*). In his interviews the director Wojciech Smarzowski declared his desire to make a film that would become a bridge, not a wall between peoples, to initiate a dialogue between Ukrainians and Poles concerning the Volhynian events. It was rather wishful thinking, because neither the text that the script had been based on ("Hate" by Stanisław Srokowski), nor the artist's intention to make a picture with the Polish perspective, that, after all, he did not hide from the very beginning, did not allow to talk about

the discovering the truth. The symbolism of "Volyn" begins from the first frames - from the motto (epigraph) "Kresovians were killed twice: the first time they were struck by an axe, and the second time they were killed through the suppression. The second death is worse than the first", which belongs to Jan Zaleski, the father of the notorious priest Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski. The film is started with the scene of the wedding which is also symbolic - in this scene we can see the marriage of Ukrainian man and Pole woman.

Many episodes are not fiction and correspond to the historical truth. So, for example, it is easy to read events in the Kisilin Church, known from the descriptions of Włodzimierz Sławomir Dębski. A quite impressive scene of breaking the negotiator with horses for historians is connected with the fate of the famous poet Zygmunt Jan Rumel, which the mention to his poem "Two homelands" refers to. The director did not spare so called "retaliation actions", which caused ambiguous reaction of representatives of Kresy environment. However, Ukrainian who was murdered by Poles just on the eve of that day had killed his own brother, who demanded him to join the massacre, and killed his own wife, who was Pole. And while in the case of actions against Poles we have straight and unopposed references to their executors (Ukrainian nationalists), the spectator here was left without such landmarks.

The perceptual problem while watching the film is that even these segmentally truth facts, gathered in one place and shown as one person saw all of these events, create a single deformed picture of what happened in the years of World War II. All subjects selected by the director served a clearly defined goal - to secure exclusive role of the "victim" for "us" and to pass all responsibility for the tragedy to "them" (read - Ukrainians), ignoring the causal relationships. The film by Wojciech Smarzowski is completely inscribed into the discourse of "Kresy", which is characterized by only an apparent dialogue, which really is a monologue with the images of the past, in which "them" play the role of background artists or even "executors". These are "our Kresy", where others live, but the main interest, the most important is our history and the very memory of it must be restored.

The problem of the film is also in the fact that it creates a general atmosphere of hatred and enlivens the "blood-suckers of the past", which both nations have just begun to dispose of. In fact, such cinema does not make the spectator think about the causes and the magnitude of the tragedy, appealing more to feelings than to the ratio. In the eyes of the average spectator, who is not aware of the historical intricacies, the film has probably strengthened the negative stereotype of Ukrainians and created an anti-Ukrainian atmosphere. After all, the main part of the film is aimed at the demonization of the Ukrainian underground; we see the images of torture, we hear pathetic texts about the murder for Ukraine, and so on. Ukrainians clearly look worse against the background of the Germans or the Soviets (despite all the repressions and sending to Siberia shown); the Soviet partisans just steal moonshine and salo, however, they admit that they "could become sheep, as well as khokhols".

One way or another, the film caused a considerable public reaction both in Poland and in Ukraine. We can mark at least two formal indicators of it. The first. In the first week after the release of the film, according to official information, it was seen by nearly 230 thousand of spectators. This is the best result among the historical films in recent years. For comparison, according to Boxoffice.pl, *Miasto 44* Jana Komasy (2014) was seen by 191,900,

Kamienienaszaniec Roberta Glińskiego (2014) - by 105,558 spectators (*Polacychcą oglądać filmyhistoryczne, 2016: URL; Shmid, 2017*). In general, we can talk about at least 1.5 million people who saw it. The second. Polish War Drama, created by Wojciech Smarzowski, received 9 of the 14 nominations for the "Orły 2017" award, the Polish "Oscar" analogue. The film is featured in all major nominations: "Best Movie", "Best Director", "Best Scenario", "Best Music", and "Audience Award". This popularity of the film (as well as the enthusiastic responses of some authors) allowed analysts to express the assumption that the film will shape the image of a Ukrainian among the present generation of Poles.

The situation with the screening of this film outside of Poland is not less interesting. In Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, Wojciech Smarzowski's film was demonstrated within the framework of the film festival "Kino Pavasaris". Here it is worth noting that due to the controversy of the film, the session was preceded by a special discussion in which on the one hand participated the head of the Ukrainian the Institute of National Remembrance Volodymyr Viatrovych, and on the other hand prof., director of the The Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Science Grzegorz Motyka. The noticeable conclusion was made by the well-known Lithuanian historian Alvydas Nikžentaitis, who argued that the film would make the Ukrainian-Polish discussions on the topic of Volyn for the next 20 years impossible (*Wiatrowycz krytykował ... URL*). In Latvia the screening of the film in the Riga cinema Splendid Palace on October 27, 2017 was initiated by private people. After interrogating in the security police, the organizers Ruslana Pankratova and Oleksandr Gaponenko sent letters addressed to Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, with information about promoting the spread of Bandera ideology by the Latvian authorities and persecuting those who speak the truth. It is symptomatic that the corresponding letters were also sent to the Polish Embassy in Latvia and the Office of the Procurator-General of Poland from the Polish partnership "Polonez" and the "Association Against Nazism" (*Tarasov, 2018*).

The events of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in the Ukrainian series by Volodymyr Lis' novel, "Century of Jacob" (directed by Bata Nedich, screenwriter Andriy Kokotyukha) look different. In the history of Ukraine through the eyes of the Volhynian peasant Jacob, who was born at the time of the Russian Empire and became old at the time of independent Ukraine, the Volyn tragedy acts as an attack on the Ukrainian village where the hero lives by the Polish group. At that tragic moment, the noble Pole (main heroine), who protects the peasants in the face of her attacking fellowmen, comes to the rescue. As a result, "... But when people found who saved them, they surrounded Zosya and Jacob, kissed Zosya's hands, and some of them knelt before her as if she was the holy ...". Human values outweighed in this film. By the way, this film was presented in 2016 as well as "Volyn" by Wojciech Smarzowski.

Equally noticeable is the information that appeared recently about the intention of starting the new film. The Polish director Konrad Lentsky (author of the film named "Wyklęty") has started preparing the work named "Łuna", which will be devoted to the Ukrainian-Polish relations of 1943-1947, and will refer to the events in Volhynia, the Polish guerrilla activity in this region in the final part - events in the Beskids of the postwar period. The artist himself defined his position as follows: "The film is a reminder of these people, because it seems to me that if,

during 20 years of so-called freedom, there was only one film created on this topic and this is, of course, very few. I think that the magnitude of the tragedy these people have faced with is so great that its implementation in one film, albeit prominent, is not enough" (*Trojan, 2018*).

On the other side, we should note the position of the well-known Polish director Jerzy Hoffman, who declared his refusal to shoot a film about Volhynian events. The refusal was motivated by the fact that every peasant war is cruel, and when people who survived from one side and the other are dead, when those who raised their children in mutual hatred die, relations between people would become normal.

The vision of the past can be promoted through cartoons successfully. The cartoon "Ludobójstwo" is not just an animation, its authors claim to be documentary, and the cartoon itself is a story about crimes against the Poles in the period after 1939 (from the Oswiecim camp to the Volyn massacre). Its creator Arkadiusz Olszewski found his audience on YouTube. The second cartoon is "Escape" by Yaroslav Konopka, produced as a classic puppet animation. As stated in the description, the film is full of stories of witnesses who "experienced their own death" in Volhynia.

The presentation of the problems of ethnic antagonisms is not something extraordinary on the stage. It is worth mentioning the performance of the Warsaw theater "At liberty" (directed by Ondrej Spižák) by the text of the play "Our Class" by Tadeusz Słobodzianek which refers to the tragic for the Poles and Jews events in the Jedwabne. Similarly, for example, the Ukrainian-Polish conflict appeared in Bydgoszcz in the "Wedding" by Stanisław Wąspyrński (directed by Marcin Liber).

For the first time the topic of Volhynian events came to the theater, when the "Ballad of Volhynia" was presented at the Independence Museum in Warsaw by Tarnowski theater Nie Teraz in 2011. Director, screenwriter and stage designer Tomasz Antoni Żak used the novel of Włodzimierz Odojewski "Zasypiewszystko, zawieje" and eyewitness accounts in his theatrical adaptation. The statement can be divided into two parts. The first is the story of tragic deaths, torments through the stories of three women, who tell about the fate of their relatives and neighbors (one of the heroines is Ukrainian); the second is a metaphorical scene after a tragedy, when women try to wash away their memories of blood and resort to self-flagellation. It is noteworthy that the director, who was born in a family of people from Volyn, formulated as his task to affect as many his fellow-citizens as possible with the death of Polish, since "Motherland is the land and graves. The people, who lose their memory, lose their lives".

The play "Aporia'43 / Decalogue: Local World War" was one of the first attempts to speak about the Volhynian events of 1943 in the theatrical parlance (*Dudko, 2012*). At the same time, it was an attempt of common reassessment of the complicated historical past and attempts to develop at least a scenic dialogue between Ukrainian and Polish artists if not a common vision of the past. In this project the Polish side was presented by the Lublin director Łukasz Wit-Michalowski (theatre "Scena Prapremier In vitro") in collaboration with the playwright Artur Pałyga. The Ukrainian side was placed in by the Kharkiv theater "Arabesque" (directed by Svitlana Oleshko). The Volyn tragedy was at the center exactly in Polish part. It starts a modern dialogue between Ukrainians and Poles, where they discuss peacefully routine things (food, women) until the subject of the conversation touches on history. Right here

appears a gulf of misunderstanding between the two sides. The diptych is based on the personal story of a woman who experienced the Volyn tragedy. Her memories kept many naturalistic details of torture of Polish inhabitants by Ukrainians. This story is intertwined with the current situation, when the Polish side wants, despite all, to count its victims. The simple and unpretentious, at first glance, history of murder and hatred is complicated by the situation when there were many mixed Ukrainian-Polish families in the Volyn villages. The story of the atrocities of Ukrainians is finished with the scene, where in the afterlife an old Pole meets a Ukrainian girl who saved her at the cost of her own life. However, small stories of humanity are not able to overcome the gap that was left in history (the symbol of it was the forest of forks and scythes that were symbols and peace work on earth, and the struggle that took place on it at the same time). The Ukrainian part became the final part of the "Arabesques" triptych - the Chernobyl disaster "Chornobyl", the Holodomor "Letters from Kharkov" and "Decalogue" - about the most traumatic events of Ukrainian history (*Dudko, 2012*).

Another play by Teatr Polski w Bydgoszcz was named "Welding". The form of the performance was simple: there was the bench for spectators made of a strict rough tree and the same ambros for actors. Such furniture could be perceived as a church, a court or a school. At the ground of the performance were accounts of eyewitnesses collected in Ukraine and Poland, presented in the form of a film reportage translated into the theatrical parlance (*Wlekiy, 2015: 6-8*). Despite the political relevance of the topic, the artists tried to remain neutral. As the authors said, their intention was to find the key to understanding the tragic past in the fragments of memories. We can see it in fragment with the analysis of the image of three dead children tied to the tree with the wire. Authors not only show that it actually belonged to the victims of the mother who killed her children in the prewar time, but also analyze the mechanism by means of which it became "evidence" in the Volyn cause (*Pastuszewski, 2015*).

Discussion

So, the description of the image of the Volhynian events in documentary and feature films, theatrical performances made by the author confirms the basic research hypothesis that they are an element of the forming the historical memory and a part of the politics of memory, the effectiveness of which is reflected in the results of sociological surveys.

Since the main task of cinematographers is to work with the spectators' emotions, it seems particularly important to show such ticklish events as the Volyn tragedy balanced and constructive, without reducing them to one-sided black and white interpretation.

Speaking about practical results of the research, they can be useful for state institutions (when forming different plans and programs) as well as for educational institutions (during the work with youth concerning difficult pages from the past).

Conclusion

Conclusions of Łukasz Jasina, that Poles want to speak about their tragedy and their version does not seem close to what Ukrainians want to speak about, so, there is no approach in popular memory of both nations, sound entirely fair (*Jasina, 2012: 716-717*). Anyway, worth reminding is a thought of David Rieff, who argued that, briefly speaking, an attempt to discover the truth is solely the thing of his-

torians. It is they who are able (sometimes, but not always) to find the truth about events that happened tens of years ago on the ground of archive materials and sources (Rieff, 2016). However, works of artists, texts of publicists, politicians and other public figures are only interpretation of historical knowledge. At the same time, the power of impact of cinema should be remembered. That, in fact, documentary and feature films, theatrical performances convey certain implicit political messages, form certain social norms, behavior patterns, and they are perceived by the spectator regardless of his or her preferences. Therefore, the functioning of such difficult topics of the past as the Volyn tragedy in cinema should meet the requirements of truthfulness, accuracy, diversity of thoughts.

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ВОЛИНСЬКА ТРАГЕДІЯ У КІНО Й ТЕАТРИ

Кіно справедливо вважають потужним соціокомунікаційним каналом інформаційного простору. Його значущість підсилена у випадку звернення до дражливих тем. У статті запропоновано огляд зразків кіно- та театрального мистецтва, присвячених українсько-польському протистоянню у роки Другої світової війни на західних землях України. Закцентовано увагу не лише на сюжетному розмаїтті стрічок, а й на філософській, герменевтичній, психоаналітичній можливостях й потребі їх ґрунтовного вивчення. Так, зокрема, хроніко-документальним та науково-популярним фільмам став властивий акцент на індивідуалізацію волинських подій через особу свідків, тих, хто її пережив. Особливістю документального кіно про Волинь'43 є неможливість зробити його більш естетичним та відстороненим. Основним завданням і кінематографу, і театру на сучасному етапі слід уважати здатність викликати емоційне співпереживання. На сьогодні кіно- та театральні твори є елементом національної самоідентифікації та формування національної пам'яті. Документальні, і особливо художні фільми можуть відновлювати та закріплювати старі стереотипи і творити нові міфи. Через засоби сучасного мистецтва досвід більш ніж семидесятирічної давнини стає досвідом сучасників. Зроблено висновок, що і документальне, і художнє кіно, і театральні вистави є одним із шляхів міжнародного діалогу. Яскравим увиразненням надважливості є бурхливі дискусії, які викликають в українському та польському суспільствах такі художні фільми, як "Волинь" Войцеха Смажовського. Водночас, слід розуміти, що важливо говорити про ті теми, які є болючими для спільноти.

Ключові слова: Волинська трагедія; театр; документальний фільм; художній фільм.

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ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION AND POPULATION DYNAMICS IN GALICIA DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19th CENTURY - THE FIRST THIRD OF THE 20th CENTURY

The study consists of two parts: the administrative-territorial division of Galicia and the general description of its population. The first part of the study provides information on the administrative subordination of Galicia during the 14th century - the first third of the 20th century. Detailed information is given on administrative-territorial division of Galicia in the days of Austria, Austria-Hungary, the West Ukrainian People's Republic, the Ukrainian People's Republic, and interwar Poland before the Second World War. The system of administration as well as territorial boundaries of voivodeships and powiats is described. The second part of the study contains quantitative and qualitative data on the total population of Galicia, its ethnic and religious groups.

Key words: *Galicia; circle; district; voivodeship; powiat; administrative-territorial division; ethnic groups; religious groups.*

Introduction

Administrative-territorial division reflects the influence of state authorities on their subordinated territories. A network of administrative units at different levels is set up due to this influence. Galicia was the largest historical region that has been a part of twelve different states throughout its existence. Thus, it is the most illustrative region of both Ukraine and Europe whose administrative division has retained numerous influences of various forms of governance having acquired its specific features. Therefore, this study is scientifically and practically relevant.

The main purpose of this research is to provide detailed information on the administrative-territorial division of Galicia as well as its multifaceted ethnic, social, religious picture of life from the 16th century to the beginning of the Second World War. A number of issues covered in the study require using a broad retrospective approach and non-standard methodological solutions.

The source base of the research is cartographic materials and statistical data showing the administrative-territorial division and population movements in Galicia during the above-mentioned period. Important statistical information is contained in census data collections. The population censuses of 1921 and 1931 were conducted by the Polish government in modern Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv,

Ternopil oblasts, partly in Volyn and Rivne oblasts of Ukraine, in Lesser Poland and Subcarpathian voivodeships of the Republic of Poland (*Drugi powszechny spis ludności z dn. 9.XII 1931 r., Zeszyt 58, 64-65, 68, 78, 88; Skorowidz miejscowości Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej..., Mułd.12, 1924*). The analysis of these data makes it possible to find out the specific features of forming ethnic, cultural, and religious self-identification of Galicia's population. A lot of statistical information is contained in annual statistical bulletins, population censuses, research papers of Polish scientists (*Krzyżanowski, and Kumaniecki, 1915; Schukz, 1878; Zamorski, 1989*).

Methods

The historical process of forming territorial structure and development patterns of settlements in Galicia during the 14th century - the first third of the 20th century has been reproduced using historical-genetic method. By means of comparative method, the peculiarities of social relations in the territorial structure of the region have been found out. Through statistical methods, the population dynamics of the region during the above-mentioned period has been shown. The use of cartographic method has made it possible to find out qualitative and quantitative features of the territory at different stages of its historical development.

Results

Administrative-territorial division. During its centuries-old history Galicia was both a sovereign state and a part of various administrative associations: the Principality of Halych (1084-1199); the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia (1199-1349); the Kingdom of Hungary (1349-1387); the Kingdom of Poland (1387-1569); the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569-1772); the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria within the Habsburg Empire (1772-1804), the Austrian Empire (1804-1867); the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918); the West Ukrainian People's Republic (1918-1919); the Ukrainian People's Republic (1919); the Republic of Poland (1919-1939).

For a short time in 1340, then in 1349, the Polish King Casimir III the Great conquered Galicia, a part of Volhynia, Przemyśl and Sanok. After the Polish-Lithuanian War, Poland gained control over Galicia, Belz and Cheim Land, Volyn fell to Lithuania. In 1370, Galicia fell under the jurisdiction of Hungarian voivodes. In 1387, after the military campaign of the Polish Queen Jadwiga, the territory was conquered by the Polish crown. Galicia was divided into Halych, Lviv, Przemyśl, Sanok, Cheim, and Belz okrugs, which were administered by royal governors (starostas). In 1434, the Polish King Władysław II Jagiełło put an end to the autonomy of Galicia and replaced local judicial and administrative authorities with Polish ones. Halych, Lviv, Przemyśl, Sanok okrugs were united into the Ruthenian Voivodeship with Lviv as its capital. Belz Voivodeship with Belz as its capital was established in Western Volhynia.

Towards the end of the 18th century, the decline of the Polish Kingdom began. It resulted in three Partitions of Poland. The First Partition was decided on June 5, 1772, when the accredited representatives of Prussia, Austria, and Russia signed the St. Petersburg Convention on partition of the border areas of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: Prussia took Pomerania, Kuyavia, and a part of Greater Poland (36 thousand km²; 580 thousand people); Austria took Lesser Poland and Galicia (Ruthenian Voivodeship, Belz Voivodeship, western parts of Volhynian Voivodeship and Podole Voivodeship (83 thousand km², 2.65 million people); Russia took the eastern territories of Belarus embracing Polotsk, Vitebsk, Mstislav, and a part of Livonia (92 thousand km², 1.3 million people). The Universal of October 16, 1772 abolished Polish government bodies and local authorities. On September 30, 1773, the Polish Sejm ratified the partition agreement.

In 1773, Galicia was divided into six circles and 59 okrugs. On July 17, 1774, the governor Andrzej Hołdys reduced the number of okrugs to 19. In September 1774, Austrian troops occupied Chernivtsi, Seret, and Suceava. In 1775, the Duchy of Bukovina with a special status was established (10.4 thousand km²; 75 thousand people).

The law of March 22, 1782 abolished the administrative division into 6 circles and 19 okrugs. The administrative reform was completed. The reform liquidated the previously division into okrugs and increased the number of circles to 18. The circles were directly administrated by the Province of Lviv (Tokarz, 1909: 31-35). In 1786, the reorganization of city governments continued, local authorities of some ethnic minorities were abolished. In August of the same year, Joseph II abolished the military administration of Bukovina and annexed its territory to Galicia.

After the Second Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, officially approved by the Sejm in Grodno in 1793, Greater Poland and a part of Mazovia fell to Prussia. Russia gained control over Ukrainian and Belarusian territories outside Galicia. The territory of Galicia remained under the jurisdiction of Austria.

On November 25, 1795, the Polish king abdicated the throne, which led to the Third Partition of Poland. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ceased to exist: Austria took Kraków, Cheim Land, Southern Podlachia, and the so-called "New Galicia", which soon became a battlefield for France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia; Lithuania, Courland, Western Belarus, and Volhynia fell to Russia; Prussia received the territories of Mazovia with Warsaw, a part of Podlachia and Samogitia.

The Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (1810 - 77,300 km²; 1912 - 78,497 km²) was established on the territory of Galicia (Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki, 1915: 2-3; Szulc, 1920: 70). The kingdom was divided into 12 districts (Berezhany, Zhovkva, Zolochiv, Kolomyia, Lviv, Przemyśl, Sambir, Stanyslavov, Stryi, Sanok, Ternopil, and Chortkiv). Lviv became the administrative and political centre of the kingdom. Bukovina with its capital in Chernivtsi remained a separate province of Galicia until 1849 (it later became a separate province of the Austrian Empire).

The Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria was the legislative body of the kingdom. Absolute power was concentrated in the hands of a governor appointed by the Austrian emperor. The Austrian government appointed members of magistrates. All power in villages belonged to possessors and mandataries.

On March 15, 1848, after the "Spring of Nations", the Austrian Emperor Ferdinand I proclaimed a constitution that de jure provided freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom to convoke parliament. Serfdom was abolished in Galicia in April 1848, in Bukovina - in August 1848. It was nearly five months earlier than in other provinces of the Austrian Empire.

New local governments with centralization of power were established at the same time. 17 crown lands were formed. Each crown land was headed by a governor. Starostas, burgomasters, and vogts were subordinate to governors. In 1853, two levels of administrative authorities were established: 16 local starostwos and 176 powiat governments. In 1866, there were two types of administration: the governmental administration and the self-governmental one, which was established according to the Statute of the Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria of August 12, 1866.

On February 28, 1867, new administrative-territorial division of Galicia was established. Circles were replaced with 74 powiat governments headed by starostas, who were directly subordinate to the Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria in Lviv. A starostwo had its own executive administration, taxation authority, technical government, mining government (embracing 32 powiats), financial administration, customs administration, school council, etc. (*Wykaz udziału Galicyi...*, 1873: 17-18).

On the eve of the First World War there were 76 powiats in Galicia. According to other sources, there were 82 powiats (Schukz, 1878).

Before the second half of November 1918, 49 powiats of Galicia with circa 4 million people and a significant part of the territory (circa 40 thousand km²) were under the administration of the West Ukrainian People's Republic (Stakhiv, 1959: 55). On January 22, 1919, the West Ukrainian People's Republic united with the Ukrainian People's Republic and was referred to as "the Western Region of the Ukrainian People's Republic". On July 18, 1919, as a result of the Ukrainian-Polish War, the province ceased to exist and was divided among Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. In December 1920, four new voivodeships were established on the territory of Galicia:

Krakyw Voivodeship (50 towns and 1,922 villages), Lviv Voivodeship (60 towns and 2,203 villages), Stanyslaviv Voivodeship (29 towns and 905 villages), and Ternopil Voivodeship (35 towns and 1,076 villages) (*Pierwszy powszechny spis ludności...*, 1927: 5).

On March 14, 1923, the Western Region of the Ukrainian People's Republic was finally liquidated by the Council of Ambassadors of the Entente Powers, and Eastern Galicia (embracing Lviv Voivodeship, Stanyslaviv Voivodeship, and Ternopil Voivodeship) was given autonomy within Poland. During the interwar period, some insignificant organizational changes occurred in the structure of the voivodeships:

- on January 1, 1923, the administrative center of Chesniv powiat was moved from Chesniv to Liubachiv, and the district was renamed to Liubachiv powiat;
- on July 1, 1925, the administrative centre of Husiatyn powiat was moved to Kopychynsi, and the district was renamed to Kopychynsi powiat;
- on April 1, 1929, Pechenizhyn powiat was liquidated, and its territory was annexed to Kolomyia powiat;
- on April 17, 1931, Turka powiat of Stanyslaviv Voivodeship became a part of Lviv Voivodeship;
- on April 1, 1932 Stryzhiv powiat was divided between

Rzeszyw and Krosno powiat; Stary Sambir powiat became a part of Sambir powiat; Bohorodchany powiat was divided between Nadvirna and Stanyslaviv powiat; Skole powiat became a part of Stryi powiat.

Population. As the boundaries of interwar Galicia were unclear, it was difficult to calculate the size of its population. Therefore, a general analysis of the demographic situation in Galicia has been made for the period after the annexation of its territory by the Austrian monarchy.

In 1776, more than 2.6 million people inhabited Galicia, after 30 years they were already more than 3.5 million, in 1843 - 4.5 million, in 1869 - nearly 5.5 million, in 1880 - nearly 6 million, 1910 - more than 8 million (Fig. 1). Between the end of the 18th century and the 1930s, the population increased by three times, and the number of inhabitants reached more than 8.5 million. There was a positive dynamic of the population growth. The only exception was the period during the First World War. From 1910 to 1921, the number of inhabitants decreased by 0.6 million (that nearly corresponds to the population size of 1900). Despite significant territorial changes, the population density of Galicia increased in parallel to its size: in 1846 - 62 people/km²; in 1870 - 70 people/km²; in 1897 - 90 people/km²; in 1911 - 103 people/km².




Figure 1. Population size and density in Galicia

The smallest natural population movement took place from 1841 to 1850 (44.9 thousand people), the largest ones (more than 1 million people) - from 1891 to 1900, from 1901 to 1910, and from 1921 to 1930 (Fig. 2). There were significant differences in migratory process. The analysis of the period from 1816 to 1931 shows that migration balance was positive only during 40 years (from 1816 to 1830; from 1851 to 1870). The largest outflow of population occurred from 1891 to 1920, in particular during and after the First World War. It was caused mainly by the first wave of Ukrainian immigration to America, and the departure of ethnic Germans, Austrians, people of other nationalities, because their countries suffered defeat in the First World War. Only during the first 20 years of the 20th century the negative migration balance was more than 1.16 million people.

Poles and Ukrainians were dominant ethnic groups on the territory of Galicia. From 1880 to 1931, their number varied between 93 and 98 percent of the total population

(Fig. 3) (*Drugi powszechny spis ludności z dn. 9.XII 1931 r., Zeszyt 58, 64-65, 68, 78, 88; Skorowidz miejscowości Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej...*, 1923-1924; Zamorski, 1989). During the above-mentioned period, the population of Poles increased from 51.5 to 59 percent; at the same time the population of Ukrainians decreased from 43 to 34 percent. Between 1880 and the beginning of the First World War, the population of Germans and Jews decreased from 5.5 to 1.1 percent. The population of Jews reached almost 6.5 percent after the end of the war. The population of other nationalities was nearly 0.1-0.2 percent. Thus, Galicia was mainly a binational state. At the beginning of the 19th century - at the end of the 20th century, Ukrainians were dominant in Eastern Galicia (between 60 and 80 percent), while Poles were dominant in West Galicia (between 70 and 80 percent) (Fig. 4). A significant number of Jews (between 10 and 20 percent) lived in Eastern Galicia (that was twice less than in West Galicia).




Figure 2. Population movements in Galicia (thousands)




Figure 3. Ethnic groups in Galicia, 1880-1931




Figure 4. Ethnic groups in Galicia at the beginning of the 20th century, %

The religious structure of Galicia was specific. In the middle of the 19th century, the number of Roman Catholics was approximately the same as the population of Greek Catholics (44.74 and 44.89 percent respectively). Before 1931, the number of Roman Catholics increased to 50.8 percent, while the number of Greek Catholics decreased to 39 percent (Fig. 5) (*Drugi powszechny spis ludności z dn. 9.XII 1931 r., Zeszyt 58, 64-65, 68, 78, 88; Skorowidz miejscowości Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej..., 1923-1924; Zamorski, 1989*). Jews were the third largest religious group. Their population remained stable and ranged between 9 and 11 percent. The number of Evangelists

decreased by 40 percent (from 0.7 to 0.4 percent), while the number of Orthodox Christians increased significantly (from 0.03 to 0.28 percent).

Before the First World War, almost all ethnic Ukrainians in Galicia (97-98 percent) were Greek-Catholic and Ukrainian-speaking (Fig. 6). During the interwar period, nearly 10 percent of Ukrainians declared Polish as their native language for the following reasons: polonization of Ukrainian people; impossibility of engaging in business, administrative and political activities for non-Polish citizens, etc.




Figure 5. Religious groups in Galicia, %




Figure 6. Ukrainian population in Galicia

Discussion

Strict subordination and systematization of administrative division acquired by Galicia during the Austrian period (1772-1918) has been proved by the authors' ana-

lysis of the demographic situation. There was a stable and essential population growth, except for the period between 1914 and 1921, the time of the First World War and the Polish-Ukrainian War. The authors have also

analyzed migratory movements in Galicia. They show that there has been a positive migration balance for almost one hundred years. This process was interrupted by the First World War that caused the wave of Ukrainian immigration to America, and the departure of ethnic Germans, Austrians and Poles to their historical homelands. The national structure of the population of the region has also been established. The analysis shows an increase in the number of Poles in comparison with other ethnic groups. Thus, certain trends in the religious situation of the region have been found out. These trends were connected with the increasing number of Greek Catholics, Catholics and Jews in Galicia.

Conclusions

During its centuries-old history Galicia was both a sovereign state and a part of various administrative associations: the Principality of Halych, the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Kingdom of Poland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburg Empire, the Austrian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the West Ukrainian People's Republic, the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Republic of Poland.

In 1773, Galicia was divided into six circles and 59 okrugs. In 1774, the number of okrugs was reduced to 19. In 1782, division into okrugs was liquidated, and the number of circles was increased to 18. The circles were directly administrated by the Province of Lviv. In 1810, the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria was established. The kingdom was divided into 12 districts and its capital was in Lviv. Bukovina remained a separate province of Galicia until 1849. 17 crown lands headed by governors were formed at the same time. Starostas, burgomasters, and vogts were subordinate to governors. In 1853, two levels of administrative authorities were established: 16 local starostvos and 176 powiat governments. In 1867, 74 powiat governments were established. The powiat governments were subordinate to the Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria in Lviv. On the eve of the First World War there were 76 powiats in Galicia. Before the second half of November 1918, 49 powiats of Galicia were under the administration of the West Ukrainian People's Republic. On January 22, 1919, the West Ukrainian People's Republic united with the Ukrainian People's Republic and was referred to as "the Western Region of the Ukrainian People's Republic". On July 18, 1919, the province was liquidated and divided among Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. In December 1920, four new voivodeships were established on the territory of Galicia: Kraków Voivodeship, Lviv Voivodeship, Stanisławów Voivodeship, and Ternopil Voivodeship. On March 14, 1923, the Western Region of the Ukrainian People's Republic was finally liquidated by the Council of Ambassadors of the Entente Powers, and Eastern Galicia (embracing Lviv Voivodeship, Stanisławów Voivodeship, and Ternopil Voivodeship) was given autonomy within Poland.

In 1776, more than 2.6 million people inhabited Galicia, in 1810, the population of the region was 3.5 million, in 1843 - 4.5 million, in 1869 - 5.5 million, in 1880 - 6 million, in 1910 - 8 million, in 1939 - 8.5 million. There was a positive dynamic of the population growth. The only exception was the period during the First World War. From 1910 to 1921, the number of inhabitants decreased by 0.6 million (that nearly corresponds to the population size of 1900).

Poles and Ukrainians were dominant ethnic groups on the territory of Galicia. From 1880 to 1931, their number varied between 93 and 98 percent of the total population. The religious structure of Galicia was specific. In the

middle of the 19th century, the number of Roman Catholics was approximately the same as the population of Greek Catholics. Before 1931, the number of Roman Catholics increased to 50.8 percent, while the number of Greek Catholics decreased to 39 percent. The population of Jews ranged between 9 and 11 percent.

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АДМІНІСТРАТИВНО-ТЕРИТОРІАЛЬНИЙ ПОДІЛ І ДИНАМІКА ЧИСЕЛЬНОСТІ НАСЕЛЕННЯ ГАЛИЧИНИ ПРОТЯГОМ ДРУГОЇ ПОЛОВИНИ ХІХ ст. - ПЕРШОЇ ТРЕТИНИ ХХ ст.

Реконструкція адміністративно-територіального устрою та етнічної, соціальної, релігійної картини життя Галичини в усій його багатогранності до початку Другої світової війни є основним завданням цього дослідження. Низка питань, що розглядаються у статті, потребують застосування широкого ретроспективного підходу до проблеми та нестандартних методологічних рішень. Джерельною базою дослідження є картографічний ма-

теріал і статистичні дані, що демонструють адміністративно-територіальний поділ і динаміку населення в Галичині. Важлива статистична інформація міститься в матеріалах переписів населення 1921 і 1931 рр., проведених польським урядом у межах сучасних Івано-Франківської, Львівської, Тернопільської, частково Волинської та Рівненської областей України, Малопольському в Підкарпатському воєводствах Республіки Польща. Багато статистичної інформації міститься в щорічних статистичних бюлетенях і наукових роботах польських вчених. Галичина впродовж своєї багатовікової історії була як суверенною державою, так і суб'єктом різних адміністративних утворень: Галицького та Галицько-Волинського князівств, Угорського та Польського королівств, Речі Посполитої, Габсбурзької та Австрійської імперій, Австро-Угорщини Західноукраїнської та Української Народних Республік, Польської Республіки. 1773 р. Галичину поділено на шість циркулів і 59 округ; 1774 р. кількість округ зменшилася до 19. 1782 р. ліквідовано інститут округ та збільшено кількість циркулів до 18, які безпосередньо підпорядковувалися Львівській губернії. 1810 р. на теренах Галичини утворено Королівство Галичини і Володимирії, яке поділялося на 12 дистриктів з адміністративно-політичним центром у м. Львові. До 1849 р. окремим округом Галичини залишалася Буковина. Тоді ж утворено 17 коронних країв на чолі з губернаторами (відтак - намісниками), яким підпорядковувалися повітові старости, бурмістри і вїйти. 1853 р. запроваджено двоступінчасту адміністративну владу: 16 окружних старостів і 176 повітових урядів. 1867 р. утворено 74 повітові уряди, що підпорядковувалися Крайовому уряду у Львові. Напередодні Першої світової війни у Галичині було 76 повітів. До другої половини листопада 1918 р. під адмініструванням Західноукраїнської Народної Республіки (ЗУНР) опинилося 49 повітів Галичини. 22 січня 1919 р. ЗУНР об'єдналася з Українською Народною Республікою, отримавши назву "Західна Область Української Народної Республіки" (ЗОУНР), що була ліквідована 18 липня 1919 р. і розділена між Польщею, Румунією і Чехословаччиною. У грудні 1920 р. в межах Галичини утворено чотири нові воєводства: Краківське, Львівське, Станіславівське і Тернопільське. 14 березня 1923 р. Рада Послів держав Антанти остаточно ліквідувало ЗОУНР, а Східній Галичині (Львівське, Станіславівське та Тернопільське воєводства) надано автономію у складі Польщі. 1776 р. у Галичині проживало понад 2,6 млн осіб, 1810 р. - 3,5, 1843 р. - 4,5, 1869 р. - 5,5, 1880 р. - 6, 1910 р. - 8, 1939 р. - 8,5 млн мешканців. Відбувалася позитивна динаміка чисельності населення, за винятком періоду Першої світової війни, коли його кількість впродовж 1910-1921 рр. зменшилася на 0,6 млн осіб і майже відповідала показнику 1900 р. Панівне місце у національному складі краю складали поляки та українці, чисельність яких упродовж 1880-1931 рр. коливалася у межах 93-98 %. Оригінальною була релігійна ситуація: якщо у середині XIX ст. чисельність римо-католиків і греко-католиків була приблизно однаковою, то до 1931 р. кількість римо-католиків зросла до 50,8 %, а греко-католиків зменшилася до 39 %. Чисельність іудеїв коливалася в межах 9-11 %.

Ключові слова: Галичина; циркул; дистрикт; воєводство; повіт; адміністративно-територіальний устрій; національний склад населення; релігійний склад населення.

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LIVIV ACHIEVEMENTS OF ARMENIAN JULIAN OKTAWIAN ZACHARIEWICZ

The path of life of Julian Oktawian Zachariewicz (17.07.1837 - 27.12.1898), talented Armenian architect, who dedicated himself to the scientific and pedagogical activities in Lviv Polytechnic National University, then Imperial-royal polytechnic school, was traced within the framework of the study of the topic "Prominent figures in culture and development of Lviv". Having founded the Galician School of Architecture, he implemented his projects in administrative and private buildings of Lviv and crown land of Galicia and Vladimiria (Lodomeria), which remain a decoration and an example of architectural mastery until now. As part of the study, the author introduces to the science newspaper publications of past years (pre-Soviet period, September 1939), dedicated to the solemn dates associated with the name of the prominent architect. The author concludes that Julian Oktawian Zachariewicz's biography can be considered as the historical source of research on the development of "neo" style architecture in the administrative, sacred and private urban buildings of Lviv of the Austro-Hungarian period (1872-1918). Despite the fact that Zachariewicz himself did not focus on his nationality, his relation to the Armenian diaspora, the Armenian ethnic group and Armenian Christianity reflected on his work and this aspect should be researched in the future.

Keywords: *Zachariewicz Julian Oktawian; Technical Academy on Lviv; Lviv High Technical School; the Tsisar-Royal Polytechnic School; Lviv Polytechnic National University.*

Introduction

National, cultural, religious (confessional) identification and assimilation of individuals in different types of states has always been a scientific problem for which scholars failed to find (establish) predicted laws. This paper gives an example of the complete (Austrian) assimilation of the outstanding architect, of Armenian descent Julian Oktawian Zachariewicz in the multifaceted multi-ethnic and multi-lingual environment of Galicia and Volodymyr (Lodomeria), the largest royal province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

As it is known, the representatives of the Armenian nation settled around the world. They found their place in Galicia as well, including in the medieval Lviv. Here they settled in a compact community - a colony, which was traditional for that time. This mode of life helped to preserve national identity. Until now, there is the Armenian street ("vulytsia Virmenska") in Lviv, in its northern part, which holds the historical heritage and the facts of staying of this ethnos on the Galician land. A sacral building - the Armenian Cathedral - is located here. This part of the municipal land belonged to the Armenian community and was called the Armenian Quarter.

The beginning of the history of the Armenian diaspora dates back to the 13th century, when, as a result of the Mongol-Tatar invasion, the Armenians lost their homeland. In 1239, the Khan Alp Aslan destroyed the capital of the Armenian state Ani, which triggered the first emigration wave of Armenians. During the 13th and 14th centuries, the princes and knights left Armenia and had to hire to serve

Galician and Galician-Volyn princes, Daniel of Galicia (Danylo Halytskyi), and his son Lev Danylovych. The Armenian merchants, who also emigrated and quickly took over the dominant position in this area, became merchant intermediaries between East and West owing to their foreign language skills.

The first apostolic Armenian churches in Lviv are associated with the names of the Most Holy Mother of God and Saint Gregory the Illuminator. Armenians were peaceful and benevolent, but quite closed, which was due to the complexity of their language and spelling, traditions, and culture. Subsequently, settled merchants turned into wealthy petty bourgeois, and some of them managed to buy estates with the land. In the 14th century, the Armenian colony in Lviv was the third in Europe, after Venice and Amsterdam. In 1364, Lviv became the center of the Armenian-Gregorian bishopric.

In the 14th century, after the loss of complete independence of Armenia and the capture of the Crimea by Turks in 1475, the second wave of emigration to the Galician lands started. The Armenian communities of Tysmenytsia, Sniatyn, Stanislaviv, Brody, Berezhany, Kut, Zholkvy and Zolochiv were much smaller than the communities in Lviv and Kamianets of Podillia. The Polish kings equalized the rights of the Armenians with the Poles, having given them the right to self-government and own court. Polish Sejm conferred nobility on some of the Armenian representatives; they gained noble status and joined the aristocratic estate with the right of their own

coat of arms. The ennobled Armenians were usually large landowners¹.

In 1630, the Armenian Archbishop Mykola Torosovych transferred to a permanent union with the Roman Catholic Church, which accelerated the Polonization and Catholicization of the Galician Armenians (*Kapral, 2003: 178-190*). In the 17th century, more than 2,000 Catholic Armenians lived in Lviv; in the next century, their number decreased by ten times, and at the beginning of the 20th century, only the Armenians with polonized surnames remained. The Lviv Archeparchy of the Armenian Catholic Church sui iuris consisted of about 3,500 believers, 20 clerics, and 15 churches. The Armenians of Lviv had their schools, libraries, hospitals, printing houses, metropolises, and theater. The Armenian historian and writer Simeon Dpir Lehatsi (Լեւիացի), pointed to charitable (philanthropic, pious, financial and moral assistance) activities in the Armenian district of Lviv.

In the second half of the 17th century, Moldavian, Romanian and Crimean Armenians came to Galicia and joined the already existing communities in Lviv, Kuty, Horodenka. After the adoption of the Union, a total assimilation process began. In 1766, Polish king Stanisław August of Poniatowski family, confirmed the rights of the Armenians. It was during his reign, when the largest ennoblement was held, up to 800 people. Armenians lost their language.

In the pre-Austrian period (1772), in Lviv, city cemeteries were located around the temples (churches, kościoły, synagogues). The Armenian Cathedral of the Assumption of Mary was not an exception. The Armenian cemetery near the cathedral still preserved the grave slabs, where the Armenian inscriptions changed to Latin, and then to Polish as time went on.

The Armenians of the medieval city of Lviv were engaged in trade, were excellent interpreters, which was the main thing for close and long-term cooperation with foreign merchants. The Armenian community had its own justice and assembly; they organized its own self-government. However, time and the surrounding urban environment prompted their assimilation: Polish, Austro-Hungarian, again Polish, Soviet, and Ukrainian.

In 1340-1349, Lviv was conquered by the Polish king Casimir III and was part of Poland until its first partition in 1772, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire acquired Galicia. Prior to this, in 1630, the Armenian Bishop Mykola Torosovych entered Catholicism, therefore the Armenian community of the 17th century spoke good Polish, had mixed marriages, changed their surnames to the Polish tradition. During this period, about 2,000 Armenians lived in Lviv.

In 1880, there were 3,872 Armenians in Galicia and Bukovyna, and in 1910, 1,392 people in Galicia and 657 in Bukovyna (*Monolaty, 2012*). The Armenian (Gregorian) diocese of Lviv in 1890 has 4,000 Armenian Catholics, served by 19 priests. Among the well-known representatives of the Armenian ethnic group were the families Passakass, Khuel, Romaszkan, and Shadbei.

The Armenians, by their Christian faith, were more close to two Slav peoples, Ukrainians and Poles, than to the Jews who were kept closed and aside. At the end of the 19th century, there were chasms between Poles and Jews, Ukrainians and Poles. Lviv became the epicenter of three

nationalisms (Ukrainian, Polish and Jewish) and two liberation movements (Ukrainian and Polish). The Armenians managed to stay away from this political and cultural struggle. The Austro-Hungarian Empire entrusted to "sew up" the polytheistic and multi-confessional environment in Galicia to the governors appointed by the emperor from the representatives of the Polish aristocrats, who were counts and princes. The representative body of the emperor of the Galician Crown Region was the Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria (currently the premises of the Ivan Franko National University), representing the interests of 8 million people, accounting for 28% of the total population of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (census of 1910). The share of Ukrainians as of 1900 was 3 million (63.5%). There were 870 thousand Poles, 613 thousand Jews, and 60 thousand Germans in the province. The Czechs, Armenians and Russians were small groups. According to religious preference, the ethnoconfessional composition of 1910 was divided into Roman Catholics - 3,731,569, Greek Catholics - 3,381,105, Jews - 871,895, Protestants - 37,698, Orthodox - 2,818, other confessions - 609 (*Hrytsak, 2006*). According to statistics, as of 1910, 104 Armenians were officially registered in Galicia. In the city of Lviv, according to the census of 1910, the Armenians were not listed at all, although according to the census of 1900, there were 231 people living in Lviv (*Kysilevskiy, 1965: 46-48*). There were 311 Catholic Armenians, and 31 Christian Armenians in Chernivtsi (Bukovyna). It was in Bukovyna that the Armenian ethnos in the middle of the 19th century owned 70-80 villages and land, which was one third of all land in the region. At the end of the 19th century, the Armenian colonies ceased to exist.

As of today, a comprehensive, systematic study of the Armenian community of Lviv metropolis steel waits for its historian. Most scholars gave attention to specific prominent representatives who made a significant contribution to the development of science, culture, and medicine. Continuing this tradition, we define the purpose of this article to be the biography of the outstanding representative of the Armenian community of Lviv, professor of architecture, the founder of the Galician school Julian-Oktawian Zachariewicz.

Theoretical basis

Biographies are an integral source of historical research. The Russian scientist I.F. Piotrovskaya in her work "Biography Studies: Introduction to Science ..." states that "biography studies are considered as a special science of the system of historical sciences. Like other historical sciences, it studies the past of humanity and has a lot of research methods in common with them. The essential difference is in the object of study. Other historical sciences study the results of people's activities and "public consciousness," and biography studies inquire directly an individual in history, in all manifestations of its existence, including its psychic world. This is the science of understanding the lives of specific people involved in all sectors of human activity. Like history, which consists primarily of historical knowledge and besides it - the theory and methodology of historical research, biography studies as a special historical science include not only the development of theoretical problems of science itself and the laws of human life, but also the actual biographical knowledge: the drawing up of biographies" (*Piotrovskaya, 2010: 12-13*).

The drawing up biography of Julian Zachariewicz was specifically undertaken by Ukrainian and Polish re-

¹ During the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the classical ennoblement (according to the decision of the Sejm) was conferred on 1,600 people.

searchers - authors of collective monographs, encyclopedic and bibliographic reference books, and newspaper publications (Yavorskyi, Blazhivskyi, 2001; Vasylenko, Voytovych, Hubenko (compiler), 2004; [Pro Yuliana Zakhariievycha], 2008; Bezv, Biryulov, Bohdanova, Didyk and other, 2008; Bobalo, Zahorodniy (ed.), 2009; Rudavskyi (ed.), 2004). Among them prof. Yu. Biryulov and his monograph "Zakharevychi" should be especially distinguished (Y. Biryulov insists on such a transliteration), in which the author focuses on the architectural achievements of father and son Alfred Zachariievicz (*Biryuliov*, 2010). Among Ukrainian researchers of educational, scientific and creative activity of prof. Julian Zachariievicz the following may be mentioned: M. Butsko (*Butsko*, 1988; *Butsko*, Kyparenko, 1994; *Butsko*, 1994), O. Zhuk (2002; 2004; 2004: 141-145; 2006; 2007: 50-53; 2008; 2008: 216-218), B. Cherkes (*Cherkes*, 1994; *Cherkes*, Zhuk, 2007; *Cherkes*, 2007), T. Klymenyuk (2000), M. Kubelik (1996), I. Lonkevych (1998), R. Lypka (2000), Yu. Petrovska (2011), Ye. Sadovska (2002), and I. Melnyk. Polish scientists Popławski Z. (1992), Zajączkowski W. (1894), German engineer-historian Khenryk Dytkhen (2015) dedicated their researches of Lviv Polytechnic University and mentioned a significant contribution of professor, head of the chair of building and architectural constructions, history of architecture, Rector of the Technical Academy in Lviv, architect Julian Zachariievicz. We found newspaper publications of the past years (pre-Soviet period, September 1939), dedicated to the special occasions associated with the name of the famous architect Julian Zachariievicz (*S.p. Zachariievicz Julian Oktawian: nekrolog*, 1899; *Odezwa: [pro vstanovlennya byusta Yu. Zakhariievycha u holovnomu korpusi Lviv. politekhniky]*, 1909; *O budowie gmachów c. k. Szkoły Politechnicznej we Lwowie*, 1877; *Uroczyste odświeżenie pomnika ś. p. [świętej pamięci] Juliana Zaharjiewicza*, 1910).

Results and discussion

Julian Zachariievicz was born on July 17, 1837 in Lviv. His father, Georgiy, came of an ancient Armenian bourgeois family. Mother was from the Grosman family. By his religion, Zachariievicz belonged to the Lutheran community, and was an Evangelical Protestant. He started his education in the real school of the Lviv Technical Academy, which was ranked the eighth after the similar academic higher education schools in Paris, Glasgow, Prague, Vienna, Karlsruhe, Dresden and Stuttgart. Having graduated from gymnasium and studied at the construction department; he received a technical engineer degree. The education process at the Lviv Technical Academy was conducted in German and completely copied the program of the Polytechnic Institute in Vienna. In 1858, Julian Zachariievicz completed his studies at the Polytechnic Institute in Vienna, where he simultaneously participated in the restoration of St. Stephen's Cathedral. In Vienna, he had an internship at the architectural bureau of Leopold Ernst. Upon his graduation from the Polytechnic Institute in Vienna, he stayed in Vienna and worked at the General Directorate of Railway Construction. From 1860 to 1865 he worked at the private railway of Karl Ludwig.

In 1865, Julian Zachariievicz lived in Chernivtsi, where he conducted the design and construction of railway station buildings. By that time, from September 1, 1866, a railway line of 267 km long was built from Lviv through the city of Khodoriv-Stanislawiv-Kolomyia to Chernivtsi. Julian Zachariievicz was a co-author of project of the station in Iași in the Moresque (Mediterranean) neo-Gothic style. At

that time, Ludwig Wierzbicki was the main designer of the railway palaces, who built in arcade style (historicism). The number of floors of the building of the railway palaces depended on the greatness of the city. Thus, the Chernivetskyi railway station in Lviv had 3-4 floors, and the railway station buildings of Stanislawiv and Chernivtsi had 2-3 floors.

In Chernivtsi, Julian Zachariievicz received the position of head of the railway transportation in the Austro-Romanian direction. Here he married Danish Anna Josefa David (1841-1874). They had three children, two sons: Viggo and Alfred, and daughter Anna. The wife died in childbirth in a private villa in Lviv at 9 Kameniariv Street, at the corner of Tekhnichna Steet near Jesuit park (now Ivan Franko Park). Zachariievicz completed his own house a year before the construction of the main building of the Lviv Polytechnic National University, in 1873.

On April 12, 1872, the governor of Galicia and Lodomeria Count Agenor Gołuchowski appealed to the Emperor of Austria-Hungary Franz Josef I to allocate funds for the construction of the Polytechnic School in Lviv. His request was met and the emperor allocated for the construction from the state treasury 1.3 million Austrian forints (gulden) which were still called zoloty rynsky in Galicia. The previous project was developed by Edmund Sticks in 1867-1868 with an attachment to the Castrum Square (now the district of Virmenska and Krakivska streets crossing). Zachariievicz began his design in 1872 near the existing Novyi Svit Street (today, it is Stepan Bandera Street) on lands belonging to Countess Maria Fredro. Already at the end of the same year, he finished the project of the main and chemistry buildings (building size 45 x 38 m) in the neo-Renaissance style. In 1873, his project was approved by the Government of Galicia and Volodymyr (Lodomeria), as well as the imperial Ministry of Education.

Count A. Gołuchowski allocated money for J. Zachariievicz's trip to Europe to study the modern European architectural practice, having allowed him a month-long vacation. Julian Oktawian visited Vienna, Zurich, and Munich, where he learned the best projects of administrative buildings.

According to the project of Julian Zachariievicz, the main building of the Lviv Polytechnic National University is rectangularly shaped; it is 113 x 68 m in size, and has two inner courtyards. The construction started on April 1, 1874. There were up to 600 craftsmen working daily, including 240 wallers, 30 masons, 40 carpenters, and 300 assistants. The stone was brought from the quarries of Terebovlia and Dempa. Gypsum was bought at the Lviv factory of Josef Franz. Plumbers and stove heating were made by Viennese specialists. On October 1, 1877, the construction of the main facade was completed (*Sadovska*, 2002). It should be noted that the year before, in 1876, the construction of the chemistry building of the Technical Academy was completed, which was also designed by Julian Zachariievicz. The Technical Academy in Lviv received the full rights of the Austrian university. On October 7, 1877, on the territory of Austria-Hungary, a demonstration of a telephone conversation between the assembly hall of the main building and room 101 of the chemistry building was held at the Technical Academy in Lviv.

In 1871, Julian Oktawian Zachariievicz was invited to become the head the Chair of Construction (Architecture) at the Technical Academy in Lviv, which from 1877 was renamed Polytechnic School. At first, he worked as professor ordinarius. He had 59 hours as a weekly load with an assistant, which evidences his enormous working

efficiency. In the same year, he received a professor degree. He served as a dean of the Construction (Architecture) Department three times (1872/73, 1876/77, 1880/81), and was elected as a rector twice in 1877-1878 and 1881-1882 academic years.

In 1875, he began to form his own group of students-architects. He introduced annual open exhibitions of diploma projects of his students (*Biryuliov, 2010*).

On November 15, 1877, during his inauguration prof. Julian Zachariewicz opened the academic year in a new building of the Polytechnic School with a speech "Art in the Service of Technology". On February 14, 1877, both buildings were solemnly blessed by the Lviv Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church Joseph Sembratovych, and the bishop of the Roman Catholic Church Grzegorz Romaszkan. The blessing was attended by marszałek of the Galician Sejm Ludwik Wodzyński and the governor of Galicia and Lodomeria Alfred Józef Potocki. These two academic places could admit up to 300 students at a time. The main building originally was white, then it was recoloured red; in 2003 the initial white color was returned to the building.

On October 8, 1877, in accordance with the Tsarist decree, the Technical Academy was renamed the Higher Technical School, which received the status of Austrian-Hungarian academic school. The board of professors changed the name to Tsar-Royal Polytechnic School at its discretion.

In the same year of 1877, prof. J. Zachariewicz married for a second time with Ludwiga Gromadzińska; they had two children: daughter Helena and son Julian-Edwin.

In 1877, at the Higher Technical School in Lviv, Department of Construction (Architecture) was established upon the initiative of prof. Julian Zachariewicz. In 1882, 28 students studied there. In 1883, Polytechnic School received full legal recognition throughout the German-speaking region (*Khenryk Dytchen, 2015*). In 1894, there were three chairs at the Construction Department. One of them, which specialized in the architectural forms, architecture aesthetics, designing and railway architecture was supervised by the professor himself. It is obvious, it was J. Zachariewicz who initiated long-term and fruitful cooperation between the academic institution and the railway administration. The second chair of architectural constructions, estimates and construction legislation was headed during 1876-1901 by Gustav Bisanz, a former assistant of Julian Zachariewicz. Prof. Bisanz was also elected twice as the rector in 1888-1889 and 1898-1899. The third chair of drawing and modeling was established in 1873; it was headed until 1899, until the day of his death, by professor ordinarius, close associate and partner Leonard Marconi, recognized master of sculptural design of administrative buildings of Lviv.

On September 13, 1880, the main building of the Technical School was visited by the Austrian-Hungarian Tsar Franz Josef I. During his visit, he attended morning prayer in the nearby Church of St. Magdalen and made a 20-minute review of the newly built premises. The Tsar donated to the Polytechnic School 11 drawings showing the technical achievements of mankind, which were subsequently performed by students of the Polish artist Jan Matejko using rough copies (draft sketches) of the latter, and an honorary title for Julian Zachariewicz himself. Considering the merits to the city and love for Lviv, the professor received a name affix to his last name Zachariewicz-Lwigród. Along with prof. Ivan Levynskyi and Alfred

Kamienobrodzki, he was the pioneer in establishing complex architectural and construction companies in Lviv.

Having served as a rector of the University in 1888, prof. Zachariewicz proposed the idea of constructing a Technical House, an "academic house" (student hostel) for students. In 1892, Lviv authorities allowed raising donations for the construction of an "academic house". Prof. Ivan Levynskyi and prof. Julian Zachariewicz presented a land lot at Kastelivka purchased at their own expense for the construction of this student hostel. The committee on the construction of the student hostel received a loan from the bank, with a pledge and a guarantee of return given by prof. J. Zachariewicz and prof. I. Levynskyi. In 1895, the student hostel was built on Issakovych street (today, it is Horbachevskyi Steet) (*Petrovska, 2011*).

In 1890, the family of Zachariewicz moved to Kastelivka, a new, yet unbuilt district of Lviv, which was quickly built up by private villas. Today, at the address 14-a Metrolohichna Street, a private villa called "Julietka" may be found, which was built by Julian Zachariewicz in 1891-1893 upon his own project.

In Lviv, prof. Zachariewicz left many of his implemented projects, including the main and chemistry buildings of the Lviv Polytechnic National University, the Galician Savings Bank (today, the Institute of Ethnography), the water tower on the Wystawa Krajowa, the Franciscan monastery complex at the address 41 Lysenko (Kurkova) Street. He was engaged in the restoration and reconstruction of architectural monuments of Lviv (temples of John the Baptist on the Staryi Rynok Square and the Church of Our Lady of the Snow). Along with these projects, the private houses should be mentioned: private villas on Nechui-Levytskyi Street, number 20 (villa "Maria") and number 23, and on Chupryny Street, No. 5, 7, 9, reconstructed monastic complex of barefoot carmelites, private villas on Metrolohichna Street, No. 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. On the corner of O. Novakivskyi and Lystopadovyi chyn Streets, there was a private house of Jan Styka, which was subsequently purchased by the Metropolitan of UGCC Andrey Sheptytsky in 1911 and transferred to the property of Ukrainian artist Oleksii Novakivskyi.

Julian Zachariewicz collected works of Ukrainian applied art (Hutsul ceramics, vytynanky).

He died in the morning of December 27, 1898 in Lviv in his villa "Julietka" in Kastelivka. He is buried at Lychakiv cemetery-museum, field number 55. He designed a tombstone on his own grave several years before his death. His family coat of arms depicted a lion with a hexagonal star in his paw and a knight with a raised sword.

In 1910, the portrait sculpture of the prof. Julian Oktavian Zachariewicz was installed in the main building. The sculptor is Julian Bełtowski (*Odezwa: [pro vstanovlennya byusta Yu. Zakhariyevycha u holovnomu korpusi Lviv. politekhniki], 1909: 13, 122*). In 1992, in honor of prof. Zachariewicz one of the streets of Lviv was named, which is located near the territory of the Lviv Polytechnic National University. In Soviet times, the name of the street was changed to Arkhitektorska. In independent Ukraine, the street in tribute to prof. Zachariewicz appeared in Kastelivka.

Conclusions

The biography of architect Julian Zachariewicz may be presented as a historical source for the study of the development of neo-style architecture in the administrative, sacred, and private urban buildings of Lviv during the

Austro-Hungarian period (1872-1918). By studying his creative, scientific, and pedagogical personality, we may not only observe the harmonious professional growth of a talented Galician student of Armenian origin in an age of the Habsburg monarchy, but we also make broader conclusions about his connection with the Armenian diaspora, the Armenian ethnic group, and Armenian Christianity. Due to the influence of polyethnic Lviv and the powerful influence of imperial ideology, Julian Zachariewicz was fully assimilated into the Austro-Hungarian society. Having been a Protestant by religious preference, he did not identify himself according to national affiliation. This aspect of personal life of prof. Julian Zachariewicz remains open for further inquiries.

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ЛЬВІВСЬКІ ЗДОБУТКИ ВІРМЕНИНА ЮЛІАНА ОКТАВІАНА ЗАХАРІЄВИЧА

У рамках дослідження теми "Видатні особистості у культурі та розбудові Львова" простежено життєвий шлях талановитого архітектора-вірменина Юліана Октавіана Захарієвича (17.07.1837 - 27.12.1898 рр.), який присвятив себе науковій та педагогічній діяльності у Львівській політехніці, тодішній Імператорсько-королівській політехнічній школі. Заснувавши Галицьку архітектурну школу, він зумів реалізувати свої проекти в адміністративних і приватних будівлях Львова та коронного краю Галичини і Володимирії (Лодомерії), що залишаються прикрасою і зразком архітектурної майстерності до цих пір. У рамках дослідження автор уводить в науковий обіг газетні публікації минулих років (дорадянський період, вересень 1939 р.), присвячені урочистим датам, пов'язаним з іменем видатного архітектора. Автор робить висновок, що біографію Юліана Захарієвича можна розглядати як історичне джерело дослідження розвитку архітектури стилю "нео" в адміністративних, сакральних, приватних міських забудовах Львова в австро-угорський період (1872-1918 рр.). Попри те, що Захарієвич сам не акцентував увагу на своїй національній приналежності, його зв'язки з вірменською діаспорою, вірменським етносом та вірменським християнством відбиваються на його творчості і цей аспект має бути досліджений у майбутньому.

Ключові слова: Захарієвич Юліан Октавіан; Технічна академія у Львові; Львівська вища технічна школа; Цісарсько-королівська політехнічна школа; Національний університет "Львівська політехніка".

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UKRAINIAN MILITARY-THEORETICAL OPINION 1920-1939: THE FIRST ATTEMPTS TO FORM A MILITARY DOCTRINE

The urgency of the article is due to the need to develop new approaches to increasing the effectiveness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the present stage of their development and designing new methods and tasks in the military policy of the state. These approaches, according to the authors, should be based on the basis of the best and most promising achievements of world military thought and take into account their own historical experience of Ukrainians. In the context of studying this experience, the authors of the article consider the theoretical contributions of some representatives of Ukrainian military emigration, whose ideas and opinions formed the basis for the design of the military doctrine of the modern Ukrainian state. The purpose of the study is to analyze the conceptual approaches to the foundations of military construction during the period of the national revolution of 1917-1921 in the writings of military historians, to clarify the place and role of Ukrainian military authors in the elaboration of the theoretical norms of the military doctrine set forth in the pages of scientific works on the issue of national construction armed forces. The article describes the state of military construction of the period of the national revolution of 1917-1921; shows the main problems of military-theoretical nature, which are presented in the writings of military historians of the interwar period; it is shown how the representatives of military emigration considered the problems connected with the future world armed conflict and the possibility of rebuilding their own army. The novelty of the study is to comprehensively study Ukrainian military-theoretical thought in the interwar period, to distinguish between conceptual differences in the views of military theorists on ways of forming a military doctrine.

Key words: *Theoretical Foundations; Military Doctrine; M. Kapustiansky.*

Introduction

One of the tasks of nation-building that must be a priority is the establishment and strengthening of national armed forces and their combat capability. An important indicator of the maturity of state is the state of its army and professed military doctrine.

Military Doctrine is defined as a system of scientifically based views on the nature and characteristics of the tasks and decisions that the state has in the military sphere, the nature and characteristics of a possible war, and the practical methods of raising a state military force. Military doctrine is developed by the political and military leadership of the state and reflects the socio-economic, political, historical, geographical, scientific and other features of the country, including the nature of its internal and external policies. It can be offensive or defensive in nature and is one of the most important, fundamental public documents (*Soldatenko, 1999*).

One of the most urgent topics that was violated in the scientific military-theoretical literature in the interwar period was the problems associated with the strategic plans for the restoration of the struggle for state independence. Due to its high intellectual potential, its scientific forces made a significant contribution to the historiography of the national

liberation struggle of the twentieth century. The great merit of Ukrainian foreign work was to work on the conceptual theoretical plan of the future armed conflict and the participation of Ukraine in it.

Among the theoreticians of the interwar period, who turned to this topic, it is necessary to isolate such ambiguous figures of Ukrainian history as S. Petliura, M. Kapustiansky. Their scientific and journalistic works determined the tendentious development of the military-theoretical thought of the twentieth century in general and in the interwar period in particular.

The independence, unification, and creation of the state of Ukraine and its armed forces were the defining purpose and meaning of life many of these people. The leaders of organizations, which began to form immediately after the forced internment of the UNR army, were deeply aware of the need to create their own armed forces. A nation may only solve its problems and make decisions to its own ends if it possesses its own independent state. Therefore, an oppressed nation's most important task is to gain and secure an independent and unified state. Accomplishing this task is only possible by the path of revolution and armed resistance, and an armed insurrection requires thorough preparation.

Analysis of studies and publications

The problem of studying the formation of Ukrainian military-theoretical thought in the interwar years was not the subject of scientific developments of domestic historians. To a certain extent, considering the problems of national military construction, the armed struggle for Ukraine's independence, researchers only indirectly touched on this issue.

On this aspect of the problem, the participants of the armed struggle paid attention. Actually in 20-30 years of the twentieth century. A lot of works appeared, which explicitly showed the design principles of the organization of military doctrine. The greatest attention is paid to this problem in the writings of senior officers of the Army of the UPR, such as V. Petriv, M. Omeljanovich-Pavlenko, M. Kapustyansky and S. Petliura (*Petriv, 2002; Omeljanovich-Pavlenko, 1935; Kapustyansky, 1938; Petliura, 1999*).

After their defeat in the struggle for independence from 1917 to 1921, many Ukrainians found themselves as having gained military experience and even expertise outside of the country, especially in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany and France on various battlefields throughout Europe. They managed, in a short time, to organize themselves and create an "in-exile" military structure, including the Ukrainian Military Historical Society (1920-1939) and to establish their own publications.

Purpose

The conceptual outlooks on historical processes, methodological maneuvers, and theoretical concepts of military leaders such as S. Petliura, M. Kapustiansky, and V. Petriv became decisive in choosing the direction of military research. Their scientific and journalistic work was characteristic of the military-theoretical thought of the twentieth century, especially of the interwar period.

Methods

The methodological basis of the study is the principles of objectivity and historicism, the complex use of sources and their critical analysis. Explaining the set tasks used descriptive, problem-chronological, combined analysis and comparative research method. As a result, the place and role of military historians in developing the conceptual principles of the stages of the theoretical formation of the military doctrine of the UNR with a clear understanding of the role of the army in public construction was determined.

Results

While in exile, one of the main Ukrainian military leaders, S. Petliura, Supreme Otaman of the UPR, became deeply aware that the temporary defeat of the Ukrainian revolution put forward a new task for the UPR Army, which was interned in Poland: to preserve aspirations for national statehood of the people and its armed forces. In the early 1920's, Petliura set himself to establish the foundations of the military doctrine of the Ukrainian People's Republic, building upon examples from Ukrainian military tradition (*Holubko, 1997: 137*).

When considering developing plans for future armed conflicts, Supreme Otaman Petliura suggested three tasks to pay attention to: firstly, identify the main levels and formation of military forces; secondly, determine the main components of military doctrine; and lastly, to determine the nature of future military conflicts.

Petliura wrote a notable article in the sphere of Ukrainian military-theoretical thought named "The Modern Ukrainian Diaspora and Its Objectives", which was published in 1923 in an internment camp of the UNR Army in

Szczypiorno, Poland. Supreme Otaman Petliura stressed that, after Ukraine's defeat in its struggle for liberation, there remained over one hundred thousand Ukrainians outside of their homeland. In Poland alone, there were thirty-five thousand, including parts of the Ukrainian army (*Riast, 1923: 232*). The important thing to consider with this wave of emigration, in his view, was that, together with the government and the army, the diaspora is "an organic and integral part of the Ukrainian people", and therefore, "must fulfill its part in the national and social activity of the Ukrainian nation" (*Riast, 1923: 235*). Petliura greatly respected the military personnel of the diaspora, officers and Cossacks "which are now under the laws and international practices of internment in special camps", and that, in his words, preserved "a great moral force against corrupting influences, and who were ready at any moment to fulfill their duties to their fatherland." Therefore, he saw as one of the most critical tasks of exile the national-patriotic education of military personnel. He said that this "is the achievement of an entire nation, of an entire state, and is its instruments and catalyst of state-building" (*Riast, 1923: 266-267*).

He also observed that an equally important part in laying the foundations of a nation's military doctrine is the role that armed forces play in state-building. The army, in his opinion, should play a leading role. Petliura believed that having a strong, disciplined army is a sign of the level of maturity and strength of any nation state. "The army," he stressed, "is the defender and protector of the state. It is the guardian of its integrity, honor, welfare, and glory. It protects the peaceful labor of the people. It enables the various creative processes of society in the production of all sorts of material and spiritual values, which, in turn, improve its well-being, bringing it to a higher level of consciousness and deepening and enriching the range of its passions, needs, and interests that are commonly called 'cultural life' (*Riast, 1923: 43*). In order to accomplish all of this, theorized Petliura, a society must make certain sacrifices, for only then can its army become the guarantor of national security.

In keeping with Supreme Otaman Petliura's observations and exhortations, a group of military experts (generals W. Kusch, M. Kapustiansky, S. Delvig P. Shandruk, and colonels V. Yevtymovych, and V. Prohoda, et al.) at Kalisz Camp in 1923 created the military history magazine, Tabor. Petliura also joined in their efforts by writing the piece "Tabor: Regular Problems of Constructing a Military in Ukrainian Military Literature", which revealed views of military history in the modern era and formulated the methodological basis of research. He pointed out that the magazine was "the beginning of the creative quest for Ukrainian military thought" in the overarching process of studying "the military struggle for statehood." However, he warned the editorial board and researchers in general that Ukrainian military thought must not limit itself only to professional military affairs. He stated that overall national interests and the interests of national-patriotic education of the Ukrainian army and of the public enjoin the diaspora to use "various measures of cultivation, and the role that military literature plays in this is extremely important. Military literature will be all the more active and effective in performing its task depending upon the variety of its content... [this type of literature] demands the special, creative attention of representatives and authors of our military research and literature and requires full coverage in scientific monographs and research papers" (*Riast, 1923: 279*). As we can see, these ideas are relevant to current research.

Considering the problem of preparing the masses to continue the struggle for the liberation of Ukraine, Petliura pointed to the difference between modern wars and local conflicts of modern times. He wrote, "Long gone are the days when war was exclusively waged by professionals who were properly trained for it. Modern warfare, as well as future warfare, is and will be a conflict between nations where there are millions of people physically involved, where standing armies are exponentially increased by mobilization, and where unity, not only in technical and military instruction, but also unity in the sense of a 'spirit of war', are a long-recognized precondition for victory" (*Riast*, 1923: 294). Therefore, the importance of the education of new generations of the nation on the historical traditions of Ukrainian people actually is growing. "Those who are morally responsible for the quality and strength of the influence of Ukrainian military thought on the citizenry should never forget the weight of this 'spirit of war' regarding the fate of the nation" (*Riast*, 1923: 294-295). As one of the most important tasks of Ukrainian military literature writers, including historians and researchers of the diaspora who study the events of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement, Petliura stressed "military virtues of nurturing the people, such as: courage, perseverance, endurance, a sense of national honor, self-respect, and self-sacrifice. All this should find its own authorities and researchers. All these themes are purposefully found within Ukrainian literature and require wider monographs, popular textbooks, essays, and published papers in magazines... It morally obliges our military writers to pay more attention in this direction" (*Riast*, 1923: 288).

In shaping the principles of military doctrine, Petliura expounded the basic, essential components which form the foundation of building the Armed Forces. He included among these: military recruitment methods; technical-logistical methods; education of a military command staff; methods for training individual soldiers to a high level of fighting ability; periodic army reserve training; and military-patriotic education in Ukraine. As both a politician and a statesman, Petliura paid much attention to the development of strategic issues linked with the geopolitical situation of Ukraine. Petliura believed that the most likely enemy of Ukraine was Russia, and, because of this, he emphasized that "a sensible assessment of the geographical position of Ukraine and a strategic defense of its borders confronts Ukrainian policy with the necessity to seek reliance on a system of political relations with countries that have interests in the Black Sea and its Basin" (*Mykhalchuk*, 1996). Petliura did not exclude the possibility of a coalition of Baltic and Black Sea region that would include Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (*Soldatenko*, 1999: 24-25). On January 15, 1921, representatives of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland signed a convention, giving rise to its creation. This was a defensive alliance against the imperial encroachments of Russia.

Strategy, in Petliura's mind, should always be associated closely with all of government policy, which, for its part, must be consistent and constant. "The art of strategy," he wrote, "has its work in human blood, the corpses of real people, and the destruction of property. Its strings and possibilities can not be endlessly tightened and tuned, in the same way that [in war] you cannot simply reset everything back to how it should be. In each predetermined and responsible issue of foreign policy of the state, it is strategy itself that is obliged to give a clear answer to this question: Does it meet the interests of the defense of the country; can the country itself sustain, through the weight of

mobilization, the difficulties arising from the political plans and combinations of states?" (*Mykhalchuk*, 1996: 282).

One other question remains about Petliura: Did he see the UNR's military doctrine as offensive or defensive? Given the fact that the strategic goal of the UNR government was to fight for the unification of Ukraine, the only way to achieve this goal, Petliura believed, was with an active offensive doctrine. He believed that "every other issue of Ukrainian politics" must be subject to this end (*Mykhalchuk*, 1996: 296). The country is obligated to care for the construction of the main communication routes and to organize national industry in subordination to military needs. It is clear that the militarization of the UPR stemmed from the fact that it would have to fight hard with countries that had ethnic Ukrainian lands.

The implementation of the UPR's military doctrine, according to Petliura, should be carried out in two stages: firstly, the freeing of pieces of Ukrainian territory from invaders; and secondly, the consolidation of those military gains into a national state in all ethnic Ukrainian lands. It followed that the Ukrainian military doctrine should have an offensive nature. Petliura believed, and not without reason, that the nucleus of the Ukrainian state was the Dniper River and its surrounding areas, where the country's economic potential has its core. The strengthening of this region, according to the Supreme Otaman, is the key to establishing Unification of the UPR. He stated that, "Once a Ukrainian state is established in the Dniper Region and around the Black Sea, then it will only be a matter of time before the ideal realization of a complete unification of Ukrainian [ethnic lands], combining them at the wellspring of the state. This is the reason why we must think first about an independent Ukrainian state, and then about the unification of Ukrainian ethnic lands" (*Mykhalchuk*, 1996: 312).

In this way, Petliura laid the foundation of the military doctrine of the UPR. Petliura saw the following as the keys to success in the fight for the establishment of an independent, united Ukrainian state: the harmonizing policies and strategies, the comprehensive training of the army, and the preparation of the Ukrainian people to join the military.

As to the creation and organization of the military, interned army experts in their scientific and theoretical works held two diametrically opposed views. Yes, part of these military theorists believed that the Ukrainian army should be formed as a regular unit in foreign military forces. According to the theorists of this doctrine, military Ukrainian leadership would form its armed forces in occupied territory, and, in the event of war or armed conflict, the Ukrainian regular army would consist of soldiers who have acquired military knowledge in the ranks of the occupying armies.

The prominent military commanders of the liberation struggle from 1917 to the 1920's became supporters of the creation of a Ukrainian military in the territory of foreign states. Before the detailed elaboration and finalization of Ukrainian military doctrine, many Ukrainian military personnel joined in. Among them M. Kapustiansky should be noted. He was one of the first, high-ranking military personnel who recognized already during the liberation struggle the importance and necessity of starting in-depth studies of landmark events in the history of Ukraine, analyzing its achievements and failures.

In the 1930s, general Kapustiansky contributed to publishing of a series of textbooks called *Military Knowledge*, and the collective works "For an Armed Ukraine" and "War and Equipment". He also wrote the substantial scientific and historical works "The Ukrainian Armed Force

and Ukrainian national revolution" and "The Spanish Civil War", and additions to "A History of Ukrainian Troops" and "The Golden Gate, A History of the Sich Riflemen".

The main focus of the military and historical studies of M. Kapustiansky was the problems faced by the Ukrainian revolution, which he wrote about in his works on the history of the armed struggle for independence of the Ukrainian people, that at the same time was the main core of reconstruction policy. His work, "The Ukrainian Army's Campaign on the Kyiv-Odessa Region in 1919" (*Kapustianskyi, 1938*), stands out with its scientific depth and conceptual thinking; it actually can be said to have opened up the historiography of the liberation struggle to Ukrainian military historians in exile.

In the preface, Kapustiansky M. writes: "The author hopes that, through his work, he again can spur on the spread and deepening, among Ukrainian society and particularly among young people, of knowledge about the heroic deeds of our army, who for a long time while disadvantaged strived for the highest ideal of the nation - its statehood. For can there be a greater source of healing and of the wellspring of faith in the future, to the end of enduring the present and of preparing for a victorious future, as our glorious Ukrainian revolutionary military history?" (*Kapustianskyi, 1921*).

General M. Kapustiansky, a man who was deeply aware of the necessity for a state to create its own armed forces in order to renew its [revolutionary] struggle, emphasized: "...the most important task for occupied nations must be achieving and securing independence and a united state. This task is only possible by the means of revolution and armed intervention, and any armed action requires thorough preparation" (*Kapustianskyi, 1938: 9-10*).

In fact, this preparation became his main focus. His work from then on concentrated on developing the concept of building up the national armed forces. In the military magazine "For an Armed Ukraine", which was published in 1938, he published a theoretical article on Ukrainian military doctrine, which presents his reflections on the question of the direction of development of the national army. In this article, the author defines what should be the foundations on which to build the Ukrainian military doctrine. In his view, military doctrine should be at the level of "...modern art, in other words, it should operate with modern military concepts", while, at the same time, it should rest upon "a) an accurate assessment of the importance and roles of the individual components of Ukrainian military potential; and b) on the latest findings, experience, and scientific methods of the last armed conflict," (*Kapustianskyi, 1938: 9-10*). General Kapustiansky believed that this issue should be considered with regard to the specific strategic and political situation of the country. He stressed that the situation should never be allowed to exist when the two most important conditions of state-building, politics and strategy, work in opposite directions. Having learned with the sad experience of the armed struggle of 1917-1921, this theorist wrote, "Unfortunately for us, during the internment of the Ukrainian state, coordination of these two factors has manifested very weakly. Moreover, all too often politics not only did not consider strategy at all, but also sacrificed strategy in different ways. We must use this sad experience of our recent past in the future," (*Kapustianskyi, 1938*). In this way, this author pointed out that, for the beginning of the renewed struggle for independence, Ukrainian military doctrine will be modern in form, though it will have its roots in the history of the national revolution.

At the same time, he gives a special place to the problem of future armed conflicts, noting that "...in future wars, armies wage war in four different theaters (land, air, sea, and underwater). Moreover, not only will huge armies do the actual fighting, but also entire nations. The Ukrainian people must fight for life and death for the achievement of great national and state ideals, because it is only by the joint efforts of the Ukrainian people they will be realized. Thus, they are they are the first and most important component of our military capabilities. It therefore should be established as one of the main foundations of Ukrainian military doctrine - we must show how to organize the regularization, the planned direction of energy, and the ranks of the Ukrainian masses," (*Kapustianskyi, 1938: 10*).

When speaking of the development of military doctrine, general Kapustiansky does not avoid the problem of organizing a regular army "... without regular military units, even if they are small at first, it will be very difficult for us to attain final victory" (*Kapustianskyi, 1938: 10*). He further stresses that, in a difficult time for the state, reconstruction of the Ukrainian armed forces will be easier in foreign-occupied territory, where, says the general, there are already millions of disciplined military and nationally-conscious Ukrainians in exile. "In this way, we are creating technical-team personnel and military-trained infantry ranks, from which the Ukrainian armed forces can be organized. The later is an important component of Ukrainian military potential" (*Kapustianskyi, 1938*).

In defining the main elements of military potential, M. Kapustiansky identifies two elements of military doctrine that also must be considered: resistance and an unbreakable spirit in battle. All of this, according to the author, will give the Ukrainian people the ability to successfully complete liberation movement (*Kapustianskyi, 1938: 10*). Thus, as pointed out by Kapustiansky, in order to develop a military doctrine well and give it real foundations, it is imperative to have comprehensive information on all aspects of the nation's military capabilities, namely: 1) a clear picture of future army personnel, including their military, technical, and tactical training; 2) the provision of the military with weaponry, military bases, and supplies; 3) the right spirit, organization, and a national-revolutionary consciousness in the masses. Besides this, Kapustiansky noted that military doctrine should be adapted to two main stages: 1) the fight for the liberation of Ukraine from her enemies; 2) the consolidation and defense of the land gained through military achievements. Military Doctrine, in his opinion, is a specific system and worldview, from which spring forth the moral and physical strength of a nation that will be required for the defense and strengthening of Ukraine's place in the world.

Discussion

Thus, it is worth noting that in the time of future armed conflicts, the theoretical issues of military doctrine in the 20-30's of the twentieth century, were the most widespread sections in the military-scientific studies of military men of the interwar period. The excellence of the analysis of their works is the emergence of a discussion around the plan to restore the war for the state of this period, theorists highlighted a block of provisions that differed in the context of general issues: the definition of the main stages of the formation of the armed forces; to find out the main components of the military doctrine and determine the nature of the future struggle.

Conclusion

1) It is substantiated that the ideas outlined in the works of the representatives of the Ukrainian military emigration, which have shown themselves as bright specialists during the period of national liberation struggles, are in some way the ideological basis of the modern military doctrine, which consists in the liberation of part of Ukrainian territory from the invaders and the consolidation of armed the achievements of national statehood on all ethnic Ukrainian lands;

2) It was shown that S. Petliura, who initiated the military doctrine of the UPR, gave such valuable ideas to the modern professional community, which, in his opinion, formed the basis of military construction, as methods of the complete set of the army, the form of logistic support of the troops, training of the command and personal composition, training of the army reserve and the basis of military patriotic upbringing of the population. In his writings, the theorist paid significant attention to the strategic issue associated with the geopolitical situation, defining the future of the most likely opponent of Ukraine-Russia;

3) M. Kapustiansky in his studios "Military knowledge", "War and technique", "Ukrainian military doctrine", giving his thoughts about the ways of building a national army and the restoration of the struggle for statehood, places a special emphasis on the role of the Ukrainian people in the future global conflict with definition of the main components of the military doctrine, which by their very nature should reflect the outline of the military policy of the state;

4) the military-theoretical works of the researchers of the interwar era are mostly permeated with the common idea of the need to intensify the Ukrainian society as a military power to the struggle for the restoration of statehood, which, in combination with strategic and tactical actions, will necessarily lead to success in the future of armed conflict.

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УКРАЇНЬСЬКА ВІЙСЬКОВО-ТЕОРЕТИЧНА ДУМКА 1920-1939: ПЕРШІ ПІДХОДИ ДО ФОРМУВАННЯ ВІЙСЬКОВОЇ ДОКТРИНИ

Актуальність статті обумовлена необхідністю розробки нових підходів до підвищення ефективності Збройних Сил України на сучасному етапі їх розвитку та проектування нових методів та завдань у військовій політиці держави. Ці підходи, на думку авторів, мають опиратися на основи найкращих та найперспективніших досягнень світової військової думки та враховувати власний історичний досвід українців. У контексті вивчення цього досвіду автори статті розглядають теоретичний доробок окремих представників української військової еміграції, ідеї та думки яких лягли в основу проектування воєнної доктрини сучасної української держави. Мета студії полягає в аналізі концептуальних підходів до основ військового будівництва періоду національної революції 1917-1921 рр. в працях військових істориків, з'ясуванні місця та ролі українських військових авторів в опрацюванні теоретичних норм воєнної доктрини, викладених на сторінках наукових праць, щодо питання національного будівництва збройних сил. У статті охарактеризовано стан військового будівництва періоду національної революції 1917-1921 рр.; показано головні проблеми воєнно-теоретичного характеру, які представлені у працях військових істориків міжвоєнного періоду; показано, як представники військової еміграції розглядали проблеми, пов'язані з майбутнім світовим збройним конфліктом і можливістю відновлення власної армії. Новизна дослідження полягає у комплексному вивченні української військово-теоретичної думки в міжвоєнний період, виокремленні концептуальних розбіжностей у поглядах військових теоретиків щодо шляхів формування воєнної доктрини.

Ключові слова: військово-теоретична думка; воєнна доктрина; С. Петлюра; М. Капустянський.

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THE VOLYN TRAGEDY IN MODERN UKRAINIAN-POLISH RELATIONS

The international Ukrainian-Polish confrontation that took place in Volhynia in 1943-1944, known as the Volyn tragedy, has been the subject of controversy between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland for several decades. Despite all the efforts of international reconciliation by both the political and intellectual elites of both countries in the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, these problems today are often at the center of social and political discourse. The purpose of the article is to retrace the evolution of socio-political discourse in Ukraine and the Republic of Poland concerning the Volyn tragedy, to analyze its consequences and impact on Ukrainian-Polish international and inter-state relations. Based on a brief historical analysis of previous events of 1918-1943, the author shows that this bloody conflict was a consequence of previous tense relations between Ukrainians and Poles. The silence surrounding the problem in Soviet times and hypertrophied interest to these events of the past in the early 1990s by both countries were stated. As a result, it led to the intensification of social and political discourse in Ukraine and the Republic of Poland, mutual claims and attempts of new counting of victims of international confrontation. The evolution of socio-political discourse and its influence on the Polish-Ukrainian relations at the level of interpersonal relations and at the level of interstate relations are shown. The novelty of the study is the analysis of the conflict between the historical memory of Ukrainians and Poles in relation to the Volyn tragedy that lays in fact that the two sides make mutual claims, considering their own side the most affected in the conflict, as well as operating with directly different figures of victims of international confrontation. This difference in interpretation of the common past, which are actualized with a certain frequency due to political manipulation of historical memory, lead to the tension in the interstate relations of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland.

Keywords: *international conflict; Ukrainians; Poles; the Volyn tragedy; World War II; confrontation; social discourse.*

Introduction

The Volyn tragedy is one of the most controversial and difficult for modern international Ukrainian-Polish understanding problems of the common history. In scientific and public discourse this term is used to denote the events that occurred not only in Volhynia, but also in Galicia, Kholmshchyna, Lemkivshchyna, Nadsyannya and Pidlyashya in 1943-1944, also known as an international Ukrainian-Polish conflict. Relatively small temporal distance of these events, the presence of living witnesses of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict, big number of victims on both sides, the tragedy of international conflict, reinforced by the events of World War II, - all these and many other factors transform the history of Volyn tragedy and related aspects into essential topic that has become a center of attention among Ukrainian and Polish societies with a certain regularity in recent decades.

At the time of the totalitarian Soviet regimes that established in Poland and Ukraine after World War II, the ruling regimes considered it preferable not to recall the international conflict that occurred between Poles and Ukrainians during World War II; this topic, along with many other controversial pages of Ukrainian-Polish history, was considered an ideological taboo. Since the beginning of the 1990s, when both Ukraine and the Republic of Poland (RP) appeared as independent states, the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Volhynia and in

Galicia had been beyond political and media discourse. On the 50th anniversary of the bloody events, the Polish political and intellectual circles were hesitant to provide an unambiguous assessment of those events, considering that not at the right time. The 60th and 70th anniversaries of the Volyn tragedy had great resonance, both at the political and social levels.

In the modern Ukrainian and Polish historiography, *the state of scientific development of the problem* is rather modest, despite the fact that the individual components of the problem were studied quite broadly. In particular, the course of international conflict in Volhynia was studied by Ukrainian historians B. Hud, O. Kalishchuk, Y. Borshchuk, M. Kucherepa¹. On the Polish side such authors as H. Mo-

¹ Hud, B. (2017). Z istoriyi etnosotsialnykh konfliktiv. Ukrayintsi y polyaky na Naddniprovyanshchyni, Volyni y u Skhidniy Halychyni v XIX - pershiy polovyni XX st. (transl. from Poland). Kharkiv: Akta, 440 p.; Kalishchuk, O.M. (2013). Ukrayinsko-polske protystoyannya na Volyni ta v Skhidniy Halychyni u roky Druhoyi svitovoyi viyny: naukovy ta suspilnyy dyskursy. Lviv, 510 p.; Borshchuk, Ya. V. (2015). Dzhereina baza doslidzhennya istoriyi volynskoyi trahediyi: deyaki osoblyvosti. *Spetsialni istorychni dystsypliny: pytannya teoryi ta metodyky*. CH. 26-27. p. 161-166; Kucherepa, M. (2013). Prychyny, khid ta naslidky ukraiyinsko-polskoho konfliktu na Volyni v roky Druhoyi svitovoyi viyny. *Krayeznavstvo*, 2013. № 3. S. 33-41.

tyka, B. Berdykhovska² should be marked. Socio-historical stereotypes in the consciousness of Ukrainians and Poles were studied by L. Khakhula, O. Dobrzhansky³; A. Kyrydon, S. Troyan, V. Vyatrovych studied politics of historical memory⁴.

Therefore, **the purpose** of the proposed article is to retrace the evolution of socio-political discourse in Ukraine and the Republic of Poland concerning the Volyn tragedy, to analyze its consequences and impact on Ukrainian-Polish international and inter-state relations.

Methods

The author of the article considered it appropriate to analyze the relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland through the prism of contemporary social and political discourse on the topic of Volyn tragedy in both societies in dynamics of the development of the problem, underlining certain features and stages of its establishment. That is why the problem-chronological approach is the basis of the conducted research, what allowed to focus gradually on detailed analysis of the most illustrative problematic issues. The research methods are based on the general principles of historicism, multifactority, scientific objectivity, comparison and analysis, systematic and formal logic, as well as provisions and principles based on the achievements of national and foreign historical science, they take into consideration conceptually important developments, theoretical conclusions and generalizations that contributed to understanding of the basic principles of the problem. The use of multidisciplinary and retrospective methods of scientific research provided comprehensive study on the problematic issues of the research topic.

Results

Polish-Ukrainian relations of the 1990s - the first decades of the 21st century can be analyzed in various aspects: political, economic, social, and cultural. The article is dedicated to the research of the narrow problem of inter-state relations, namely the contemporary Polish-Ukrainian controversy surrounding painful for both peoples events of World War II, known as the 1943-1944 international conflict in Volhynia, which for several centuries was a kind of experience frontier of Ukrainians and Poles.

² Motyka, H. (2019). Druha svitova vйна u polsko-ukrayinskykh istorychnykh dyskursakh. *Ukrayina Moderna*. № 4 (15). S. 127-136; Berdykhovska, B. (2013). *Polshcha-Ukrayina. Duzhe vazhke dorikannya. Nezalezhnyy kulturolozhnyy chasopys "YI"*. 2013. CH. 74. S. 23-25.

³ Khakhula, L. (2016). "Rizuny" chy pobratymy? Suchasni dyskursy pro Ukrayinu. Lviv: Natsionalna akademiya nauk Ukrayiny, Instytut ukrayinoznavstva im. I.Krypyakevycha, 304 p.; Dobrzhansky, O. (2018). Evolyutsiya suspilno-istorychnykh stereotypiv u svidomosti ukrayintsiv ta polyakiv na prykladi opiky nad mistysamy natsionalnoyi pamyati. *Ukrayina - Polshcha: istorychne susidstvo. Materialy mizhnarodnoyi naukovo-y konferentsiyi. 19-20 travnya 2017 r.* / ed. Yu. A. Zinko. 2017. S. 365-370.

⁴ Kyrydon, A. (2018). "Istoychna pamyat" u prostori polityky pamyati. *Transformatsiyi istorychnoyi pamyati. Istoychni ta politolohichni doslidzhennya. Naukovyy zhurnal. Spetsialnyy vypusk: dopovidi na mizhnarodnyy naukovy-praktychniy konferentsiyi "transformatsiyi istorychnoyi pamyati"*, 2018. S. 45-53; Troyan, S. (2000). *Ukrayina i Polshcha v Yevropeyskomu poli hlobalnykh transformatsiy. Stratehiya ukrayinsko-polskoho sotsialno-ekonomichnoho partnerstva: Materialy mizhnarodnoyi naukovo-praktychnoyi konferentsiyi (Lviv, 7 - 8 hrudnya 2000 r.)*. Lviv: LNU, 2000. S.132-135; Vyatrovych, V. (2011). *Druha polsko-ukrayinska vйна 1942-1947*, Kyiv: Alternatyv, 288 p.

Volyn tragedy as a bloody international conflict that occurred during wartime was the consequence of strained Ukrainian-Polish relations of previous decades. To expose the problem integrally we have to resort to a brief historical analysis of the events that preceded, actually, the international conflict itself.

It is common knowledge that before World War I, Volhynia, as the majority of the Ukrainian lands, was part of the Russian Empire. There was such political situation at the end of World War I that since 1918 year Volhynia was in the middle of the struggle between the two states: renewed independent Ukraine and the Second Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania (*Strilchuk, 2018: 149*). Actually, the struggle for the Volhynia began in 1918 with the attack of the J. Piłsudski Polish Legions supported by the Triple Entente on the young West Ukrainian People's Republic. The last, as known, lost this struggle, and its territory together with the western Volhynia and western Belarus became part of the Second Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania (*Zashkilnyak, 2002: 451-552*).

The new Polish state resorted to a variety of oppressions of Ukrainians with the aim of making the Second Commonwealth a mono-ethnic state by introducing polonization, colonization of the region. A striking example of the attempts of polonization in Volhynia is the fact that the Polish authorities confiscated the best lands from Ukrainians and delivered them to the Polish colonists, the "osadniks". Usually they were retired Polish soldiers and officers, as well as civil volunteer migrants from among the Poles who lived on the so-called "crown lands", and they received allotments on the territories of Western Ukraine (Western Volhynia, Polissia, Eastern Galicia) and Western Belarus after the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 (*Zashkilnyak, 2002: 552*). This fact alone caused a conflict between the Ukrainians and Poles, because the most fertile lands were confiscated from Ukrainians delivered to the Poles. The pacification policy implemented in the 1930s did not assisted with gaining authority to Polish authorities, to the contrary, it sharpened international hostility between the indigenous ethnic groups - Ukrainians and the state nation - Poles. The pacification policy brought mass arrests, acts of vengeance against the civilians, the closure of Ukrainian schools, Orthodox churches, the prohibition of the activity of Ukrainian civic-cultural institutions and organizations to the Ukrainian population of Volhynia and Galicia (*Strilchuk, 2013A: 10*).

The peculiarity of the World War II in Volhynia was the national liberation struggle of Ukrainians on three fronts: with the German punishers, red partisans and, third front, the Polish self-defense groups and the Armia Krajowa. Actually, in 25 years of Polish power in Volhynia, Poles from friendly to Ukrainians became the main enemy in Ukrainians' wars of national liberation, on the way of building the independent Ukrainian state. In addition, provoking inter-ethnic confrontations in Volhynia by the Germans and the Bolsheviks led to the Ukrainian-Polish conflict apogee that took place in 1943-1944 (*Strilchuk, 2018: 149-150*).

The above facts reveal that there were many causes of an international conflict in the Volyn region. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Polish Armia Krajowa (AK) were involved in the international confrontation, strengthened by the tragedy of World War II. The Ukrainians tried to return lands lost in previous years, the Poles, who were often supported by the German fascists, responded to such attempts with punitive actions. In order to protect the Ukrainian civilians from armed Polish self-defense groups, the UPA interfered with the conflict, subsequently AK did

the same. Apart from protecting the Ukrainian people from Polish retaliatory actions, the aim of the Ukrainian nationalists in Volhynia was to prevent the future claims of the Polish Government to these lands (as happened after the end of World War I) (*Strilchuk, 2018: 150*).

However, neither the hopes of the Poles for possession of the lands of Western Ukraine, nor the hopes of Ukrainian nationalists for the establishment of their own state were not realized. The Soviet regime, which returned to these areas and was established in Poland, wanted to forget about the international conflict and undertook the development of the socialist commonwealth with the enthusiasm inherent to communists. Of course, under such circumstances, such "inconvenient" history was a taboo, especially since events in Volhynia in the years of World War II were closely linked to the activities of the UPA, and the latter was considered "the most shameful page in the history of Ukraine".

The years of the Soviet totalitarian regime were accompanied by *silence surrounding the problem*. So, it is reasonable that a strong, sometimes even exaggerated desire to provide answers to many difficult questions of the historical past developed in renovated Ukraine and the RP in the early 1990s, in the national environment both Ukrainians and Poles. One of the most acute problems of international reconciliation were the events associated with World War II: the Volyn tragedy and the "Vistula Operation", which was carried out in 1947 by the Polish communist regime. Relatively small time separation, as well as the presence of living participants and witnesses of international conflict, long silence and traumatic historical memory - all of that caused the activation of social and political discourse in Ukraine and the Republic of Poland, mutual accusations and claims, attempts of new counting of victims of international confrontation.

From the beginning of 1990s, there were attempts to sharp the rough edges of the historical past at high leadership levels of government of both countries, however, in both societies the memory of these events was rather painful. For example, on August 3, 1990, the Senate of the Republic of Poland issued a Decree condemning "Operation Vistula" of 1947. The document stated that the communist authorities were responsible for the massive resettlement of Ukrainians. In fact, the Senate admitted the partial responsibility of the Polish party for the action organized by the regime of B. Bierut with this decision. Despite the stated in the Decree idea that: "in view of the presence of the Ukrainian people in Poland, mutual learning, understanding and the connection between Poles and Ukrainians are particularly important", in the eyes of many Ukrainians, the "Operation Vistula" was legitimized as one of the historical faults of Poland towards Ukraine (*Nowak, 2007: 377*), confirming the stereotype of the repressive policy of the post-war Poland towards Ukrainians. However, for the Polish historical memory, "Operation Vistula" remained an "appropriate answer to the UPA's crimes during the war or after it" (*Prokop, 1997: 99*).

Vivid examples of attempts to smooth international contraries at the level of the highest authorities of both countries are the joint statement of the Presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland "To Understanding and Unity" of May 21, 1997 (*Do porozumienia, 1997*); the unveiling of a memorial to the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation in the village Pavlivka in Volhynia in 2003 by the President of Ukraine, L. Kuchma, and the President of Republic of Poland, A. Kwaśniewski; the unveiling of a memorial to killed Ukrainians by V. Yushchenko and L. Kaczyński on May 13, 2016. In Pawłokoma (RP) (*Strilchuk,*

2018: 179). On February 28, 2009, Presidents of Ukraine and Poland, V. Yushchenko and L. Kaczyński, attended the commemoration of the victims of the international confrontation during World War II in Huta Pieniacka (Ukraine).

Along with the course for international reconciliation, which was supported by the ruling political elites of Ukraine and Poland in the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, scientists from both countries also worked actively. In particular, the best representatives of historical science took up a responsible, rather difficult and extremely important mission to agree the interpretation of common history, thus establishing good-neighborly relations and promoting international understanding and reconciliation.

The Ukrainian-Polish Historical Commission headed by Academician J. Isajewycz was established by the decision of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine of August 26, 1993. On October 29 of that year in Lublin, an organizational meeting of the joint commission of historians "Ukraine - Poland" was held. The Ukrainian part of the commission was headed by J. Isajewycz, the Polish part was headed by A. Podraza, professor of the Jagiellonian University (*Strilchuk, 2013B: 349*). During 1996-2002, ten seminars, where the experts of both sides discussed all the components of the Polish-Ukrainian relations of inter-war decades, the years of World War II and the first post-war years, were held. The seminars resulted in the publication of materials of reports and transcripts of discussions, disputes, protocols of agreements and disagreements, as well as chronology of events in Volhynia and Galicia in 1939-1945 published in Polish and Ukrainian languages. The published materials filled gaps in the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations during World War II and became valuable for the preparation of historians, political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, experts in international relations. In addition, the seminars promoted the formation of a group of young Ukrainian and Polish historians interested in the study of Polish-Ukrainian relations of the twentieth century (*Kolesnyk, 2001: 6-7*).

Actually, the course of seminars and published materials themselves showed the difficulty of reaching a common view on controversial issues in doing it on the basis of politicized positions. Each of the parties wants to see the events of the Ukrainian-Polish international of wartime from the position of their own national interests, and attempts to look at them from the common human position almost always met with the accusations of betrayal of "national interests". Despite significant differences in the approaches of historians of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland to many issues of the Polish-Ukrainian relations of the mentioned period, seminars demonstrated that such meetings have the right to exist and aim at smoothing out the cornerstones of contradictions.

In fact, summing up the period of the twenty years of Ukrainian independence, it can be stated with certainty that both nations, the Ukrainians and the Poles, made a huge progress on the way of overcoming the negative historical heritage. However, as further events demonstrated, all the hopes of the Ukrainian side for the decisive point in the issues of international reconciliation about the events in Volhynia in years of World War II proved to be premature.

The statement of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland made in June of 2013 in the eve of the 70th anniversary of the tragic events in Volhynia in 1943 was the first disturbing message for Ukrainian society. It also caused a violent public discourse in Poland, placing on the agenda the question of rethinking the attitude towards Ukraine and Ukrainians (*Strilchuk, 2018: 179*). The discussions that accompanied the 70th anniversary of events in Volhynia

had essential differences from the previous waves of debates. There was enough conciliation rhetoric from politicians, intellectuals, civic organizations, churches. When the anti-Ukrainian apogee of July, motivated by the 70th anniversary of the massacre in Volhynia, was signaled in the spring of 2013, it might have seemed like it would only cover the parliamentary platform and the media. However, it happened differently.

Unlike the 50th and 60th anniversaries of the Volyn events, the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue in 2013 effected not only on the political climate of the Ukrainian-Polish interstate relations, where the talk of the need for mutual concessions for political reconciliation was in sharp contrast with the unwillingness to compromise, but also on public statements of motivated intellectuals who just added fuel to the fire of discord.

The worst predictions made in the spring of 2013 were confirmed in June. In the upper chamber of the Polish Parliament, the Senate, the relevant decree restored heated discussions on the proper commemoration of the Polish victims of the international conflict in Volhynia in the years of World War II. In the decision taken by the majority, Volyn events were called "ethnic cleansing with signs of genocide" (*Uchwała, 2013A: 582*). The Senate emphasized the unfair national policy of the Second Polish Commonwealth and called J. Kuroń and L. Kaczyński the primary figures of the case of the Polish-Ukrainian consolidation (*Khakhula, 2016: 240*).

In the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, where five draft decisions were submitted to the consideration of the ambassadors, there were heated verbal battles. Finally, on July 12, 2013, the majority of votes adopted the agreed text of the decree, the main thesis of which was that "... the Volyn crime was of ethnic cleansing with signs of genocide ...", declaring the number of the Polish victims of the conflict in 100,000 people (*Uchwała, 2013B: 606*).

In the years that followed the situation escalated even more. In author's opinion, reviving of the controversy surrounding the events of World War II in Volyn was a direct consequence of the implementation of national politics, in particular the policy of memory, which was implemented by the ruling political force, fulfilling its electoral promises (*Myelykyestsev, URL*). In this case, it is about the PiS ("Law and Justice"), right-wing party, with the advent of which to power in the Republic of Poland, the political and social discourse between Ukraine and Poland concerning the Volyn tragedy was significantly aggravated, reviving the old controversy that appeared in the 21st century with new faces.

The "Law and Justice" is, in fact, the largest party of the right direction in Poland, which is on the Polish political stage since the end of May 2001. In its history, the PiS formed the Polish government twice (2005 and 2006), it also was in the opposition three times - in 2001, 2007 and 2011. In the last convening of the Sejm, the "Law and Justice" party was the largest opposition force. J. Kaczyński (Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland in 2006-2007) remains the leader of this force for many years. This party won in the presidential race twice. L. Kaczyński (twin of J. Kaczyński) occupied the highest position in the state from 2005 to death in the Smolensk plane crash in April 2010. His brother J. Kaczyński was a presidential candidate in 2010 election, but in the second round he lost to B. Komorowski. However, in May of 2015, the candidate from the PiS, A. Duda won the presidential race. These were the first elections in the Republic of Poland since 2005 where "Law and Justice" celebrated a victory (*Partiya Pravo*

i spravedlyvist... URL). Today, the PiS combines elements of social and national conservatism, as well as solidarity.

With the advent of the PiS to power in the Republic of Poland the revision of history, the return to the previously tested attempts to influence on the transformation of the historical memory of Polish society appears on the agenda with all the urgency. It is demonstrated by the return to the discussions around the Volyn tragedy, the recount of the number of victims of the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in the years of World War II, manipulation and overestimation of the figures of the Polish victims of the conflict.

The above facts demonstrate that contemporary Ukrainian-Polish contradictions are the result of the same old problems, however, with new faces. The author sees this "new face" in the manifestation of hypertrophied and distorted nationalism, which the modern political elite of Poland has taken for a conceptual doctrine in making the state policy of national memory.

After coming of the PiS to power, political and social discourse around the Volyn tragedy is gaining gradually higher degree not only in Poland but also in Ukraine. The story has received a continuance in 2016, when the Ukrainian leadership expressed its readiness to apologize for the old historical unfairness to the Polish side, what caused the response in the Ukrainian society. On July 22, 2016, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland voted for the resolution "On establishing the 11th of July the Day of Remembrance of Poles, Victims of Genocide committed by OUN-UPA". The resolution of the Polish Sejm, in fact, destroyed all undermined all previous achievements of the Ukrainian and Polish political institutions in the process of international reconciliation, bringing old socio-historical stereotypes to the public court.

In fact, that date, the July 22, 2016, became a new turning point in the Polish-Ukrainian international relations: the mutual accusations supported and warmed up by the current Polish authorities quickly turned to so-called "war on the graves", the beating of Ukrainian students and migrant workers in Poland, the shelling of the Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Lutsk on March 29, 2017. The film "Volyn" by W. Smarzewski that was released in October 2016 even more fed the fires of interethnic hostility (*Strilchuk, 2018: 180-181*).

The film "Volyn" claim leadership in the nomination "a film that negatively influenced on international relations" with its scandalousness, distortion of historical facts and gratuitously cruel scenes. However, this film broke all sale records of the Republic of Poland over the last ten years (*Polskyy film ...URL*), and therefore, it was seen by a large part of Polish society. Although in Ukraine the film "Volyn" by Wojtek Smarzewski was immediately prohibited after its release on wide screens, the public resonance associated with it influenced on the attitude of Ukrainian society to the Polish neighbors negatively. In addition, sociological researches conducted in the Republic of Poland showed that after a few months of distribution of the film, the number of Poles who changed their attitude toward Ukrainians from positive or neutral to negative increased sharply.

To confirm the last point, let us compare the results of sociological surveys conducted by the Polish institutions: the Center of public opinion polls (Centrum badan opinii społecznej) and the Center of the Study of Public Opinion (Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej) (*Wołyń 1943-2003...URL; Rocznica zbrodni na Wołyni...URL; Wołyń 1943. Komunikat...URL*). So, among the Poles as at 2003 the percentage of those who did not know about the events of the international confrontation in Volhynia during World War II was 49% of respondents, and in 2013 - those were

already 31%. In 2003, 14% of the respondents were well aware of the problem, and in 2013, respectively, 28%. After watching the film "Volyn", the number of Polish spectators who apprehended this film with enthusiasm reached 43%, and another 21% were those who gave exemplary remarks to this film (*Rocznica zbrodni na Wołyniu...URL*).

Two consecutive and rather loud emphases (the decision of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of July 22, 2016 and the release of the film "Volyn") on Volyn events of World War II made by the Polish side showed attempts to manipulate historical memory and socio-historical stereotypes for political purposes. The events of 2016, related to the Ukrainian-Polish international confrontation in the years of World War II, made clear whether they have become an essential part of the Polish historical consciousness. Actually, once again these events revealed the differences in their perception in Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. For Polish society, the topic of Volhynia is alive, it constantly causes emotions, and, for the Ukrainian society, this topic appears as marginal episode that is much less important than a confrontation with Russia and the USSR (*Babakova, 2016*).

Meanwhile, with the approaching of half-anniversary of the Volyn events, on January 22, 2018, Polish members of parliament supported a bill prohibiting the propaganda of "Bandera ideology". On the night of February 1, the Institute of National Remembrance adopted an appropriate law, which was supported by the Senate of the Republic of Poland. The President of Poland, A. Duda, signed the law, what resulted in disappointment of several countries of the world. It is also known that later A. Duda appealed to the Constitutional Court with a request to check the articles of the law for their compliance with the national legislation.

The Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland admitted changes to the law about the Institute of National Remembrance on the provisions of the "Ukrainian nationalists" as contradicting the constitution of the Republic of Poland. In fact, the judges supported the position of the President of the Republic of Poland, A. Duda, who said that the terms "Ukrainian nationalists" and "Eastern Lesser Poland" were inaccurate and violated the fundamental law, so he appeals these provisions in February 2018. However, the Sejm and the Attorney General of the Republic of Poland took the direct opposite stand (*U Polshchi vyznaly...URL*).

Actually, the 75th anniversary of the international Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volyn in years of World War II, contrary to expectations, passed calmly, without targeting the fact that the Presidents of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the President of Poland, A. Duda, did not meet each other, personally participating in ceremony of the commemoration of the victims of the Volyn tragedy.

It is known that on the eve of the mournful ceremonies, the Ukrainian side proposed simultaneously to commemorate the victims of the Volyn tragedy jointly by the two Presidents in the Volyn region, and then visit the Polish village Sahryń, where it was planned to open the memorial to the Ukrainian victims of the Volyn tragedy. The Polish side refused to participate in joint action (*Poroshenko i Duda ne zmohly...URL*). Therefore, the President of Poland A. Duda arrived in Lutsk on July 8, 2018 to attend the events dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy, he visited the Holy Mass in the Saint Peter and Paul Cathedral in Lutsk. Ukrainian President P. Poroshenko was in the village Sahryń (RP) at that time. There he opened the Memorial to Ukrainians killed by the Polish "farmers' battalions" and the units of the Home Army in March 1944 (*75 richnytsya Volynskoyi trahediyi...URL*).

On the 75th anniversary of the day of commemoration of the victims of the international conflict, the presidents once again illustrated the positions of their states and peoples in their addresses. In particular, speaking in Lutsk on 8th of July, 2018, A. Duda described the international confrontation as "ethnic cleansing" (*Pro shcho hovoryly Poroshenko...URL*). At the same time, the president of the Republic of Poland urged to build relations with Ukraine on historical truth and not think about revenge.

Unveiling the Monument in memory of the Ukrainian victims of AK in Sahryń Ukrainian President underlined that Ukraine was counting on amending the Poland's law about its Institute of National Remembrance and revising the attitude to Ukrainians. He described the events of Volyn tragedy as "the most painful trauma" and "fratricidal conflict". P. Poroshenko emphasized that the 1943-1944 conflict required a thorough historical study undertaken by a joint group of Polish and Ukrainian scientists (*75 richnytsya Volynskoyi trahediyi...URL*).

The Ukrainian President noted that the Ukrainian and Polish peoples are united by the experience of the struggle for their freedom against the Russian invaders, so Warsaw and Kyiv have to take all possible measures to prevent conflicts between peoples. P. Poroshenko declared that any speculation on this topic by the political forces would be inadmissible, probably hinting at the ruling party of Poland "Law and Justice", which initiated the recognition of the Volyn tragedy as genocide against the Polish people in 2016.

Discussion

Considering modern Ukrainian-Polish relations through the prism of socio-political discourse, the author emphasized Ukrainian-Polish relations from the aspect that was unexplored before - the conflict of historical memory of Ukrainians and Poles concerning the Volyn tragedy. *The scientific novelty* of the conducted research lies in this approach. The evolution of social and political discourse is shown. It is proved that the latter has direct impact on international Polish-Ukrainian relations and leads to not only the increased tensions in interpersonal relations of neighboring states, but also the tensions in interstate relations, that in general has a very negative effect on the Ukrainian-Polish partnership.

The modern conflict of historical memory between Ukrainians and Poles lies in the fact that both sides bring mutual claims, considering their own side most affected by the conflict together with giving entirely different figures concerning the number of victims of the international confrontation. This difference in interpretation of the common past, which are actualized with a certain frequency due to political manipulation of historical memory, lead to the tension in the interstate relations of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland.

Concerning *the practical use of the results of the research*, the analysis of the problems in the modern Ukrainian-Polish discourse on the Volyn tragedy and the identification of the moments which are the most difficult to come to an agreement can be used by the existing government institutions, responsible for the policy of historical memory forming, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in the vector of foreign policy formation.

Conclusion

The genesis of Ukrainian-Polish controversy is deeply rooted, however, only moving forward and not recalling the past and mutual reproaches could influence on the normalization of relations and the building good-neighborly

relations. International reconciliation will benefit all: average citizens and politicians. The reviving of negative national stereotypes about neighbors, and furthermore an attempt to implement political speculations through them is a road to nowhere. Apart from this, it is necessary to understand clearly that overcoming the negative historical legacy in national consciousness is possible only with bilateral interaction and coherent policy of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland, as it was, for example, at the time of the presidency of A. Kwaśniewski. Taking into account the previous positive experience and significant groundwork, there are optimistic preconditions for looking to the future with hope, and we would like to believe that the present posture of affairs would become rather negative lesson than the norms of bilateral relations.

The conducted research shows that the topic of Ukrainian-Polish understanding on issues of the causes, course and number of victims of the Volyn tragedy became the subject of political manipulation. Old controversies about a common history with new faces of disputing politicians have shown once again that recalling past injustice is a road to nowhere.

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ВОЛИНЬСЬКА ТРАГЕДІЯ В СИСТЕМІ СУЧАСНИХ УКРАЇНСЬКО-ПОЛЬСЬКИХ ВІДНОСИН

Міжнаціональне українсько-польське протистояння, що мало місце на Волині у 1943 - 1944 роках, відоме як Волинська трагедія, уже не одне десятиліття є предметом суперечок України та Республіки Польща. Не дивлячись на усі зусилля міжнаціонального примирення, зроблені політичними та інтелектуальними елітами обох країн у 90-х роках ХХ - на початку ХХІ століття, ці проблеми сьогодні доволі часто постають у центрі суспільного та політичного дискурсу. Метою статті є простеження еволюції суспільно-політичного дискурсу в Україні та Польщі щодо Волинської трагедії, аналіз його наслідків і впливу на українсько-польські міжнаціональні і міждержавні відносини. На підставі короткого історичного аналізу попередніх подій 1918-1943 рр. автор показує, що цей кривавий конфлікт став наслідком попередніх напружених відносин між українцями і поляками. Констатовано замовчування проблеми в радянські часи та гіпертрофований інтерес до цих подій минулого на початку 90-х років ХХ століття з боку обох країн. У підсумку це спричинило активізацію суспільного і політичного дискурсу в Україні та Республіці Польща, взаємні претензії та спроби нових перерахунків жертв міжнаціонального протистояння. Показано еволюцію суспільно-політичного дискурсу та його вплив на польсько-українські взаємини на рівні міжлюдських стосунків і на рівні міждержавних відносин. Новизною дослідження є аналіз конфлікту історичної пам'яті українців та поляків щодо Волинської трагедії, який яполягає у тому, що обидві сторони виставляють взаємні претензії, вважаючи саме свою сторону найбільш постраждалою у конфлікті, а також наводять діаметрально різні цифри жертв міжнаціонального протистояння. Ці різночитання спільної минушини, що в силу політичних маніпуляцій історичною пам'яттю актуалізуються з певною періодичністю, ведуть до напруження у міждержавних відносинах України та РП.

Ключові слова: міжнаціональний конфлікт; українці; поляки; Волинська трагедія; Друга світова війна; протистояння; суспільний дискурс.

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THE GADA SYSTEM AND THE OROMO'S (ETHIOPIA) CULTURE OF PEACE

The purpose of this study is to add to recent calls to develop indigenous knowledge of peace system and culture development to promote culture of peace in Africa. It assesses the indigenous Gadaa system peace concept and culture, identify its peace related values, philosophies, traditions, institutions, etc for nurturing and sustaining peace in the Oromo society, with the neighbouring ethnic group, and its relevance to creating peace culture in Africa and beyond. It relates Gadaa peace system with the UN peace system initiative and framework in demonstrating the relevance of Gadaa peace system to peace building in multiethnic conflicts transformation in the Horn of Africa and beyond. Oromo people were traditionally a culturally homogeneous society with genealogical ties. They governed themselves in accordance with Gadaa (literally "era"), an outstanding democratic socio-political system long before the 16th century, when major three party wars commenced between them and the Christian kingdom to their north and Islamic sultanates to their east and south. The Gadaa system elected males from five Oromo miseensa (groups), for a period of eight years, for various judicial, political, ritual and religious roles. Retirement was compulsory after the eight-year term, and each major clan followed the same Gadaa system. Women and people belonging to the lower Oromo castes were excluded. A male born in the upper Oromo society went through five stages of eight years, where his life established his role and status for consideration to a Gadaa office. Under Gadaa, every eight years, the Oromo would choose by consensus an Abbaa Bokkuu responsible for justice, peace, judicial and ritual processes, an Abbaa Duulaa responsible as the war leader, an Abbaa Sa'aa responsible as the leader for cows, and other positions. Gada concept of peace, truth, values, principles, and conflict resolution techniques need to be restored and promoted. It should be documented and made part of education system. The academics should do research and disseminate these values. The regional state government and civic societies should develop a peace education program based on these values and traditions so that they should be restored quickly and sustained among Oromo community in all corners of east Africa where Oromo community lives. The concepts of gender equality and participation in sustainable development of the society needs to introduced into the Oromo culture and Gada system.

Key words: *Peace; peace system; culture; values; Gada; Oromo; Indigenous; Africa; Ethiopia.*

Introduction

Culture of peace is an ideal state of wellbeing that every society and nation aims for. Peace is critical for an individual, family, society, country, region and the world. More specifically in Africa peace is not simply about absence of war or violence it is about sustainable development (Ahlin, 2013). Furthermore, the concept of peace culture as a tradition, and way of life is not of western origin (de Rivera, 2009). Africa has institutions and cultural practices that have restored and sustained peace among African communities (Ahlin, 2013; Charles, 2013; Mohammed, Habtamu and Ahmed, 2017). For instance, the Oromo people of east Africa has been living and practicing a peace culture based on its Gada system values, way of life reinforced through its institution (Mohammed, Habtamu and Ahmed, 2017; Tessema, 2016; Debela, 2017).

Nevertheless, the culture of peace concept as it is popularized know is an initiative of UN to build a culture of

peace based on values of equality, fraternity, and liberty (UN, 2012; de Rivera, 2009). It is an initiative conceived as an antithesis to curb war and their devastating consequences. As a proposal to build peace culture this initiative was praised as an attractive proposal (Fernández-Dols, Hurtado-de-Mendoza, and Jiménez-de-Lucas, 2004; de Rivera, 2009) and was promoted through UN system as a program. However, in spite of its popularity; it is not without criticism. Among others it is criticised as an attempt to promote western culture, an attempt to impose western parliamentary democracy values on non-western culture that may have contrary values (Fernández-Dols, Hurtado-de-Mendoza, and Jiménez-de-Lucas, 2004).

Therefore, there is a repeated call for building lasting peace from within by nurturing indigenous social and cultural practices. These African cultural practices should be kept alive, nurtured, encouraged, and spread in Africa and even beyond (Ahlin, 2013; Charles, 2013; Mohammed, Habtamu and Ahmed, 2017).

The purpose of this study is to add to recent calls to develop indigenous knowledge of peace system and culture development to promote culture of peace in Africa. It assesses the indigenous Gada system peace concept and culture, identify its peace related values, philosophies, traditions, institutions, etc for nurturing and sustaining peace in the Oromo society, with the neighbouring ethnic group, and its relevance to creating peace culture in Africa and beyond. It relates Gada peace system with the UN peace system initiative and framework in demonstrating the relevance of Gada peace system to peace building in multiethnic conflicts transformation in the Horn of Africa and beyond.

Methodology

Studying indigenous culture requires understanding the past and establishing the link between the past, present, and the future. Therefore; this study used secondary sources on Gada System and its peace culture, the general literature on peace culture, interview on the current state of Gada peace culture and its relevance to peace building in Africa.

Results and Discussion

The Concept of Peace Culture and its Elements

The culture of peace has been defined by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/52/13 A (1998:1) as a set of "values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behavior and ways of life" that can be achieved through (1) promotion of peace and nonviolence using education, cooperation, and dialogue; (2) adhering to principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations; (3) respecting human rights and freedoms of people; (3) resolving conflicts peacefully; (4) sustainable development including the right to development; (5) gender equality and rights; (6) right to information and free speech; (7) inclusiveness, tolerance, rule of law, and democracy in the society. These values and principles are considered as universal values that are based on western democracy principles that can be implemented in all member nations through program of action spearheaded by UNESCO, member states, and civic societies (*de Riviera, 2009*). The aim is prevention of violent conflict and developing or building culture of peace. Therefore, a culture of peace according to this resolution is a culture that promotes dialogues, cooperation, tolerance, peaceful resolution of conflicts and that nurtures sustainable peace and inclusive sustainable development.

Nevertheless, the universality of western values and principles in different regions' culture might be questionable (*Hofstede, 1994*). The western values and principles are based on western culture and they may not fit to local or regional culture. Culture is a group phenomenon that might defer from one society to another (*Hofstede, 2011*). Even in sub-Saharan Africa culture though there might be some communality there can also be remarkable difference and identifying the common values of sub-Saharan African culture requires studying each culture by culture and then comparing them to identify what they have in common.

In this regard the UNESCO/ Africa union report AFR-2013/WS/3(2013) tried to localize the universality definition discussed above in a way that takes the local culture into account. It referred to the concept of a culture of peace in Africa as "the integration of values, belief systems and forms of spirituality, local knowledge and technologies, traditions and forms of cultural and artistic expression that

contribute to the respect of human rights, cultural diversity, solidarity and the rejection of violence to build democratic societies (AFR-2013/WS/3, 2013:1). This implies that local cultural values, beliefs, norms, and traditions that promotes sustainable peace should be restored, promoted and serve as a bedrock for building culture of peace in Africa. Nevertheless, these traditions should respect human rights and diversity, and shone violence. Building democracy according to western values is also implied as the goal of culture of peace.

More specifically Africa is one of the conflicts ridden continent with about 25 of 54 member states facing or in some state of conflict (*Ahlin, 2013*) and the issue of peace is much more than negative peace or absence of violence (*Debela, 2017*). It is about poverty reduction and inclusive sustainable development (*Ahlin, 2013*). Being cognizant of this Africa union has sustainable development, peace, pan-African renaissance, women empowerment as its key agendas (AU Agenda 2063). Nevertheless, despite these agendas and AU vision of "By 2020 all guns will be silent. A culture of peace and tolerance shall be nurtured in Africa's children and youth through peace education" (*IDEA, 2016*) Africa has continued to be a continent of conflict. Though the source of lasting peace is regarded as Africa's own culture and traditions, the sources of this sustained conflicts are also attributed to failure of social relations and institutions at local, national, and regional levels (*Pavanello and Scott-Villiers; 2013*). These implies the need for further research on addressing the root causes and indigenous culture based peace culture building.

The Oromo and their Gada System

Oromos are the second largest ethnic group in sub-Saharan Africa living in Ethiopia, Kenya, and other neighbouring eastern Africa region (*de Salviac, 1901, 2013; Oromia Culture and Tourism Bureau, 2009; Tessema, 2016*). The Gada system is a socio-political, ritual, economic administrative system through which the Oromo people organized and managed their nation for a number of centuries even before the arrival of colonizers on African soil (*Legesse, 2006; Hassen, 1994*).

The Gada system is an indigenous institution that pervades every aspect of an Oromo life including personal, interpersonal, social, economic and political life (*Jalata, 2012; Legesse, 2006*). As a political organization it organizes Oromo in to age groups that participates in the social, economic process and takes over power through election. It has branches of government the judiciary, the executive and the legislature with clear division of labour and system of check and balance. Furthermore, it organizes three levels of government the centre, region and local with clear division of power among them and all the three branches at each level. It is a political and government organization, with rules and practices. As a political system it organizes male Oromo in to age generations that seizes political power through election and accountable to the people. The formation and operation of these organs is based on transparency, participative democracy, and accountability. It runs its operation and the societal life of the society through laws and customary traditions (*Luis, 1994; Legesse, 2006; de Salviac, 1901, 2013; Zelalem, 2012*).

The significance of the GADA system and its democratic principles are that (1) it is purely indigenous and African system, (2) that existed before the concept of democracy is conceived in the west, (3) survived colonial tests and destruction, (4) a variety of which is practiced by number of non-Oromo Ethiopian ethnic groups, (5) a

number of east African ethnic groups of Oromo neighbours and of Oromo dissent in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, etc. (Jalata, 2012; de Salviac, 1901, 2013) (6) is currently functional in Ethiopia and Kenya, and (7) currently gaining importance and attention of people and Oromia regional state government in Ethiopia. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to review, synthesis, and argue the relevance its system in building culture of peace in Oromo community and of Oromo community with their neighbouring community in Ethiopia and horn of Africa.

The Oromo concept of peace

Peace in afaan Oromo is Nagaa and has much more broader meaning than absence of violence or war (Tenna, 2013). It is the most valued asset which is part of their daily prayers, greetings, any ceremonies opening and closing. The daily morning prayers are "yaa Rabbi nagayatti nbulchitee nagayatti nu oolchi" oh God thank you for the peaceful night, make our day peaceful. In the evening the Oromo prays "yaa Rabbi nagayaan nu oolchitee nagaatti nbulchi" oh God thank you for maintaining our peace during the day, make our evening peaceful. In their greeting with neighbour or other person their greetings centre on peace. In their greetings they enquire about peace of family members, their home, cattle, belongings, and their entire locality. This shows that the Oromo culture is a culture of peace which believes in a comprehensive peace for humans, their mountains, forests, rivers, animals, cows, etc (Debela, 2017). Furthermore, in their prayer the Oromo's don't simply pray for peace only they also curse the wrong doers, envies, and transgressors which discourages evil intention and actions in the members. Therefore, these prayers are part of daily rituals for promoting and sustaining peace.

Similarly, according to Tenna (2013) the Oromo concept of peace has internal and external dimensions which might be divided into intrapersonal, interpersonal, intra-ethnic and interethnic. The internal aspect of peace is peace within the Oromo community itself. The external dimension refers to living in harmony and peace with neighbours and other communities. These show that the Oromo concept of peace is one of cooperation and living in harmony with other ethnic groups.

The intrapersonal peace requires every individual Oromo to be at peace with him-self to be at peace with others. That is an individual has to be non-violent, tolerant, and live in harmony with others. The interpersonal aspect of peace requires members to cooperate and live in peace, and if there is any problem to solve their problem non-violently through discussion and dialogue. The principles of tolerance and peaceful coexistence are enshrined in the value system and culture of Oromo people (Tenna, 2013). Furthermore, according to Tenna, peacemaking and peace building is not left to politicians it is rather a responsibility of every Oromo.

According to de Riviera (2009), anthropological studies in different parts of the world shows that a peaceful society has philosophies, values, beliefs, cultural practices that shone violence, promote peace, tolerance, and cooperation; and conflict resolution mechanisms to restore and sustain peace. This shows that the Oromo society is a peaceful society with established culture of peace.

The Gada System and its Culture of Peace

The Oromo concept of peace is central in the Gada system. Gada system itself is a system of peace that has peacemaking and peace building as its central value (Tenna, 2017; Debela, 2013). Its core principles are rule of law, accountability or recall of public officials, sovereignty

of people, morality, equality, human right, and freedom (Baisa, 1994; De Salviac, 1901; 2013). These principles lay the foundation for conflict prevention and building peace culture.

The Gada system is based on rule of law. It has laws governing socio-economic, political, and other aspects of societal life. These laws are parts of everyday life of every one and nobody is above the law. There is a rule of law not rule by law (Zelalem, 2012). Any conflict at any level is solved based on these laws. According to informant M1 in Borena areas where the system has remained strong under centuries of pressure and marginalisation the Gada rules of resources utilisation, social relations, rights, etc are observed and ensured through participation of citizens and leaders at all levels.

Furthermore, the Gada system sustains peace through participative democracy where by leaders are elected by members to serve for single term of 8 years, accountable for their action and the constituents can recall them. The democratic election, fixed term of office and peaceful transfer of power and answerability of the elected officials for their action shows that the source of power is the society. Such leaders' prime mission is peace (Baisa, 1994).

As a system of governance for peace, the Gada system has system of check and balance between branches of governance and has decentralised governance for keeping peace at different levels. This institutional arrangement serves as a mechanism for assertive peace making process among the judiciary, the legislature, and executive branches and social forces at different levels (Jalata, 2014).

Above all, peace is one of the core values of the Gada system. The concept of peace and maintaining peace is at the heart of relationship in the society and with neighbour's communities. It is the central criteria in decision making and solving conflicts or problems (Luis, 1994). The leadership practices hence is one that promotes harmony and maintains relationship, through conciliation, mediation, and transformational approaches to conflicts and problems. These and other value is part of the belief system of an Oromo for peace making and sustaining positive peace as part of their daily life.

The Gada systems' is also based on values of freedom, human right, and equality. The Oromo's are free people who believe in individual and collective freedom (De Salviac, 1901; 2013). Every member of the society is also treated as equal irrespective of their status, economic fortune, and position (Jalata, 2012). All their rights including right to property, freedom of speech, to elect, are inviolable (Baisa, 1994).

Other underlying Gada system value is the principle of morality. Every Oromo is socialised to ethical values from childhood and is expected to conduct his affairs ethically. This has a potential to pre-empt the root causes of conflict. In this regard the key informants have divergent opinion on the practicality of this value. In the Borena and Guji area of the region the society ascribes to ethical principle of Gada system (M1, M2, 2019). In the other areas of the region where the Gada system have been weakened by the pressures of the oppressive regimes the it did not have a strong influence on behaviour of people (M3, M4, and M5, 2019). Nevertheless, they are of the opinion that with the recent restoration of Gada structure in all areas of Oromia regional state and link with Gada structure in neighbouring countries; the restoration of all Gada values and its sharing through peace education is what this time requires for resurrecting the Gada peace culture.

The above values and norms of the Gada system show

that it has cultural values that promote culture of peace. It has conflict resolution and peacemaking system that has maintained peace and averted conflict in the society and with neighbouring societies (*Tenna, 2013; Tessema, 2016*).

Besides these values the Gada system has detailed rules, provisions, and procedures for criminal and civil cases if any violent action happens in the society (*Debela, 2017; Tessema, 2016*). Whatever conflicts can be immediately contained and resolved accordingly.

Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in the Gada System

Conflict starts as a perception in the mind of one of the party to the conflict when s/he perceives the other party has infringed his rights (*Korsgaard, 2008*). As an Oromo the first step is to discuss among themselves and solve it peacefully without resorting to violence or retaliation. If they cannot resolve it by themselves, still they should not resort to violence; rather should bring their case to the attention of elders' council.

Peacemaking or conflict resolution tradition of Oromo society is a truth finding process based on the Oromo belief of truth. According to informant M1 Oromo believes that "Dhugaan kan waaqaati. Oromoon dhugaatti bula. Bakka dhugaan hinjirre nageenyi hinjiru; truth belongs to God. Oromo people live by truth. Where there is no truth there is no peace". Therefore, laying, dishonesty, false allegation, etc are considered as taboo for they are breaking truth. When there is conflict, the party to the conflict should refrain from violence or retaliation and resort to resolution through third party interventions. These resolution techniques are based on truth finding and restoring truth.

Peacemaking in the Oromo society is done by different actors from local to the national level. At the local level interpersonal conflict is often brought to the attention of local elders through "jarsummaa" (mediation) or "ararsuu" (reconciliation). The elders are chosen from among seniors and honest people who try to listen to the case from both sides, find the facts, and help solve the problem. Such local level mechanism has effectively served in restoring interpersonal and family peace and is widely used across Oromo and other societies in the east Africa region (*Tenna, 2013; Debela, 2017*).

According to M1 and M2, in Borena and Guji area when conflict happen the parties select 5 members' elders' council or "Shenecha". These members are chosen for their character of altruism, knowledge of societal rules, and willingness to devote their time (*Tenna, 2013*). In most of the cases the two parties will accept their solutions and restore peace among them. The types of conflicts at such council are family, neighbourly, and relational non-violent conflicts. Despite its informal nature, mediation by elders is regarded as more effective in restoring peace and justice much faster and effective than state system (*Tessema, 2016*).

Quite related to Jarsuma is "arara" reconciliation. Arara can be used for interpersonal, intra Oromo community, and with neighbouring community conflicts settlement. Reconciliation is not only settling the disputes or restoring peace; it goes beyond solution to healing the affected relationship and parties which results in peace building (*Debela, 2017*). According to Miall (*2004*), the cultural approach to healing leads to conflict transformation.

For violent conflicts where loss of life and property are involved in the interethnic or intra-ethnic conflicts the case is referred to the Gada leader and follows formal mechanism of jarsuma and Guma. The Gada leader forms

councils of elders to fact finding and come up with solutions that hills the wound and restore relationship. Council of elders lead by the Abbaa Gadaa himself interferes in settling it if it is intra-ethnic conflict. If it is an interethnic conflict, they meet with the leaders and elders council from the other ethnic group and demand the settlement of the problem through Guma or blood money (*Tessema, 2016; Debella, 2017*).

Therefore, the Oromo Gada system is a peace making and peace building system that has philosophies, beliefs, values, traditions, and institutions that promotes and sustains peace culture. According to de Riviera (*2009*) building culture of peace requires recognising and strengthening what is (the cultural values, beliefs, values, institutions, traditions, etc) in the society that promotes culture of peace and changing the behaviour, cognition and emotion of people in line with them. De Riviera also notes that a peaceful society has shared values and beliefs that shones violence, promotes tolerance, and cooperation. It socialises these values and beliefs to the children, upholds human rights, and equality. Therefore, an Oromo Gada system has successfully built peace in the Oromo community and made it a peaceful society. Nevertheless, according to the informants these cultural values and beliefs need to be promoted in the areas where the pressure of government machineries have weakened the Gada system.

Gada system and the UN culture of peace elements

Gada system as socio-economic and political institution of Oromo communities living in eastern Africa region has traditions, institutions, norms, beliefs, and values required for peace culture and has effectively promoted and sustained peace for over four centuries, since 16th century; and is still alive and proving itself.

The UN's definition of peace as a set of "values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behavior and ways of life" (A/RES/53/243 A, 1999) directly fits the Oromo concept of peace. The Gada system has values, traditions, beliefs, desired modes of behaviour to sustain peace. The Oromo concept of peace is much broader as it covers intra-personal, interpersonal, within community and with non-Oromo community, with nature, and God. To at peace with onself and others at all levels an Oromo should live truth as a way of life, and there cannot be peace without truth.

The UN concept of culture of peace building requires the values, attitudes, and behaviours "that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavor to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation and that guarantee the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the development process of their society" (A/RES/53/243 A, 1999:1).

The Gada system values, norms, and beliefs are shared by society members and are reinforced through citizens' participation and relevant institutions. The interaction within the society and with other society is based on these values, beliefs, and principles and any brich of them by members will have prescribed consequences to restore truth and peace.

The Gada system is also based on principles of freedom, justice, and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity that rejects violence and prevents conflicts. The Oromo Gada system has established these principles long before the western world. Freedom is the key principle of gada system. Full freedom is guaranteed to all members

and every member of the society are treated equally before the law. The social justice and inviolable human rights of each individual member is enforced through legal system and judiciary of the Gada system. It is also a responsibility of every member of the society that should not be left to the politicians. The Oromo concept of peace and truth encourages every member to live in peace with themselves and others, to be tolerant, resort to dialogue to resolve conflicts and resort to traditional institutions to restore and sustain peace.

The Gada democracy a participative democracy where leaders are elected through participation of citizens, with fixed term of office and peaceful transfer of power, where the authority lays with the people including the right to hold officials accountable and recall, check and balance between the branches of government, and rule of law.

Though women have rights, the only point of difference with the western concept of democracy, equality, and rights is gender equality. The Oromo Gada system is a system where there is role differentiation between men and women. It organises the men in age based generational cohorts and roles. The men's are the major players of economic and political roles in the society. They are elected and elects their leaders. The women have roles in social and economic affairs of exercising their rights and contributing to the peace building in the society through sique and etete institutions (Kuwee, 1997). They prevent conflicts through direct intervention and stopping the parties from violent actions. They also play a very key role in socialising their children to the values, norms, and beliefs of the society and encouraging tolerance and dialogue in solving problems.

The only thing that needs reconsideration in the Gada system is gender equality and the use of the existing values in the engagement of the society's members in the sustainable development of the Oromo community and neighbouring communities.

Conclusions

The concept of peace, peacemaking, and peace building are not new to Africa. The Oromo concept of peace is much broader than western conception of peace as absence of violence or war. The Oromo community as one of the largest sub-Saharan African people has values, beliefs, traditions, and institutions that promote peace, tolerance, non-violence, conflict prevention, and resolution through established standards and institutions. It socialises and educates members of the society through peace education at home and participation in socio-economic activities that contributes to collective wellbeing.

The Gada system is an egalitarian, just, and democratic system that guarantees democratic rights, freedom, and equality, rule of law, accountability, morality, and peace. Its democratic nature is the same to western democracy with accountability. The only points of difference are with the western concept of gender equality and full participation of women in the political process of the nation.

Therefore, Gada system and its culture of peace can be used to sustain peace in east Africa. It should be used as a way of life and to shape behaviourism attitudes, and emotions to prevent conflict, and promote culture of peace.

Nevertheless, Gada concept of peace, truth, values, principles, and conflict resolution techniques need to be restored and promoted. It should be documented and made part of education system. The academics should do research and disseminate these values. The regional state government and civic societies should develop a

peace education program based on these values and traditions so that they should be restored quickly and sustained among Oromo community in all corners of east Africa where Oromo community lives.

The concepts of gender equality and participation in sustainable development of the society needs to introduced into the Oromo culture and Gada system.

Gada system is not the sole institution of Oromo society. Neighbouring communities of Sidama, Gedio, and others also have Gada system. Future researchers need to consider the peace culture and traditional institutions of different African communities in sub-Saharan Africa. The communalities need to be identified and promoted among different ethnic groups as African concepts of peace and culture of peace.

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СИСТЕМА ГАДА І КУЛЬТУРА МИРУ ОРОМО (ЕФІОПІЯ)

Автор акцентує, що ключовим питанням для всього африканського континенту є встановлення стійкої системи світу і безпеки, під якою він розуміє сталий розвиток, а не просто відсутність війни чи насильства. Його ідея полягає в тому, що в якості інструменту для встановлення системи світу краще застосовувати традиційні ціннісні й соціально-організаційні системи народів Африки, які сформувалися і застосовувалися задовго до ініціативи ООН щодо створення культури світу, яка зараз сформована в якості базової програми ООН для Африки та просуває демократичні цінності західної (американської і європейської) культури. Як дієву альтернативу оонівській парадигмі встановлення миру на африканському континенті він пропонує традиційний інститут соціальної організації народу оромо (що населяє різні області Ефіопії) - систему вікових класів гада (гадаа). Її основним структурним принципом є поділ на генеалогічні покоління. Інтервал між поколіннями становить 40 років і включає п'ять вікових класів, що послідовно проходять п'ятиланкову систему вікових ступенів. Всі вікові класи є корпоративними прооб'єднаннями, кожне з яких виконує ряд нормативно визначених функцій (господарських, військових, ритуальних). Функцію організатора життєдіяльності соціального організму віковий клас отримує при переході у віковий ступінь лубу - ступінь "правління". Серед оромійців, що досягли за віком цього ступеня, обирається група лідерів, так звана рада гада. Всі три основні функції з керівництва плем'ям - організаційно-управлінську, військову, релігійно-ідеологічну - у оромо здійснює рада гада. У релігійно-ідеологічній сфері діє, крім ради гада, релігійний лідер Абба муда ("батько помазання"). Ядром громади є патрилійна родова група. Сусідні села, як правило, населені спорідненими групами. Важлива роль в сільськогосподарському виробництві і суспільному житті належить групам сусідської трудової взаємодопомоги. Частина оромо працює за наймом в промисловості й сільському господарстві; останнім часом збільшується національна інтелігенція. Важливим досягненням автора статті є концептуальний порівняльний аналіз системи гада оромо і концепції встановлення миру, запропонованої програмою ООН. Він робить висновок, що традиційна концепція більш зрозуміла і природна для африканських народів, ніж західна концепція миру, що розуміється тільки як відсутність насильства і військових дій. Одночасно він вказує на принципи системи гада, які зупинилися в своєму розвитку і не відповідають викликам сучасного африканського суспільства. Такими він вважає, наприклад, питання участі жінок в управлінні та організації соціального життя. На його переконання, вивчення і просування природних для Африки систем соціальної організації життя сприятиме зміцненню миру і злагоди на континенті набагато більше, ніж західні методики організації життя і примусу до миру.

Ключові слова: мир; система миру; культура; цінності; Гада; оромо; корінне населення; Африка; Ефіопія.

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EFFECT OF MOBILE PHONE COMMUNICATION MESSAGES ON PARTICIPATION IN AGRICULTURE AMONG UNIVERSITY UNEMPLOYED GRADUATES

The article analyzes an influence of 412 SMS from Mtn Nigeria agro info Services Added Value that were sent by graduates of universities with agricultural specialties during 2018. The author examined the content of those messages and their effectiveness in decision making by young specialists about their employment in Nigerian agricultural enterprises. For this purpose the author divided all messages into four categories ("evidentiary", "local", "descriptive", "striking"). Of them, "evidentiary" messages were the most effective in communication by encouraging unemployed to make constructive decisions about their employment. Generally, the results of the research demonstrates that the messages sent to mobile phones are effective means in attraction of the qualified specialists to the work in agriculture sector of the county. Apart from historical, sociological component of this research is also important, because unemployment of graduates of universities makes them vulnerable and may influence negatively on the society. It is also important that the research may result in positive changes in certain behavior patterns, because now mobile phone is an effective means of not only communication, but also forming of certain tastes and values. Finally, the results of this research may influence on substantive content for mobile phone users, because they reflect a rather significant multiaspectual effectiveness of the named categories of SMS. Therefore, the most important innovation of the article is an evidence of the influence of mobile communication on important behavior reflexes; given facts and conclusions may be useful and instructive for telecommunication service providers and communications experts, as well as for managers of agricultural enterprises, social workers and researchers on this issue. The most important result of this research is the demonstration that due to the receiving agro-informational hints by unemployed graduates of universities a large part of them found employment, at the same time, those who did not regard this information remained unemployed.

Keywords: *agriculture; communication; messages; university graduates; participation.*

Introduction

One of the problems facing world today is how to cater for its teeming youth unemployment. The situation is such that even the educated youths are not spared as graduate unemployment has continued to increase. Figures from the International Labour Organization (2016) suggests that the world is facing its most trying moment with regard to the future of educated youths. According to the Labour Organization, "the number of unemployed youth globally will rise by half a million in 2016 to reach 71 million and will remain at this level in 2017. (p.VII)." The situation in Nigeria is particularly worrying as youth, even after acquiring western education, remain either completely unemployed or underemployed. This is evidenced in the increasing number of graduate unemployment in Nigeria. Available statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (2016) for the second quarter of 2016, showed that the total number of youth unemployment/underemployment was 49.5%. Ezeah and Gever (2017) argues that the situation may even be worse considering that every four months, each of the 36 states of the Federation, as well as the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja produce an average of 2000 youths into the labour market after completion of compulsory one year mandatory service. Ezeah and Gever

further recalled the incidence of 2013 when the Dangote Group of Companies needed 100 drivers to fill existing vacancies. Out of the 13,000 applications received, there were 6 Ph.D. holders, 704 Masters and over 8,460 first degree holders. Considering the limited employment opportunities in Nigeria, agriculture is considered as a viable option through which unemployed graduates can gainfully engage themselves and create wealth. However, the problem is that most graduates are not interested in agriculture. They feel that agriculture is meant for the uneducated. This assumption is supported by evidence in literature as Ibitoye (2011) studied 600 youths in Nigeria and reported that they have negative attitudes towards agriculture. Beyuo and Bagson (2011) reported similar result after studying youths from Ghana. Also, Maina and Maina (2015) revealed the same result after studying youths from Kenya.

Considering the seeming wide acceptance of the mobile phone among university graduates, who are mostly youths, it has the potential of serving as a tool to persuade university graduates to take part in agriculture. The mobile phone can serve as a platform to educate graduates on the need to take part in agriculture. Ekwueme and Gever (2017) argue that the mobile offers an express avenue

through which people can be persuaded to participate in agriculture. The researchers note: "in this era of growing acceptance of the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM), its application for the purpose of promoting agricultural activities will go a long way in enhancing food production" (Ekwueme and Gever, 2017: 55).

Mobile phones, just like the Internet, have significantly modified the way things are done in contemporary society. In the present day society, spheres of the society like the economy, security, governance, religion, communication, among others have substantially depended on mobile telephone to function. Scholars (e.g., Aricat, Karnowski & Achib, 2015; Sahota & Kameswari, 2014; Chatterjee, 2014; Khayyat & Heshmati, 2013) agree that mobile telephone has become pervasive, infiltrating almost all aspects of the society and its services have changed people's lifestyles by transforming and revolutionizing the way they work and interact. In addition, they have provided opportunities for a powerful communication medium to influence business and social life. Chatterjee captures the centrality of mobile phones thus: "Mobile phones have become the most important and integral part of today's life style and mobile handset has become a widely recognized consumer artifact" (p.55). The submission of Chatterjee, does not only offer insights on the pervasiveness of mobile phone, but also shows the potentials inherent in this new communication technology as a tool for agricultural development.

Mobile phone has been considered as playing a central role in information gathering processing and dissemination about agriculture thereby promoting agricultural activities. Razaque and Hassan (2013) aver that farming communities appreciate mobile phone as easy, fast and convenient way to communicate and get prompt answers of respective problems and that nowadays, the mobile phone has generated an opportunity for the farmers to get the information about marketing and weather. The authors add that through this technology, farmers directly keep in touch with market personnel and offer their produce with reasonable prices. Haruna, Jamilu, Abdullahi and Murtala, (2013: 14) corroborate thus:

Mobile phone provides existing new ways through which extension workers can reach farmers in rural areas that have in the past been very difficult to contact, particularly in developing countries like Nigeria. Ownership and use of mobile phone among the rural farmers has continued to increase thereby increasing the chances of contacting farmers in their communities for extension activities.

Anjum, et al (2015) share similar view on the pivotal role that mobile phone plays in agricultural communication. Farmers at all level seem to have also realized the potentials of the mobile phone as the device is very common to them. They carry it along even when going to the farm. This, no doubt has made agricultural communication easier.

Theoretical Framework

Although there may be other frameworks to anchor this study, the ACADA model was thought to be most appropriate considering that it fully incorporate communicate into the process of behavior change campaign. The model is an acronym for Assessment, Communication, Analysis Design and Action. It was developed by the United Nations for International Children Emergency in 2001. This model is informed by the fact that influencing or modifying human behavior through communication is a complex process that needs to be planned carefully (Ekwueme & Gever, 2017). The stages of the model are as follows:

Assessment Stage. This is the first stage of the ACADA

model wherein the main objective is researching into the real situation as well as knowing its nature, characteristics, history and current status, those involved and the social cultural environment. In this instance, this stage will be aimed at understanding the level of graduate involvements in agriculture, the hunger threats, unemployment situation, among others.

Communication Analysis. During this stage, the essence is to carry out series of activities like, analysis and formulation of the problem, determination of problem to address, behavior analysis, participant analysis, channel analysis/ media analysis, statement of communication objectives, identification of communication strategy and activities, development of monitory and evaluation indicators. The crux of the matter here is how best communication can solve the problem so identified.

Design stage. At this stage, the aim is to package a design that suite the target group. The message is designed through the instrument of persuasion, enlightenment and full information. The communication materials and messages are to be pretested and modified in line with the programme objectives (Okorie, 2013). The choice of the mobile phone for this study is an attempt to use a medium that is most known to the target.

Action. This is the last stage in the model. It is the point where what is planned is implemented. For this study, it is a point where the messages are sent to university graduates through their mobile phones.

Use of Mobile Phone Technology among University Graduates

University graduates are people who have completed a course of study at the university. In most cases, they are largely youths within the ages of 20-29 years. In Nigeria, to qualify for admission into the university, a person must not be less than 16 years of age and to participate in the compulsory National Youth Service, a person must not be more than 30 years. The very fact that most people who graduate in Nigerian universities and even abroad take part in the mandatory service year suggest that they are usually less than 30 years. Even while still in the university, undergraduates make use of the mobile phone to meet their communication needs. Walsh et al. (2008) and Ogunyemi, (2010) note that the mobile phone is used by university students in the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia for many other functions, such as alarm clock, camera, music player, diary and phonebook. Chen and Katz (2009) found that university students in the United States of America (USA) said that owning a mobile phone is important for keeping in contact with their parents, to ask for advice or get emotional support. Even when students graduate from the university, they continue using their mobile phones.

After graduation from the university, most graduates make use of the mobile phone to communicate with classmates, friends and even family members. Some graduates use their mobile phones for job alerts, other for social networking. Some also use it to surf the Internet for existing job opportunities. Other even use it to get samples on how to write their curriculum vitae. The important point to notes here is that the mobile phone is a very essential device through which through which university graduates meet their information, integration and socialization needs. This tool can serve as a means through which behavior change information can be communicated to these graduates.

Mobile Phone as a tool for behavior Change Communication

Behavior change communication is aimed at promoting positive behavior among the target receivers. The hall

mark of behavior change communication is to ensure that people accept and practice acts that are beneficial to them and the society as a whole. In behavior change communication, the essence is to ensure that people graduate from the point of being unaware to the point of awareness, to knowledge, to motivation to change, to practicing trial behavior and ultimately sustain such behavior (Gever & Nwabuzor, 2014). Behavior change communication is part of strategic communication. Paul (2011: 3) defines strategic communication as "co-ordinated actions, messages and other forms of signaling or engagement intended to inform, influence or persuade selected audience to support national objectives." The import of the definition of Paul is that it places emphasis on informing and persuading selected audience. The United Nations Children's Fund (2005: 6) provides further insights into strategic communication thus:

Strategic communication is an evidence-based, result-oriented process undertaken in consultation with the participant group intrinsically linked to other programme elements, cognizant of the local context and favouring a multiplicity of communication approaches to stimulate positive measurable behavior and social change.

The submission above has further shown the essence of behavior change communication. One of the factors to consider in behavior change communication is the choice of media. That is, the channel through which the information reaches the target is very important. Marshall McLuhan corroborates that *the medium is the message*. The first thing to be said about *the medium is the message* is that it is a warning and a wake-up call. It is a plea to pay attention, for as McLuhan insists in *The Medium is the Message*, "there is absolutely no inevitability as long as there is a willingness to contemplate what is happening" (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967: 25). The medium, is, therefore, very important in behavior change communication.

Considering the wide acceptance of the mobile phone as a means of communication, it has the potential of serving as a vehicle for behavior change communication. The mobile phone have the potential of serving as a medium through which behavior change communication messages can be sent to target receivers. People can forget to turn on their radio set, TV, or buy a copy of newspaper or magazine, but their mobile phone is always handy. At places of work, motor parks, places of worship, market, eateries, on transit, in school, at lecture venues, on bed, on the dining table, the mobile phone is handle, it is simply a phenomenon and a technological *miracle* of the 21st century. Both the educated and the uneducated alike have found the mobile useful. The use of the phone also cuts across occupation as public and civil servants, security agencies, business men and women, farmers, artisans, herdsmen, among others are engaged in the use of mobile phone for one thing or the other.

Evidence in literature also suggests that the mobile phone can serve as a viable option for behavior change communication. Boaz, et al (2016) investigate the access and use of mobile phones for improving the coverage of agricultural extension services among farmers in the pre-harvest stages of maize value chain in Kilosa district in Tanzania and found that that majority of respondents used mobile phones and had a positive attitude on the contribution of mobile phone in their farming business. The study results also indicated that mobile phones offered an affordable solution to farmers' information needs and information requirements. Egbule, et al (2013) did a study in Nigeria and reported a similar result.

The mobile phone has also been used to change behavior in the education subsector. Valk et al (2010)

examined the evidence of the role of mobile phone-facilitated mLearning in contributing to improved educational outcomes in the developing countries of Asia by exploring the results of six mLearning pilot projects that took place in the Philippines, Mongolia, Thailand, India, and Bangladesh. The result showed that the mobile was successful in increase access to education. Scholars (e.g. Haapala, et al, 2009; Franklin, et al, 2006; Fjeldsoe, et al, 2009; Whittaker, et al, 2009; Cole-Lewis, Kershaw, 2010) have also examined the effectiveness of the mobile phone in health behavior modification and the outcome showed that the mobile is an effective tool for health communication. However, there still exist paucity of literature examining the effect of mobile phone messages in promoting participation in agriculture among university graduates, especially in developing countries like Nigeria.

The Message as a tool for Behavior change communication

The message is a very essential component of the communication process. Apart from the medium, the content plays a critical role in deciding the reactions of the receivers. Wigington (2008) opines that considering the centrality of the message in communication, its development should be taken seriously. The National Archives (2013) notes that message should conform with the following: keep it short and simple. The message must be clear, concise and complete.

Okoro (2017) avers that for communication to be effective, its message must be candid, clear, complete, concise, concrete, correct and courteous. The central idea is that the message is at the heart, soul and body of knowledge transfer. The message can be classified into different categories. Li-Shia et al (2007) in a study found that the message types significantly influence the behavior. Their result revealed that instrumental messages are more influential than affective messages. The result of Li-Shia et al. also showed that a significant interaction effect exists between message types and reading motives. Also, Nguyen and Fussell (2013), Li, (2006) and Otondo, et al (2008) have also reported that the message contents greatly influence the receivers of such messages. Ekwueme and Gever (2017) in a study reported that the message content for promoting agriculture should be properly crafted such that it educates and at the same time persuade people to get involved in agriculture. The researchers found that agriculture has image problem, especially among the educated youth who are ill-disposed to it.

It is important to add here that telecommunication services providers in Nigeria have also realized the potentials of the mobile phone in changing behavior. Consequently, they have initiated different Value Added Services (VAS) through which they send messages to subscribers on different issues like health, security, agriculture, education, etc. Subscribers only receive such messages if they subscribe to such services and a certain amount will be deducted from their accounts on regular basis. A good example of such services is the *mtn Nigeria agro info* tips which provides regular tips to subscribers on a regular basis while N50 is deducted from their account after 7 days. Mostly, the telecommunication services providers get subscribers by sending them invitation messages. Mtn Nigeria is one of the leading telecommunication services providers in Nigeria. According to the Nigeria Communications Commission (2017), Mtn Nigeria has the largest market share of 36.07%. The motivation for this study began when one of the researchers received an invitation message in January, 2016 to subscribe to *agro info* tips services service. The message read: "Nigeria targets 2016 for self-sufficiency in food production via

farming. It begins in food production via farming. It begins with you, get more information on business of farming. Text AGRIC to 2707." Although the *agro info* has been ongoing with a view to promoting participation in agriculture, studies have not been sufficiently carried out to measure its effectiveness. There is also paucity of literature that provide insights into the messages sent out by such services.

The objectives of this study therefore are:

1. To examine the message contents of Mtn Nigeria *agro info* Value Added Service.
2. To determine the effectiveness of such messages on participation in agriculture among university graduates in Nigeria.
3. To ascertain the specific aspect of such messages that have effects on university graduates.

Study 1: Content analysis of Mtn *agro info* messages Methods

In the first study, the intention of the researchers was to generate short messages from Mtn *agro info* Value Added Services and analyse them. To achieve this, AGRIC was sent to 2707 through a mobile number 08064938817 on January 3rd, 2016. We then opened a log book where all the short messages sent were documented. This lasted for a period of 412 days. That is one year 46 days. When these messages were received, we then developed four coding categories as follows:

Evidential: Messages were classified as evidential if they provide evidence in figures or practical terms on the benefits of agriculture.

Locatial: We considered messages as *locatial* if they provide location concerning where agricultural activities

can best be carried out, or where to locate improved seedlings or where to sell agricultural products

Descriptial: Messages were considered as *descriptial* if they merely describe the importance of participating in agriculture.

Impactial: Messages were considered as *impactial* if they attempt to educate people on how to carry out agricultural activities.

Two coders were then engaged and given the code guide as well as the written out messages. They were asked to code the messages based on frequency of occurrences of the categories (*evidential, Locatial, descriptial, and impactial*). In the process of coding, it was discovered that the coders disagreed on the categories of some of the short messages. We highlighted such areas and later discussed them until 95% agreement was reached. The short messages were also subjected to an inter-coder reliability test. Riffe et al (2005) make a case for a random selection of content samples for inter-coder reliability testing. In the same direction, Wimmer and Dominick (2013) recommended that between 10- 25% of the body of content should be tested. Therefore, we determined the inter-coder reliability for this study using a randomly selecting 10% of the short messages. Using Holsti's formula (cited in Wimmer & Dominick, 2006), the inter-coder result revealed the inter-coder reliability of 0.72. In the analysis of the results, simple percentages were used while the results were presented in a chart.

Results

The result of the first study was aimed at providing insights into the nature of short messages provided by the *Mtn agro info* Value Added Services. After coding the messages along four delineated categories, the result is presented in the following chart.




Fig 1: Categories of messages sent by Mtn Nigeria on agricultural tips.

The result from the chart above revealed the dominance of descriptial and impactial in the message categories that the Mtn Nigeria sent out to its subscribers to *agric info* tips from January 2016 to February, 2017. The dominance of these two categories point out two things. First, it showed that most of the messages were aimed at educating subscribers on agricultural techniques and describing its benefits to them. Second, it showed that such could educate the subscribers and describe agricultural products to them without convincing them to participate. Conversely, they may be convince to join after being educated. Although we understood categories of messages that Mtn Nigeria sent to subscribers through its *agro info* Value Added Service, we did not understand if such messages actually have effects on the subscribers. To achieve this, a second study was necessary.

Study II. Effectiveness of messages on participation in agriculture among university graduates in Nigeria Methods

After getting the *agro info* tips of Mtn Nigeria from study 1, the second study sought to measure the effectiveness of such messages. We recruited a total of 32 (16 males and 16 females) university graduates for the second phase of the study. The mean age of the respondents was 26 years (range 23-28 years). The mean number of years of graduation from the university was 5 (range 2-8). The selected graduates were not working at all as at the time of participation in this study. They also reported not having any intention of venturing into agriculture as because they were applying for jobs. They also had mobile phones and were using it daily. The mean number of years of usage of mobile phone was 9 years (range range 8-10).

With regard to the course of study in school 5 studied Mathematics, 6 studied Biological sciences, 2 studied Mass Communication, 7 Studied Political Sciences, 2 studied Pharmacy, 1 Studied English and Literary Studies, 3 Studied Economics and 6 Studied Chemistry.

We selected the respondents for this study through purposive sampling. It was decided that purposive sampling was best for this study because it best helped in reaching the desired respondents. We used an experimental approach for this study. This experiment was based on the following hypothesis:

H1: University graduates who are exposed to *Mtn agro info tips* are likely to participate in agriculture than those not exposed.

The Experimental Process

We collected all the mobile numbers of the study participants. Their names and phone numbers were written in alphabetical order and from 1-32. We then gathered them at the Examination hall, of Community Secondary School, Ede-Oballa where they were briefed about the essence of the study. Consequently, we asked them to sign a consent form. We told them that we were going to be contacting them via their mobile phone numbers. After that, we then decided that the first 16 were the treatment group and the other 16 the control group. We gave them a number through which we were reaching them and discouraged them from sharing the contents of either call or text from the research team among themselves.

We targeted twelve calendar months so the study opened on February 22, 2016 and ended on February, 21, 2017. It is important to add here that even though we started collecting the short messages from Mtn Nigeria in January, 2016 the treatment began in February, 2016. It should also be noted that during the period of the treatment, we were also calling the control group on interval of one week to find out their welfare and assure them that the study was still ongoing and get commitment from them if they were still part of the study. We allowed the respondents the period of February to September, 2017 so as to better determine the effect of the treatment. On October 5th, we then called all the participants and gave them a questionnaire to provide information on their job status. They were told to indicate their serial numbers as contained in the study book on their questionnaire for easy separation of the control from the treated group.

Semi-Structured interview

After the experiment, a semi-structured face-to-face interview was scheduled with the respondents. The interview was conducted in three days and each interview lasted between 30 to one hour. The essence of the interview was to understand the aspect of the text messages that interested and influenced them. We were also interested in understanding their views about the short messages sent to them. We only interview members of the control group who reported in the questionnaire that they were involved in agriculture.

Data Analysis

We combined both qualitative and quantitative method of data analysis for the study. We used the t-test to determine the mean difference between the treatment and the control group. It should be noted that we attached codes to the quantitative response for ease of analysis. Therefore, those who said that they were involved in agriculture activities were scored 3 while those who said they were not were scored 1. We used thematic analysis to analyse the semi-structured interview which took place after filling of the questionnaire. We transcribed all the interviews verbatim and read them many times for better understanding. We also checked all the transcribed interviews

for accuracy. After which we followed Brawn and Clark (2006: 79) 'patterns' within the data in our analysis. We also followed the guide to the phases of conducting the thematic analysis. These are: familiarity with the data, gathering initial code, searching for themes (vital concepts, explanatory ideas, recurring ideas etc.); reviewing the themes, defining and naming the themes and producing the report inform of illustrative quotes.

Results

An independent-sample *t-test* was conducted to compare the participation in agriculture scores of university graduates who were exposed to *agro info tips* through their mobile phones and those not exposed. The result showed a significant difference between the treatment group ($M = 2.3750$, $SD = .95743$) and control group ($M = 1.5000$, $SD = .89443$; $t(30) = 2.671$, $P = 1.2$, two tailed). The magnitude of the differences was 87500. Based on the result of this study, the lone hypothesis of this study is proven and we conclude that there is 95% chance that university graduates who are exposed to short messages on agricultural tips are likely to participate than those not exposed.

Interview Results

We held semi-structured interviews of the respondents for two broad reasons. First, to understand the aspects of the text messages that interested and influenced them. We were also interested in understanding their views about the short messages sent to them. For the control group, our interest was to understand why they were not engaged in agriculture. The result of the study showed that most of the treatment group participants were very excited about the text messages on agricultural tips sent to their mobile phones. They also reported that such text messages served as a spring board for them to participate in agriculture. One of the respondents said:

Such text were very inspiring. At a point, I had no option but start thinking of agriculture. Right now, my fish pond is growing and my customer base is also expanding. I am more focused now than when I was looking of non-existing jobs. I am happy that I took part in this study. My next plan is to set up a poultry farm.

Our result also showed that some participants had also invested in crop production as a result of exposure to message through their mobile phones. One of the respondents said: "The messages kept coming and at a point, I just needed to start something. Today, if you see my cassava farm, you will be shocked." Another participants said: "I am currently into agriculture full time. As soon as I am done with this interview, off, I go". Some of the respondents even expressed regrets for not engaging in agriculture earlier, therefore wasting precious time. "I wish, I started earlier". "Had I know, by now, I would have been a big man. Just look at me, after 6 years of graduation, I am just defining purpose in life." "The good thing is that I will no long beg for money nor job". There were also those who were into buying and selling of agric products. "What I now do is to buy during harvest and resell when demand is higher". Said another participants. We probed the respondents to ascertain which message type influenced them more and their responses indicate that the *evidential* messages were most effective followed by *locatival*. One of the respondents said: "when a message has verifiable evidence, it makes the argument stronger". Another one said: "Some of the messages contained evidence that had compelling influence". Another one said: "Even in court, evidence is sacrosanct, messages with facts and figures greatly had effect on me". When we asked them to supply some of the messages they could recalled, we got the following:

Demand for fish is currently put at millions of tons in Nigeria, 40% are locally sourced while 60% are imported. This shortfall potent a huge opportunity.

Investment in small scale cassava processing business is good especially cassava chips and starch production. The export value is high and are very profitable.

Stand a chance to benefit from coconut as Lagos State ministry of Agric revealed plans to expand structure for its production and processing. Don't be left out!

Double your income with quick returns through meat production. If you grow broilers, within 42-45 days most broilers are grown and ready to be sold to consumers.

Irrespective of your job, you can augment your earning in December by investing in small scale rearing of broilers chickens, their maturity is 12 weeks.

In summation, therefore, out of 16 treated members, 11 representing 69 % had started participating in agriculture. Among the remaining 5 representing 31% percent, we sought to know if they had intention of participating in agriculture and 4 representing 25% said they were already in the process of starting while the remaining 1 representing 6% said she was not thinking of engaging in agriculture in the near future. When we asked her why, she retorted: "I simply do not like agriculture". We also noticed that the lone participant who refused to participate in agriculture had graduated two years ago. This could be the reason she was still adamant or could also be her gender. We also noticed that among the control group, 4 persons representing 25% had started participating in agriculture. We probed them further to gain insights into the sudden change and discovered that they had contacts with some members of the treatment group. Therefore, when they saw them participating in agriculture, they also had to join. Based on this, we concluded that peer influence was responsible for their involvement in agriculture. The influence was a spillover of the treatment.

Discussion of Findings

The result of this study showed that short message sent through the mobile phones of users are very effective in behavior change communication. The result has shown that when unemployed university graduates are exposed to agricultural tips, there is 95% chance that it will likely have affect on their participation in terms of involvement in crop production, rearing of animals as well as marketing of agricultural products. This result is consistent with previous studies (e.g. *Haapala, et al, 2009; Franklin, et al, 2006; Fjeldsoe, et al, 2009; Whittaker, et al, 2009; Cole-Lewis, Kershaw, 2010; Egbule, et al, 2013; Boaz, et al, 2016*). The result of this study differs from previous studies because it made use of short messages from the telecommunication service providers and not just drafting imagined messages. This study also differs from others because it did not focus on existing farmers, but fresh university graduates who were not interested in agriculture at all. This is a complete departure from other studies (e.g., *Anjum, 2015; Boaz, et al, 2016*) that examined the role of mobile phone in agriculture. This new dimension could be useful because farming requires energy and the youth who still have the energy are hardly interested in venturing into farming. The situation is even worst with the educated ones, a situation that has led to increased rural-urban migration. This study has implications on ACADA model because it has shown that when a problem is identified, properly analysed and the appropriate communication approaches are applied, it is likely to yield the desired result. The result has also shown that ACADA model could be an appropriate framework for studying behavior communication through the mobile phone.

Consequently, this result provides the theoretical support for subsequent researchers who may be interested in understanding how the mobile can be used as a channel of communication aimed at changing behavior.

Conclusion

This study set to achieve trio objectives of: examining the message contents of Mtn Nigeria *agro info* Value Added Service; determining the effectiveness of such messages on participation in agriculture among university graduates in Nigeria and ascertaining the specific aspect of such messages that have effects on university graduates. These objectives were achieved through two different but complementary studies. The first study examined the message type sent to subscribers through Mtn *agro info* Value Added Services. The message were coded along four categories namely *evidential, locatial, descriptial and impactial*. Our result showed that most of the messages were *descriptial and impactial*. In the second part of the study, we found that evidential messages were most effective in attitude change communication. The implication of this result is that messages aimed at promoting participation in agriculture should contain more evidential elements than *descriptial, impactial and locatial*. Overall, our result suggests that messages sent through the mobile phone of subscribers are very effective in promoting participation in agriculture among those who are not interested in participating in agriculture.

This result has three broad implications. First, the result of this study has sociological implications because unemployment and food security are sociological issues. When university graduates are unemployed, they are vulnerable to crime and other social vices and this may have a negative influence on the society. When there is hunger, it is equally a sociological problem because this makes people vulnerable to different vices. Therefore, by providing evidence based-understanding on how the mobile phone could be effective in persuading youth to participate in agriculture, this study has addressed a sociological issue. Second, this study has implication on behavior change communication because it has shown that the mobile phone could be an effective medium of communicating attitude change messages to the target receivers. In the third place, the result of this study has implications on ACADA model because it has shown that the model could be useful as a framework for examining mobile phone and behavior change communication. Finally, this result has implications on the crafting of messages for mobile phone users as it has shown that not all messages are effective in behavior change. This means, the crafting of short messages must be carefully done so as to achieve the desired results. Therefore, the basic contribution of this study is that it has provided evidence for understanding the effect of mobile phone communication on behavior change campaigns. The study has also addressed sociological problems of unemployment and hunger. We hoped that the result of this study will, therefore, be useful to telecommunication services providers, agricultural extension worker, social workers, communication experts as well as researchers. We recommend, therefore that further studies should be expanded to include other critical aspects like small and medium scale enterprises and other areas that best address the challenge facing 21st university graduates.

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ВПЛИВ СМС-ПОВІДОМЛЕНЬ НА ПРОЦЕС ПРАЦЕВЛАШТУВАННЯ БЕЗРОБІТНИХ МОЛОДИХ СПЕЦІАЛІСТІВ З УНІВЕРСИТЕТСЬКОЮ ОСВІТОЮ ДО СІЛЬСЬКОГОСПОДАРСЬКИХ ПІДПРИЄМСТВ НІГЕРІЇ (ІСТОРИКО-СОЦІОЛОГІЧНЕ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ)

У статті проаналізовано вплив 412 смс-повідомлень від Mtn Nigeria agro info Services Added Value, які протягом 2018 р. надсилались випускникам університетів із сільськогосподарськими спеціальностями. Автором був вивчений зміст цих повідомлень та їх ефективність у прийнятті рішень молодими спеціалістами щодо власного працевлаштування до сільськогосподарських підприємств Нігерії. Задля досягнення цього завдання автор здійснив поділ усього масиву смс-повідомлень на чотири категорії ("доказові", "локальні", "декриптивні" та "ударні"). З них "доказові" повідомлення були найефективнішими в комунікації, спонукаючи безробітних до прийняття конструктивних рішень щодо свого працевлаштування. Загалом результати дослідження свідчать про те, що повідомлення, надіслані на мобільні телефони абонентів, є дуже ефективним засобом у залученні кваліфікованих спеціалістів до роботи в аграрному секторі країни. Окрім історичної, важливою є й соціологічна компонента даного дослідження, бо безробіття випускників університетів робить їх вразливими, і до того ж може мати негативний вплив на суспільство. Важливим є й те, що це дослідження може прислужитись й до позитивних змін у деяких поведінкових стереотипах, бо нині мобільний телефон є дуже ефективним засобом не лише у передачі повідомлень, але й у формуванні певних смаків та ціннісних уявлень. Нарешті, отримані результати дослідження впливатимуть на змістовне наповнення контенту для користувачів мобільних телефонів, оскільки вони свідчать про доволі суттєву різноаспектну ефективність згадуваних категорій смс-повідомлень. Відтак найголовнішою інновацією даної статті є доведення впливу мобільного зв'язку на важливі поведінкові рефлексії, а поданий в ній фактаж та сформульовані висновки будуть корисними та повчальними як для постачальників телекомунікаційних послуг та експертів з комунікації, так і для менеджерів аграрних підприємств, соціальних працівників та дослідників даної проблематики. Найважливішим результатом даного дослідження є доведення того, що завдяки отриманню безробітними випускниками університетів агроінформаційних підказок значна їх частина зуміла працевлаштуватись, водночас ті, хто не зважив на цю інформацію, залишалися безробітними.

Ключові слова: сільське господарство; спілкування; повідомлення; випускники університетів; участь.

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THE "WEAK STATE" CONCEPT: THEORETICAL ROOTS AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION

In the modern world, almost simultaneously in the texts on national security strategies of the United States and the European Union the *weak states* are mentioned as the main threat to security for the whole world. The relevance of the study lies in the fact that weak states have long been the subject of research by Western scholars. It covers the search for solutions to problems in several areas, including the post-Soviet transfer, the issues of the African continent development and formation, the study of security issues in the Middle East, and so on. The article attempts to identify discrepancies in definitions and categorizations, as well as to analyze the preconditions and ways to overcome the position of "weak state", in particular in the foreign economic and security sector. The main theoretical approaches to the definition of weak states in the foreign literature have been analyzed, but in domestic research this question is very rarely raised by scientists. The threats to international security of countries with a "weak state" status have been summarized. The study concludes the definition and assessment of the weak states status, namely, weak states in different regions of the world and in particular in Ukraine. Within the framework of this research, it has first been proposed to clarify the definitions of "weak" and "failed" states, as well as to determine the principles of the weak state existence along with the neighboring large country, and clearly defined preconditions and ways of overcoming its political and economic weakness, on the example of Ukraine.

Key words: *Weak states; Failed states; State; Ukraine; Democracy; Stable government; Political transfer.*

Introduction

Currently, one can observe the different dynamics of the states development: the downturn, numerous crises, rapid development or stable evolution. It has to be noted that the listed negative processes are, to a greater extent, natural and manageable, but nevertheless sometimes unpredictable, dangerous for ordinary citizens, and for the whole surrounding. Numerous forecasting attempts in such cases are not effective, mainly because crisis states (or, as the authors of this article call them "weak state") appear to have state-political institutions with a democratic facade, and civil society (albeit at the initial state), and more or less stable power, and ideally prescribed legal norms, but development does not go along the path of development of stable indicative democratic countries, and always chooses its "distorted" path with crisis pitfalls, own social so-called sideways and financial disasters. Thus, no copying, complete or selective, can provide one hundred percent guarantee of "proper development" and a stable welfare growth of such a state.

Many researchers of the political transferring processes try to find an answer to the question: "Why does copying democratic institutions and the implementation of the ideas of modernization in some countries have a tremendous success, and in others, initially, doomed to failure?" In some ways, a new, growing popularity in Western Europe and, especially in the United States, "theory

of a weak state" can be the answer to the question. Thus, it is necessary to consider some of the features of "the theory of weak states" and the arguments of the researchers concerning this phenomenon, which can bring the answer to the question "how to succeed in a separately taken state" (Zelinska, 2017: 163).

Regardless of or perhaps because of the numerous approaches to statehood in general, and in particular to the weak states, there is no coherent and unique definition of a weak state.

It has to be noted that traditional political sciences (in particular, realism and liberalism) have little to explain concerning the issue under study because they are not able to describe the principles of the weak state existence, the rules and conditions for its survival in the world where democracy generally prevails.

The same problem of "scientific gap" is observed within the framework of the so-called "hybrid paradigm" in the process of democratization, namely in studies by Larry Diamond (2002), Andreas Schedler (1998: 91-107), David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997), Thomas Carothers, Jean Griegel (2002) and others. Gruegel (2002: 68-91), for example, only mentions the possible relationship between the nature of state power and the establishment of democracy in the state as one of many aspects in the democratization process (Zelinska, 2017: 165).

In previous studies, the author (Zelinska, 2017) also

adhered to a somewhat controversial approach to identifying the concepts of "failed state" and "weak state", largely because of the above problem, the lack of a clear definition of these concepts in foreign and, moreover, domestic researchers. According to R. Rotberg (2004), the possibility or impossibility, efficiency or inefficiency of providing three groups of political goods by the state to the citizens is the basis for the division of states into strong states, weak states, "states that do not perform their functions" (failed states) and "collapsed states".

Weak states make a wide circle which is:

1) naturally weak due to the physical and geographical situation or unfavorable ecological and economic situation and resource constraints;

2) initially strong, but demonstrate, at some stage of their functioning, weakness because of unsuccessful management, despotism, internal contradictions, or external attack;

3) states of a mixed type combining the characteristics of the two above-mentioned ones.

Traditionally weak states include ethnic, religious, linguistic and other intergroup issues that eventually move from a latent conflict phase to an open armed conflict. The main indicators of economic development in the weak states are extremely fast, the level of corruption inside the country is increasing, and the form of government is often despotism (Mashura, 2015). That is, the problem is a rather fine line of determination in which case the state is weak and is itself "weak state", and in which the state is a vivid example of failed one. The prior author's identification of these definitions will be corrected in the framework of this study and provides more precise definitions and characteristics.

The Barry Buzan's (1991) author view on the issue of the weak states existence has to be taken into consideration as he believed that the essence of any state is a combination of the three main components that form a triangle, namely, the institutional expression of the state (bureaucracy) - administrative, legal and legislative authorities, coercive forces. This indicator also covers the rules and procedures under which public administration is carried out. It is worth noting that the model does not pay particular attention to whether the existing institutions are democratic or not.

The second component of the triangle is the idea (spirit) of the state (nation) - an idea that connects people in socio-political unity and answers the question of how organized the state is and why it exists. The indicator relates to terms such as nationality and ideology, which is particularly strong in national states.

Finally, the third component, the physical basis for the existence of the state (territory) - since the basis of the state are people, a certain territory, natural resources within the state borders. Another author Kalevi Jaakoo Holsti (Holsti, 1997: 83) also notes that the variables in this indicator have to change over time, except for the boundaries of a specific territory, the position of which in the late epoch is considered almost as "Sacred" and unchanged. The latest figure in the Buzan public model is the most important in his opinion.

Consequently, the conclusion can be made that weaker states are those ones where the influence of ideas (spirit) and bureaucracy is too weak for the unmanaged space possessed by the state, in order to protect the territorial integrity, full-fledged life and the implementation of international norms incorporated in the UN Charter (and if speaking in general, then at least basic human rights).

In turn, Paul Brooker (2000) explores the phenomenon of state weakness in the context of the political regimes in Africa, which draws attention primarily to the inability of elites within African dictatorships to pursue an effective and constructive policy. Despite the fact that strong states are almost absent not only in Africa but also in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, Brooker does not address the obvious relationship between the type of political regime and the strength / weakness of the state. Analyzing the regimes, he only assumes the possibility of deconstructing the existing non-democratic regime in the future towards consolidation, but does not consider regimes in weak states as self-sufficient and rather long-lasting phenomenon.

Therefore, the main objectives of this study, above all, to overcome the differences in definitions and categorizations, as well as assess the status of weak state (and its prospects for Ukraine, which, unfortunately, is already in the category of world weak states and poses a threat to world security).

Methodology

The main methods of scientific knowledge used in the study are systemic (weak state is considered as a separate system, which exists among other state systems), structural-functional (the weak state is investigated taking into account all its components that determine its functionality and interact with each other), comparative (for the identification of commonly important features in various political systems and their institutions), the socio-cultural method (the functioning of a weak state depends, in particular, on the type of political culture in society), and the method of forecasting appointment (providing a model for further development of weak state within Ukraine).

The results of the study are:

the proposed work is one of the first studies in the domestic science of the weak states status existence in the context of all changes in the global sense and the political system of Ukraine in particular. The status of weak state for each country is decisive, whose changes may lead to changes not only in the political system of the state, but also in its place and role in the world arena and in the international security system.

In this context, the main scientific results of the work, which are characterized by novelty and reveal the logic and the basic concept of the article, have been formulated:

- clarification of definitions of "weak" and "failed" state;
- conditions of the existence of states in the status of weak state near the neighboring powerful country;
- Ukraine in the status of weak state: preconditions and ways to overcome.

Discussion

Weak state can be defined as a country / state that has all the attributes of a democratic state (in particular, state-political institutions), but not the ability to fulfill the basic functions of the state and provide public services to its citizens. This state can be a separate sovereign entity within the world community, to be an independent actor in world politics. However, these hybrid states, which are inherently weak in nature, undoubtedly have all the signs of a democratic regime: "democratic" elections are being held, the "democratic" elections are proclaimed and even "almost adhered" to freedom of speech and assembly, the rights of citizens are respected, the arbitrariness of power is reduced, in other words meet the minimum

procedural requirements, but regular, acceptable and predictable democratic procedures will never lead to the formation of a truly strong state. At the same time, democracy is not replaced, it is preserved, but it functions in a special regime that serves the interests of the ruling elite and individual groups, or even, as already mentioned above, one person (*Zelinska, 2017*). The concept of "weak state" is used to refer to a group of countries where the modernization process explicitly does not evolve or even goes back: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Bosnia, the Philippines, some Latin American countries, and former Soviet republics.

In general, there are several terms derived from the "weak state" ("weak", "failed", "failing" (dying) state) that are more detailed and specific. Scientists came up with the terms "collapsed", "fragile", "traumatized" (damaged) and "diminished" (condensed) state.

Some of these terms, such as "fragile", are more likely to be used in countries that have recently emerged from the crisis or overcame a civil war. Others characterize different stages of the destruction of statehood. The term "failing state" refers to countries that are not at all able to descend from the trajectory of decay. For the most part, they include Lebanon, Guinea, Ethiopia, Mali, Chad, and Libya. The concept of "weak state" is used to refer to a group of countries where the modernization process is explicitly constrained or even goes back - the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Bosnia, the Philippines, and some Latin American countries. The term "collapsed states" describes subjects that in fact do not represent a coherent political space - Somalia, Liberia and Haiti (*Minayev, 2013*).

It has to be noted that the main indicator of a strong state is its ability to maintain political stability in conditions of modernization. Instead, weak states, besides economic and political instability, are often located in unstable regions (with ethnic and / or religious issues). Because of their weakness they become sources of additional instability.

The main attributes of the state's membership in the weak state are:

- loss of physical control over the territory;
- loss of the right (monopoly) of the state to lawful use of force;
- impossibility for collective decision makers to develop;
- the increasing level of corruption and organized crime;
- impossibility of tax collection;
- large-scale displacement of refugees and demographic disasters;
- ecological catastrophes (the example, Chornobyl);
- intrusion from outside.

Of course, to obtain weak state status, there are only a few of the abovementioned features.

Modern researchers assess weak state autonomy for its ability to achieve state objectives, such as security and development, in order to survive. Since they have little opportunity, it is anticipated that weak states have little autonomy and cannot achieve much independently.

According to the definition of Brookings Institution, weak states are poor countries that suffer from significant "gaps" in security, lack of state efficiency and legitimacy. Such states have no control over certain areas of their territory and, therefore, a critical international security capability to deal with the internal threats of the terrorists or armed insurgents appearance. However, given that repressive and authoritarian tendencies may appear in so-called weak states, some scholars regard this term as intrinsically controversial. In addition, a well-functioning state some-

times displays signs of such weakness in peripheral regions:

- states that have ceased to perform their functions (failed states). These are the states whose central government has discontinued existing. Thus, the state has lost physical control over its territory and the legitimate use of force. In fact, such states can no longer create conditions for their own survival;

- collapsed states. They completely ceased to perform their functions and are in a state of complete internal anarchy that affects all spheres of public life (*Rotberg, 2004*).

Interestingly, weaker states can also be seen as a condition for the survival of a neighboring powerful state. If a weak state is in a vital strategic space (be it geography, resource security, economic potential, territory, population or competence, large states can act aggressively to gain control over this weak state.) Weak states in such circumstances will be forced to adhere to the strategy balance: and therefore, win, negotiate or, if they are lucky, remain neutral in an attempt to guarantee their own survival.

Weak states can learn from their specific historical experience and, therefore, continue the policy of neutrality to ensure their continued existence.

Other economists describe the passive policy of the existence of a state in the status of weak state; this policy may include rigid balancing (military campaign or global alliance for countering the threat), soft balancing (diplomacy or economic management of the state to counteract the threat), countering (neglecting the claims of the hegemonic state), blackmail (using threats to obtain some concession), slipping of the leash (increasing abilities irrespective of the existence of neighboring large states), connecting (linking a great power with weak power economically or through institutions) and gluing (the development of a "special relationship" with the powerful state) (*Kassab, 2015: 105*).

However, there is also the opposite situation with the "bad neighbor" - experts recognized the "domino effect" as an extremely dangerous one, when conflicts in one weak state necessarily affect the fragile stability of the same "weak" neighbors. An example of the spread of instability from one "failed" state to its weak neighbors was the situation around Liberia. Conflicts in this country, creeping in during the 1990s, crossed the border and captured Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. Together, these subjects formed the whole "failed region".

Taking into account the traditional realistic view of international relations, international security challenges come from strong, aggressive states that seek to gain greater influence on the international scene and expand their area of responsibility. Speaking about new security challenges, they come not from force, but from the internal weakness of the state, which determines the social, economic and political factors of the state administration.

Consequently, our attention is given to the view of the nature of modern international security and international conflicts that increasingly confirm the transformation of the Westphalian world order into the post-World Transparency, when internal and external factors of state policy affect international security in the same way. In fact, this approach recognizes that the inalienable right of the state to govern the sovereignty of the state within a single country and the inviolability of that sovereignty (a norm that has never been completely respected of the Westphalian) are no more absolute. If the state ceases to be the main actor of international relations, then conflicts are more likely

characterized by civil wars, insurrections, the inability of states to perform their functions, and not intergovernmental wars. The very boundary between internal and external policies is blurred, where actions in response to new security threats are completely in conflict with the standards of inviolability of state sovereignty. Indeed, state sovereignty often becomes a threat to human rights and the human security dimension (*Mashura, 2015*).

It is necessary to come back to one of the tasks of the current research, namely, specifying the definitions of weak state and failed state.

In accordance with the above definition, the authors can point out that weak state is, above all, a weak state at the economic and security level, which is not able to fully satisfy the demands of its citizens.

Talking about a failed state, then this is a kind of "falling into the abyss" of a state, whose state-political power has lost control over its territories and no support for its actions in the population. This is a peculiar final step towards the complete destruction of statehood and the transition to the status of collapsed states.

The most professional list of failed states is the American Fund for Peace, founded in the middle of the twentieth century. Based on the CAST system, the fund examines 12 social, economic, political and military indicators, assesses the ability of the five most important government institutions to provide stability and security, and also, which authors consider important, takes into account risk factors and unexpected (negative) events that may affect the status of the state. Much attention is paid to the vulnerability of the state and the risks of domestic violence in the future.

According to recent reports of The Fund for Peace (*FFP, 2019*) out of 193 members of the United Nations there are sixty or seventy strong states. These are the nation-states ranked first - they include countries such as Finland, New Zealand and Singapore, as well as Canada, the United States, major regions of Europe, and countries such as Brazil and South Korea. After strong countries, there are eighty or ninety weak states: some are almost strong, and some are those at the bottom of the list and tend to fail and can become a subtype, the so-called "failed states". They are weak because they supply less: inadequate quantity of political goods and / or political goods of lower quality. The rest are collapsed states (often around twelve from around the world at one and the same time) that form separate categories.

Interestingly, according to the aforementioned The Fund for Peace (*FFP, 2019*), Ukraine belongs to the category of states with a higher level of danger and instability with an index of 71.0 (however, with a tendency to deteriorate the stability index: in 2019 it is -1.5 a mark in comparison with the indicator of 2018). This is a peculiar confirmation of Ukraine's status as a weak state.

Some Russian researchers point out that the topic of Ukraine as a failed state has recently become particularly fashionable among a certain circle of Russian political scientists - "implacable friends of Ukraine." One of such "friends" is S. Karaganov, who is an important figure in Moscow establishment and the head of the presidium of the Council on foreign and defense policy of Russia, expressed a number of considerations that have to attract the attention of those who are not indifferent to the fate of the Ukrainian state. Similar, and often more aggressive talks about Ukraine and the possible division of its territory are persistently conducted by Zatulín, Prokhanov, Dugin and others, are imposed on Russian society as a geopolitical issue: as before, Russian bolsheviks created

the fantastic propaganda slogans based on bloody reality. There is no doubt that the idea of "desuverenization" of Ukraine, its "uncontrolled territory", "disintegration" into parts is quite seriously processed at various levels of the political, military and intelligence leadership of the Russian Federation: large and small Russian bosses did not forget that their leader in Bucharest shouted during 2007 summit in the moment of an angry revelation: "Ukraine is not a state! What is Ukraine? One part of it is Eastern Europe, and the other one - and very big - is presented by us! "

Even in the distant 2009, in fact, 5 years before the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine, a remarkable article on the matters of Ukraine appeared in the issue of the *American Foreign Affairs (Foreign Affairs, 2009: 106-120)*. The authors believed that the deterioration of relations between Russia and Ukraine have to be a major concern for the West, since Ukraine's security is critical to Europe's stability.

Ukraine, in the opinion of the authors, was supposed to return to the political agenda as a state that protects its own rights, but not moves towards the status of Russia's vassal. The article describes Russia as an undemocratic, authoritarian and self-confident nationalist country. Its mass media consistently create the image of hostile, aggressive Ukraine, a thief in Russian gas matter, which is joining the enemies of Moscow (it cannot be but mentioned the degree of hostility of Russian society to Ukraine, when according to the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee on 15/02/2009, every sixth Russian was ready for war with Ukraine, and 70% of respondents consider possible armed conflict with the country). The process of "zombification" of the former "brothers" who had recently had peaceful relationships with Ukraine was very influential. The blame lies entirely in the ruling regime of the neighboring state and contradicts the interests of Russia and its people (*Shcherbak, 2009*).

That is, Ukraine has always existed in the conditions described above, namely, as a condition for the survival of a neighboring great power. Another issue is that, over the years of independence, due to well-balanced state-economic policies, it would be possible to get rid of at least the dangerous status of a weak state, especially considering the danger of close proximity to the Russian Federation. However, the Ukrainian top leadership, instead of choosing the most advantageous path for a weak country with a dangerous neighbor, namely the tactics of "slipping a leash" (building up their own abilities, regardless of the existence of large powerful neighboring countries next to each other), has always chosen deliberately losing methods of so-called soft balancing (diplomacy or economic management of the state to counteract the threat) and blackmail (use of threats to obtain some concessions, for example in the case of gas transfer).

The good news is that the status of a weak state is not a sentence for our country. It is not static and may vary depending on the conditions and the very time. In recent years, the role of civil society has been intensified in Ukraine, and protest rallies have been caused by the dissatisfaction of the population with the absence of certain political freedoms, as well as social inequality, corruption and unemployment. That is, the population of a "weak state" with a caricature democratic facade begins to alter the embarrassing and cumbersome political system by using more or less democratic instruments to protect themselves and their rights and freedoms. Ukrainians are still in search of an alternative system of government that would preserve the identity of our culture and traditions, would

allow the nation to live decent lives, but would not restrict those rights and freedoms.

In relation to such seemingly basic concepts as the rights and freedoms of a citizen in Ukraine, the fact that in the course of the poll conducted by the "Democratic Initiatives" Fund in the autumn of 2016 on the Donbas (territories under the control of Ukraine) to endure material difficulties for the sake of rights and freedoms of people and citizens, 54% of those surveyed ranked security (79%) and freedom (66%) of the inhabitants of this region as the highest values for themselves (*Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2016*). That is, certain changes in the consciousness of the citizens have already taken place, now the direct way to consolidate society in order to withdraw the state from the position of "weak state".

Conclusions

Therefore, it is necessary to develop new and improve existing methods of combating the threats that are responsible for the states status of weak states primarily to their own citizens and to the whole world, and the first steps in this long and extremely difficult path are seen by the authors as following: 1. Reforming the political system, namely, overcoming the trend of creating "decorative" democratic institutions and reforms for the sake of reform; 2. Economic transformation taking into account resource features of each region of the country and its potential; 3. The election of a new strategy of neighborhood with a hostile large state where the emphasis is on strengthening the economic potential of its own country; 4. Last, most importantly, to recognize a citizen as the highest value of the state not only as a sentence from the text of the Constitution, but due to an effective policy of state sustainable development (*Chechel, 2017*).

What have we gained? Was only our weapon used? No. With our craft only? No. We have succeeded in our social order, our consent and our friendship (Ivan Franko)¹.

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КОНЦЕПЦІЯ "WEAK STATE": ТЕОРЕТИЧНІ ВИТОКИ ТА ПРАКТИЧНЕ ВТІЛЕННЯ

У сучасному світі майже одночасно в тексті стратегій національної безпеки США та Європейського Союзу називають саме *weak states* головною загрозою безпеки для усього світу. Варто зазначити щодо актуальності дослідження, що *weak states* вже досить давно є предметом досліджень західних науковців. Це стосувалося пошуку шляхів вирішення проблем у декількох сферах, зокрема пострадянський трансфер, проблеми розвитку та становлення держав Африканського континенту, дослідження питань безпеки на Близькому Сході тощо. У статті зроблено спробу виявити розбіжності у визначеннях і категоризаціях, а також проаналізувати передумови та шляхи, спрямовані на подолання слабкості держави (*weak state*), зокрема у зовнішньоекономічному та безпековому секторі. Проаналізовані основні теоретичні підходи до визначення *weak states* в зарубіжній літературі, оскільки у вітчизняних дослідженнях це питання науковцями піднімається вкрай рідко. Узагальнено загрози для міжнародної безпеки країн зі статусом *weak state*. У підсумку дослідження надано визначення та оцінку статусу *weak states* - слабких держав у різних регіонах світу та в Україні зокрема. У рамках цього дослідження було вперше запропоновано уточнення дефініцій "weak" та "failed" state, а також визначені принципи існування слабкої держави поруч з сусідньою великою державою, та чітко окреслені передумови та шляхи подолання державою, на прикладі України, своєї політико-економічної слабкості.

Ключові слова: *weak states; failed states; держава; Україна; демократія; стабільна влада; політичний трансферінг.*

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STALINGRAD STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION (19.11.1942 - 02.02.1943): FACTORS OF SUCCESS OF TANK FOR SURROUNDING AND DESTRUCTION OF LARGE FACTIONS OF ENEMY

Author in this article continuous publications on the Battle of Stalingrad, revealing the role of army armored troops of Red Army during the breakthrough of the enemy's defense and surroundings of the 6th and 4th tank armies during the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation in the autumn-winter of 1942-1943, as the only one operation of the southwest, Don and Stalingrad fronts. The importance of groups of tanks of direct support of the infantry during the breakthrough of the enemy's defense and mobile units (tank and mechanized corps) during the completion of the breakthrough of the main enemy's defensive zone and the development of success inside of the enemy lines have been analyzed. The experience of the association of three tank corps for closer interaction under the general leadership of one of these commanders was singled out, which was the basis for the formation in the spring of 1943 of tank armies of a uniform composition.

Key words: *Stalingrad strategic offensive operations; front line; tank corps.*

Introduction

During the Second World War, in the offensive operations of the Red Army occupied an important place in the operations of the environment and the defeat of the surrounding grouping of the enemy. These operations are complex and demand from commanders, headquarters and personnel of diligent preparation, high organizational work of the headquarters and command and control units during the preparation and in the conduct of fighting (actions). The strategic offensive operation of Stalingrad occupies a special place in its scale and results, consisting of a set of front operations and operations of groups of fronts, which should be considered in stages.

The relevance of military and historical research of Stalingrad Strategic Offensive operations during the war imposed by Russian militarists in 2014 has theoretical and practical significance for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The level of military arts nowadays are not derogate from the experience gained during operations in World War II, particularly in Stalingrad Strategic Offensive, but rather confirms its viability. It requires constant development of military ideas aimed at improving the forms and methods of modern operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And taking into account the experience of military experts will contribute to the expansion of their knowledge, outlook, development of creative thinking.

The historiography of the problem, which includes the question of the combat use of tank troops, is extremely broad and multifaceted. And Soviet historiography occupies a prominent position, and since the end of the twentieth century - Russian historiography.

Stalingrad's strategic offensive operation enriched the theory and practice of martial arts with new techniques and methods of armed struggle, as evidenced by numerous sources and scientific works, memoirs and popular literature.

In general, all the scientific works devoted to the course of the war are marked by the ideological stamps of the totalitarian era. The best of them, in our opinion, is "The History of the Second World War" in 12 volumes (published in 1973-1982), which contains a large scientific and historical material.

Despite ideological postulates and pre-programmed conclusions, the works of Soviet researchers of these years were marked by a significant factual and contained a lot of materials devoted to tank troops. The best of them are the works of G.A. Deborin¹, the collective monograph "The Second World War", edited by Lieutenant General S.P. Platonov, Major-General N.G. Pavlenko and Colonel I.V. Porotkin².

Lots of interesting information can be gleaned, bypassing obligatory ideological postulates and stamps, and from other Soviet scientific literature, where military-theoretical views on the use of tank armies were considered, as well as the participation of tank units (associations) in campaigns of 1942-43 years³.

¹ Deborin, G.A. (1958). Second World War. Moscow, 234 p.

² Platonov, S.P. (ed.), Pavlenko, N.G. (ed.) and Porotkin, I.V. (1958). Second World War of 1939-1945. Moscow, 1958. 654 p.

³ Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v period korennoho pereloma v khode Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (19 noyabrya 1942 g. - dekabr 1943 g.) (1958). *Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg. Vol. 2.* Moscow: Voenizdat, 518 p.; *Korennoy perelom v khode Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (noyabr 1942 - dekabr 1943) (1961). Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg. Vol. 3.* Moscow: Voenizdat, 662 p.; Stokov, A.A. (1966). History of military art. Moscow: Voenizdat, 398 p.; Rotmistrov, P.A. (1963). History of military art. Vol.2. Moscow: Voenizdat, 720 p.; *Kratkoye opisaniye pleniya shtaba 6-y nemetskooy armii vo glave s yeye komanduyushchim general-*

In general, studies of Soviet, especially contemporary Russian historians, helped to study the history of the development and use of tank troops⁴.

Question of the history of the use of tank armies has long been studied in Western Europe and the United States. Moreover, national schools not only make their peculiarities, but also maintain some tendentiousness⁵. German historiography has always been characterized by scrupulousness and attention to numbers and details. Actually, she managed to maintain objectivity and coverage of such a difficult topic as the Second World War, which provided a sufficient fact that allows us to understand the features of the use of tank armies in various campaigns and operations. Another feature of the German researchers were enthusiastic about the descriptions of the fighting of individual units, parts and compounds, especially the tank compounds, where it was possible to show the strong points of the Wehrmacht. Modern German historians are very restrained about the idea of a preventive war and are in no hurry to declare Stalin as an aggressor.

English historiography has become the most critical of the attitude of both - to their own and opponents. And although tank issues are second only (fleet occupies Britain's traditional championship). Not the most active among British military theorists of that time was Biezel Henry Liddell Hart. His main ideas relate to the mechanization and motorization of the army. B. Liddle Hart also survived the Second World War.

French military-theoretical thought was not far behind from English. French historians also did not justify their military-political leadership. The most prominent of them was Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle. He advocated for the mechanization and motorization of the army.

The works of American researchers, on the other hand, are rather superficial and contain whole series of minor inaccuracies. Their authors are hard to blame for deliberate engagement or supremacy, it is rather negligence for

details. In this respect, the publication of American authors⁶ can be opposed to the works of the German authors.

A respectable place in the complex of research sources for the development of military arts is taken by documents of personal origin: memoirs, memories⁷.

Archival materials⁸ are of special value for the study of military arts as regards the use of armored personnel carriers in the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation.

Ukrainian military historiography has only begun to consider these problems.

The complex of sources used in this study is divided into four groups: research of Soviet and contemporary Russian historians, works of military theorists of various national schools, memoirs and the fourth group includes archival collections.

During the analysis of the source base and historiography, views and ideas of military theorists of different countries regarding the role and order of the use of unions, unions of tank armies were taken into account.

Despite the peculiarities of the national historical schools, historiographical literature reflects various aspects of the combat use of tank troops.

The analysis of sources, scientific works, memoirs, the value of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation allows using its experience in modern conditions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the theory and practice of military arts.

The purpose of the article

On the basis of studying and analyzing of archival documents, memoirs and scientific literature about the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation, to identify the peculiarities of its preparation and conduct as operations on the surroundings, to identify the features and peculiarities of combat use of tank troops, to offer suggestions on the use of the experience in military theory and practice of modern military construction.

Methods

To achieve the purpose of the study, special methods of military-historical science and general scientific methods were used.

Due to the application of the historical method of research, they could identify the stages and with the maximum possible reliability to recreate the factors of the success of the tank troops in the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation, to clarify its results and consequences. Due to the use of the logical method, the factors that influenced the preparation and conduct of the operation

feldmarshalom Paulyusom v Stalingrade chastyami 64-y armii Donskogo fronta 31 yanvarya 1943 g. (1959). *Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, № 2. (In Russian).

⁴ Samsonov, A.M. (1989). Stalingradsкая битва (4 ed.). Moscow: Nauka, 604 p.; Rodin, A.G. (1958). Koltso okruzheniya. In: *Bitva za Volgu*. p. 134; Doerr, H. (1955). Der Feldzug nach Stalingrad. Versuch eines operative Überblickes. Darmshtadt; Isayev, A.V. (2008). Stalingrad. Beyond the Volga there is no land for us. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 448 p.

⁵ Tippelskirch, K. (2001). Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945. Moscow: AST, 796 p.; Werth, A. (2001). Rossiya v voynе 1941-1945 gg. (Translation from English). Moscow: Voenizdat, 664 p.; Mellentin, F.V. (2005). Tank battles of 1939-1945: combat use of tanks in World War II (translat. from germ). Moscow: AST; SPb.: Polygon, 437 p.; Morzik, F. (1961). German Air force Airlift Operations. USAAF Historical division. P. 195; Manstein, E. von. (1955). Verlorene Siege. Bonn, p. 384; Haupt, Werner. (1997). Army Group North. The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-1945. In: *Schiffer Military History*. Atlegen, 247 p.; Haupt, Werner. (1998). Army Group South. The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941-1945. In: *Schiffer Military History*. Atlegen, 259 p.; Fuller, J.F.C. (1948). The Second World War. London, 659 p.; Newton, S. (1994). German battle tactics on the Russian front. 1941-1945. In: *Schiffer Military History*. Atlegen, 333 p.; Busch, R. (2016). Survivors of Stalingrad: Eyewitness Accounts from the 6th Army, 1942-1943. London, 256 p.; Glantz, D. M. and Jonathan, M. (2017). House Stalingrad (Modern War Studies). Kansas, Abridged, 640 p.; Hellbeck, J., ed. (2015). Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich. Public Affairs, 512 p.

⁶ Werth, A. (2001). Rossiya v voynе 1941-1945 gg. (Translation from English). Moscow: Voenizdat, 664 p.; Young, S.P. and Ford, J. (1970). History of the British Army. New York, 189 p.; The Second World War. Two glances (G.-A. Jacobsen and A.Taylor) (1995). Moscow, 556 p.

⁷ Vasilevsky, A.M. (1965). Nezabyvayemye dni. *Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*. No. 10; Voronov, N. N. (1963). Na sluzhbe voyennoy. Moscow: Voenizdat, 434 p.; Wieder, I. (1965). Katastrofa na Volge. Vospominaniya ofitsera-razvedchika 6-y armii Paulyusa (Translat. from German). Moscow: Progress, p. 51-53; Adam, V. (1967). Trudnoye resheniye. (translat. from death). Moscow, p. 278.

⁸ Central archives of the Ministry of Defence RF, f. 206, op. 262, d. 173, 189; Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR June 22, 1941 - 1942. T. 13 (2-2) (1997). Moscow: TERRA, 448 p.; Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: Supreme Command Rate: Documents and materials: 1942. T. 16 (5-2) (1996). Moscow: TERRA, 624 p.

on the surrounding and the destruction of a large group of enemy were identified and revealed, the features of combat use of tank troops in the operation were identified and analyzed, the contribution of the acquired combat experience to the development of military art were revealed.

Results

Preparations for the transition to a counterattack began during the defensive battles near Stalingrad (*Samsonov, 1989: 348*).

The plan for the destruction of the German group on the Volga was the most important part of the plan of the winter campaign of 1942/43, the strategic goal of which was the defeat of troops throughout the southern wing of the German army, the seizure of a strategic initiative and a breakthrough during the war in favor for the Soviet Union (*Great Victory on the Volga, 1965: 219*).

The idea of a counterattack was to smash the flanks of the main group of the enemy (*Vol. 19, 1965, No. 10. p. 18*) with powerful strikes from the bridgeheads Serafimovich, Kletsk and from the lake area south of Stalingrad and, developing an offensive in the directions that converge on Kalach, to surround and destroy the main forces of the enemy, who operating in the area of Stalingrad.

The fronts were tasked with operations. Fighting troops: to inflict a major blow from the bridgehead southwest front (SWF) of Serafimovich, defeat the enemy in the frontline and, by developing an offensive, by the end of the third day of offensive, enter the Kalacha region, where, together with the troops of the Stalingrad front (SF) and the Don front (DF), to complete the encirclement. Simultaneously part of the forces went out on the River Chir and create an active external front of the surrounding.

SF troops: strike from the area of the Sarpin lakes, break through the enemy's defense, and, developing an offensive against the Soviet, unit with the troops of the SWF, to surround and further in cooperation with other fronts, to destroy the enemy group. In order to secure its front group, it was necessary to part of the forces to step on Kotelnikovo and create an external front of the encirclement.

DF: strike two attacks in the direction of Vertyachy with the purpose of surroundings and defeat the enemy group near the bend of the Don. In the future, together with the troops of the SWF and the SF to destroy the surrounding group of the enemy (*History of War and Military Art, 1970: 198*).

At the same time, it was planned to inflict auxiliary strikes from the regions of Kachalinsk and Kletsk in the direction of Vertichy to cut down the enemy troops defending themselves in the bend of Don, from the Stalingrad group.

An significant role in the preparation of a counterattack in Stalingrad was played by the reserves of Supreme High Command General Headquarters (SHCGH), which consisting mainly of new formations (*History of Military Art, 1966: 398*).

But to determine the time of the transition to the offensive, the composition of the shock groups and the direction of their attacks on the German command was not successful (*Fateful decision, 1958: 166; War.-Historical Journal, 1961, No. 4. S. 89*). The uncertainty factor at this important stage of the struggle was of great importance in the course of further development.

The concentration of troops near Stalingrad and regrouping was carried out only at night with maintaining the strict measures of masking. General A.G Rodin, who commanded 26 tk and 5 TA, later wrote in his memoirs: "Unexpectedness was provided with all care and severity. When sending trains by rail, even their chiefs did not know

the way of movement and station of destination. The concentration of parts after unloading took place only at night ... The task was known to a certain circle of people" (*Rodin: 134*).

The beginning of the offensive for the SWF and the DF was planned for November 19, and for the SF - by 20. It was planned to simultaneously create the internal and external fronts of the encirclement. The inner front of the surrounding was created by tank, mechanized and cavalry corps. At the outer front there were rifle and cavalry divisions. Operative line up of the fronts was supposed to be in one echelon, and the general armies - in two echelons⁹.

The strike groups had a significant advantage over their enemy in terms of manpower and technology in the direction of major strikes. As pointed out by K. Tippelskirh, the direction of the enemy's strikes was determined by the image of the front line: the left flank of the German group stretching nearly 300 km from Stalingrad to the bend of the Don in the district of Novaya Kalitva, and the short right flank, which was located particularly weak forces, began near Stalingrad and was lost in the Kalmyk steppe (*Typelskirh, 2001: 349*). And G. Djorr noted that "the command of the Soviet forces was skillful ... has set a breakthrough point so far from the flank of the German troops that the assistance of the German reserves did not come immediately" (*Djerr, 1957: 66*).

In all armies for the artillery preparation of the attack were involved artillery of other echelons. 45-mm battalion and regimental, as well as 76-mm regimental guns were planned to be used during the artillery training period for direct gunfire shooting, and with the onset of the attack, as infantry and tanks guards. For the support of infantry and tanks, it was planned to use part of the gun of diving artillery and anti-tank artillery regiments. In the armies, which had on the reinforcement of the cannon regiments of the SHCGH Reserve, armed groups of long-range action were created¹⁰.

Fighting artillery was planned for periods: artillery training, artillery attack assault, and artillery support for infantry and tanks during combat at the depths of the enemy's defense (*Operation SBAS, 1958: 33-44*).

Much attention was paid to the air defense of the troops, for which the SWF and the DF had two, and the SF - one anti-aircraft artillery division and several anti-aircraft artillery units (*History of Military Art, 1966: 402*).

The main tasks of the aircraft were: the maintenance of conquered domination in the air; coverage from the air strikes of the enemy of the strike groups of armies in the starting position for the offensive; suppression and destruction of the living force and fire equipment, as well as the destruction of defensive structures in the direction of major strikes of the armies during the breakthrough of the enemy's defense; direct support for the troops coming on offensive; air cover of mobile armies in the waiting areas and when they enter the breakthrough; suppressing the tactical and operational reserves of the enemy and

⁹ The bandwidth of the offensive of the fronts ranged from 85 to 180 km, and the armies from 35 to 110 km. The fronts broke the enemy's defense on two and three sections, and the army - on one, a width of 5 to 16 km. The depth of operations for the fronts reached 60-140 km, and the armies - from 50-60 km to 110-140 km, the duration was 2-3 days, and the rate of offensive planned operations for the front reaches 60-140 km, and armies - from 50-60 km to 110-140 km, the duration was 2-3 days, and the pace of the offensive was planned 25-45 km.

¹⁰ It consists of 3-4 gun regiments, approximately one for each division.

obstructing their approach to breakthrough areas (*Operation SBAS, 1958: 45*).

The plan of aviation security provided for the beginning of the operation to strike night bombers on the combat orders of the enemy in the main lane of defense, and in the break-through period - the main forces of 17 PAs suppress hostile artillery positions, support points, KP and nodes in the direction of the main strike. With the beginning of the success of the aircraft, aviation was supposed to strike at enemy airfield and reserves, and part of the forces to support the attack of tank corps (*History of Military Art, 1963: 202*).

Fighting of tank and mechanized parts and units were planned according to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense (PCD) No. 325 from October 16, 1942 (*Russian Archives, 1997: 334*). Tank and mechanized corps were planned to be used as echelons of success¹¹. They were intended to introduce into the breakthrough in the stripes of the armies advancing in the direction of the main strikes of the fronts with tasks: rapidly developing the offensive in the operational inside of the enemy's defense, defeating its immediate operational reserves, reach the rear of the main group of the enemy and surround it.

Individual tank brigades¹² and battalions were added to infantry divisions to be used as group of tanks for direct infantry support (BPP). But due to insufficient number of Tank Army BPP¹³ as such, it was planned to use part of the forces of tank and mechanized corps. This weakened the impact of the last, but the army commanders were forced to take such measures because of the lack of tank units at their disposal (*Operation SBAS, 1958: 46-47*). The main task of the BPP tanks was to destroy enemy infantry. Typically, tanks were not allowed to engage with enemy tanks (except in cases of explicit advantage).

The skillful training of Soviet troops in a counterattack notices the A. Vert. "Preparing for an offensive was conducted with the highest secrecy. ... The Germans did not have a clear idea of the amount of equipment and troops delivered (mainly at night) to the area on the north of the Don and to the two main Soviet bridgeheads in the twist of the Don. ... the Germans did not have an idea of the power of the blow that was being prepared" (*Vert, 2001: 353*).

The coordination of the actions of all three fronts was assigned to the representative of the Stake Colonel-General O. M. Vasilevsky.

On the morning of November 19, after the 80-minute artillery training, an attack on the forces of the SWF and the DF went on the offensive.

A crushing fire inflicted heavy damage on the enemy. However, due to bad things, far from all targets were destroyed, especially on the flanks of the strike group of the SWF, where the enemy made the greatest resistance to the advancing troops (*Samsonov, 1989: 375*).

Unfavorable meteorological conditions did not allow aerial training. But the artillery fire was so powerful that the infantry connections of the first echelons of 5 TA and 21 A SWF for 4-5 hours moved to a depth of 3-4 km, that means

they broke through the first position of the main band of the enemy's defense. In order to complete the breakthrough of the main lane of the enemy's defense at 12 o'clock at the breakthrough area 5 TA (commander-lieutenant-general P. L. Romanenko), the main forces of 1 tk (commander-lieutenant-general P. L. Butkov) and 26 tk (commander-major-general O.G. Rodin), and at the breakthrough area 21 A (commander - Major General I. M. Chistyakov) - 4 tk (commander - Major-General A.G. Kravchenko). The massive attacks of large groups dazzled the enemy. He began to hurry backward. For 4-6 hrs. Tank corps, together with the rifle connections, completely completed the breakthrough of the tactical zone of the enemy's defense and entered the operational space (*History of Military Art, 1966: 403-404*).

On the first day of the offensive on November 19, the strike group of the SWF broke through the tactical zone of the enemy's defense and advanced units of tank corps moved forward inside for 20-35 km (*Great Victory on the Volga, 1965: 262-264*).

The output of the three tank corps at operating depth made a huge impact on the entire further course of the operation. He led to the partition of the 3A (Romanian) opposing troops on isolated parts, which lost their interaction, which forced them to move away in different directions (*History of Military Art, 1963: 208*).

The next day, the Soviet troops, developing an offensive, struck at the operational reserves of the enemy. 1 tk, together with 8 kk, threw 22 td (German) on south of Medvezhe. And 1 tk, developing the offensive, by the end of November, 22 went to the river Liska in 15-20 km north of its mouth. At the same time, 26 tons were dropped from the Perelazawsky region to the east of Part 1, td (Romanian) on November 20, and, continuing the offensive on the southeast, on November 22, pushed for Don in the Kalach region, seizing the crossing over the river. 4 pm until evening on November 21 went to the Don to the north of Kalach.

Rifle units 5 TAs and 21A the strikes of parts of their internal flanks captured the troops of two Romanian corps in the Raspynskaya region, and the remaining parts using the success of tank corps, quickly moved forward.

The SF troops started an offensive on November 20 in adverse weather conditions, which also ruled out aviation's actions. The armies went on the offensive alternately one after another, as the fog dissipated.

Connection 57 A (Commander-Major General, since January 19, 1943 - Lieutenant-General F.I. Tolbukhin), 51 A (commander-major-general M.I. Trufanov) and 64 A (commander-lieutenant-general M.S. Shumilov) on the first day broke the defense of the enemy and provided the introduction of a battle of 13 and 4 microns (mc), 4 kk, which by the end of the day moved to a depth of 10-16 km.

After the breakthrough of the enemy's defense, the troops of all three fronts were able to develop an offensive at operational depths. Tank and mechanized corps moved up to 50-70 km a day (*History of Wars and Military Art, 1970: 202*).

The German command made attempts to prevent the connection of armored and mechanized buildings of the SWF and the SF. For this purpose, it sent to the Kalach and Malinovka districts 24 and 16 td and they managed to stop the Soviet offensive after they captured Kalach and a large bridgehead in the area and on the left bank of the Don.

Thus, on November 23, the surroundings of the enemy group in the area of Stalingrad were completed. On this day, the troops of the 64th and 57th SF securely took the border along the Chervlena River, blocking the ways to go south, and to the Don in the Kalach region, advanced

¹¹ The introduction of a breakthrough in tank shells was planned at 12 o'clock on the first day of the operation at a depth of 6-8 km from the front edge of the enemy's defense. The corps for the breakthrough was provided with an 8-10-km band from the calculation: 4-5 km for the column movement and 2-2.5 km for the provision of each flank of the strip for introduction into the breakthrough.

¹² The width of the front of the offensive of the tank brigade ranged from 1.5 to 2 km, and the tank regiment from 1 to 1.5 km.

¹³ The density of TPBs in the breakthrough areas was 6-14 tanks per 1 km of front.

detachments of infantry divisions of 21A SWF (*Operation SBAS, 1958: 52*).

Inside, there were 22 divisions 6 A and 4 TA units, 15 infantry divisions, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 1 cavalry, as well as 160 separate units. The total number reached 330 thousand people. Troops DF failed to cut off the enemy in the bend of Don, and the enemy partially went to the main group that operated directly near Stalingrad.

In addition to the 6A and 6T forces, the Soviet troops defeated the 3rd Romanian Army, 48 tk, which comprised the enemy's operational reserve, inflicted defeats 6 and 7 of the Romanians operating south of Stalingrad and were operationally subordinated to the commander of 4 TA (German) (*Great Victory on the Volga, 1965: 283*).

By the end of November 23 Soviet troops have created internal and external fronts. The total length of the outer front was: in the SWF band - 165 km, and in the stretch of the SW - more than 100 km. The maximum distance of the external front of the environment from the internal one was equal to the SWF - 100 km, and at the SF - 75-80 km. Minimum distance was within 15-20 km. At the same time, the least distance from the outside was internal, it was in the most responsible directions¹⁴, from which the enemy was more likely to carry out a counterattack in order to release his surrounded group (*Great Victory on the Volga, 1965: 283-284*).

On November 24, an offensive against the Soviet troops began. Against the group of opponents surrounded at Stalingrad went on the offensive 21 (*Russian archive, 1996: 415*)¹⁵, 65, 24 and 66 A DF, 62, 64 and 57 A SF. Fierce battles lasted until November 30th. The area occupied by the surrounding group of the enemy was reduced to 1 500 km² (40 km from west to east and 30 to 40 km from north to south) (*Operations SVS, 1958: 54*).

A distinguishing feature of this stage of the counter-attack was that tank and mechanized corps were aimed at creating the inner front of the encirclement. Cavalry corps and infantry divisions went to the rivers Chir and Aksai to create the outer front of the environment.

Soviet troops on the front of the Bokova to the lake. Sarpa (southern), over a distance of more than 300 km, created a huge gap, covered only by the river Chir and Don with the remnants of the broken divisions of the enemy.

As a result of military actions, the enemy's defense was broken. The Strategic initiative went to the command of the Red Army. At the beginning of December 1942, a dense inner front of the environment was created around the grouping of the enemy.

During the development of a counterattack in the Battle of the Volga before the command of the Red Army, there was a need for a simultaneous solution to mutually opposite directions of two important tasks: to liquidate the surrounded enemy group in the rivers of the Don and the Volga and to develop further offensive on the Rostov direction (*Russian Archive, 1996: 459*).

The situation on the external front of the environment seriously aggravated. The enemy captured a small bridgehead on the left bank of the Don in the Nizhniy-Chirsk region and held it firmly despite repeated attempts by the troops 5 TA to capture the bridgehead (*History of Military Art, 1963: 212*). In order to quickly release their surround troops 6 A and parts of forces 4 TA The German

command hastily created two groups: one of the district Tormosin (about 17 divisions) and the second in the district Kotelnikovo (13 divisions), which became part of the newly formed group of armies "Don" (Commander - Field Marshal Erich von Manstein).

Taking into account the current situation, the SHCGH Stage made changes to the previously approved plan Saturn (*Russian Archives, 1996: 466*) and limited itself to Operation Small Saturn: instead of an offensive on Rostov it was decided to strike a powerful blow in the south-eastern direction on Tacin, Morozovsky, defeat the Italian and Romanian troops who were defending Don and Chir, as well as the Hollidt operational group and moving the outer front of the ambience to the west of the confederated forces at 150-200 km.

Soviet SHCGH made a decision with the forces of 1 A, 3 guards A and 5 TA SWF and 6A Voronezh Front in order to develop counterattack and disrupt the plans of the enemy A and defeat the 8th Italian and the remains of the 3rd Romanian Army.

According to the plan of the front commander, the defeat of the enemy on the Don and Cher River was supposed to be carried out by strikes of the forces of 1 guards A from the Upper district. Mamon in the direction of Tacin and 3 guards A from the eastern part of. Bokovskaya - on Morozovsky. At the same time, part of the forces of the adjacent flanks of these armies was planned to develop an offensive in the directions converging on Bokovsky, in order to surround and destroy the troops of the 8th Italian Army. Provision of a shock group of 1 guards A from the west he was assigned to 6 A, who was given the task to step in the direction of Kantemirovka, Millerovo (*History of Military Art, 1963: 214*).

The attack on the SWF strike groups started simultaneously on the morning of December 16 after an hour and a half of artillery attack preparations. In the fierce two-day battles, the tank corps, together with the infantry, broke through the enemy's defenses, and by the morning of December 18 they went to the southern coast of Bogucharka river. Until the end of the day, the troops of 1 guards A and 6A expanded the front of the breakthrough to 60 km and completed the breakthrough in the band of 3 guards A at the front of the width of up to 20 km (*Operations SVS, 1958: 65*).

The actions of tank corps after their release into the operational space took the nature of the rapid pursuit of enemy troops, who were retreating. The greatest pace of persecution was developed by 24 tk. In five days they moved on 240 km and on the morning of December 24 they seized the station Tacin. The attack was so rapid and sudden that the enemy did not have time to pick up airplanes. In total, it was captured at the airfield and in echelons at the railway station of 350 planes. Thus, the troops of 24 tk crossed the more important railway communication linking the group of armies "Don" with the rear, which deprived the German command not only to complete the concentration of their brakes group, but also to provide supplies with the necessary material resources. Under the prevailing German command it was compelled to refuse the use of the Germans group to release its surrounded troops in the inter-rivers Don and the Volga and in a hurry to send them against the attacking troops. But the enemy succeeded at the turn north of Tacins, Morozovsky to prevent a breakthrough 25 tk. 24 tk was in the surroundings. Within five days, the corps repulsed the enemy's attacks, which sought to seize the Tacinsk (*History of Military Art, 1963: 216*).

Until December 24, an enemy group was liquidated, consisting of three Italian and one German infantry divisions in the north-east of Alekseevo-Lozovsky region.

¹⁴ Soviet, Lower Chirsk and Soviet, Askai.

¹⁵ Directive No. 170694 of 11/27/1942: 21 and in the composition: 4 and 26 tk; 51 vols, 293, 277, 63 and 96 sd; three tp and parts of the reinforcement of the army to transfer from the FPF to the DF. 3 gv kk without tank regiments to leave as part of the NRF.

The development of the offensive by Soviet troops threatened to cover the right flank of the group of German-Hungarian troops in the Voronezh direction and, which was particularly dangerous for the enemy, threatened the reach of the left flank and the rear of its group in the areas of Tormosin and Kotelnikovo.

Until December 30, troops of the SWF, destroyed the enemies surrounded by the rear of the group, stood at the turn: Nov. Kalitva, Markovka, Chertkovo, Voloshino, north of Millerovo, Ilyinka, Skorsir, Chernyshkovsky (*Operations of the SWS, 1958: 66-67*).

The success of the operation, as well as in the first stage of counterattack, played a decisive role in tank and mechanized corps¹⁶.

For closer interaction 24, 25 tk and 1 guards during the battle for Tacinsk and Morozovsky, during the battle, they were united under the general command of the commander of 24 tk (*Major-General V. M. Badanov*). This experience was justified and was the basis for the formation in the spring of 1943, tank armies of a homogeneous composition.

From 12 to 30 December, the Kotelnikovsky offensive operation was conducted by the SF troops. The 51A troops resisted parts and connections of the right wing of the Goth armies group, whose goal was to join forces surrounded by troops, which in turn were supposed to strike a counter strike.

The main forces of the left flank of the Goth armies group, concentrated in the area of Tormosin and intended to strike at Stalingrad, but were transferred to Morozovsky and Tacinsk, where they were involved in the battle with the troops of the SWF. There was also thrown from Kotelnikovsky direction and 6 td. Thus, by December 24, the plan to attack the enemy in order to release his troops surrounded by the Stalingrad region was sabotaged.

By December 23, on the Kotelnikovsky direction, concentrated 2 guards A from 7 tk and unfolded on the Mishkov River from Shabalinsky to Kapkinsky. Left-handed 51 A in the five sd and three microns. More to the right 2 guards A were deployed one cd of 5 Defence A and 4 kk.

On the morning of December 24, the group of the left wing of the SF went on the offensive to defeat the opposing group (*Operations SVS, 1958: 67-68*).

The main strike inflicted 2 guards A in the direction of Kotelnikovo from the north, 51 A - from the north east, and its 13 mk and 3 guards mk broke through the front of the 4th Romanian army to deep cover the enemy's group from the south.

Within three days of the battles, the rifle divisions 2 guards A and 51 A together with the 2 guards mk and 7 tk entered in the battle were consistently broke through the defenses of the German group on the Myshkov Aksay-Yesaulovsky rivers, advanced to a depth of 40 km and proceeded to cover the enemy's flanks retreating.

At the same time, the troops of the left wing, 51 A, together with 13 mk and 3 guards mk defeated the opposing parts of the 4th Romanian army, and, pursuing them, went to Shabalin and the Zavitne (*History of Military Art, 1963: 220*).

Until December 31, the SF troops went to Verkhnyaya, Rubizhne, Tormosin, Zhukovsky, Komissarovsky, Gluboky. During the operation on the Kotelnikovsky direction, the 4th Romanian army was finally defeated, and the 4th German Tank Army was thrown at 200-250 km away from Stalingrad, to the Zimyvinki area with great losses. The remnants of the units of the Army group "Don" departed in

the southern direction, to the turn of the Manich River (*Samsonov, 1989: 467*).

Thus, the second German group, which had the task of helping its surrounded troops, was defeated. And hence the fate of the surrounded group was solved in advance. This was understood by the German SHCGH. F. Millentin noted that "... The battle on the banks of this river led to the Third Reich crisis, put an end to Hitler's hopes for the creation of an empire and became a decisive link in the chain of events leading to the defeat of Germany" (*Mellentin, 2005: 242*).

In terms of improving the organizational forms and combat use of armored troops, the experience of uniting under the general leadership of several tank and mechanized corps are of certain interest. It was taken into account when creating tank armies.

By the end of December 1942, the threat of a bleeding blow from the outside had been eliminated. The territory occupied by the surrounding troops, shortened significantly, and almost fired by the fire of Soviet artillery. In the course of the fighting, the German command completely spent all its reserves.

The calculations of the German command for the organization of the uninterrupted delivery of troops surrounded by air failed. With loss at the end of December, as a result of Operation Small Saturn in most airfields, the shoulder of air transportation increased significantly (*Isaev, 2008: 389-390*). This transformed the operation of supplying 6 A Paulus into the beating of the transport aircraft Luftwaffe (the Germans from November 24, 1942 to January 31, 1943, lost 488 planes and about 1,000 people flying warehouse) (*Morzik F., 1961: 195*).

Elimination of the surrounding group of the enemy was assigned to the troops of the DP, acting on the internal front of the environment (*Voronov, 1963: 300*).

The vision of the operation envisaged eliminating the surrounded group of the enemy in a consistent manner: to cut off and destroy the enemy's forces in the western part, and then, in the southern part of the ring, after a rapid blow to dissociate the enemy troops, which remained in two parts, and destroy them separately (*History of the Great Patriotic War, 1961: 56*).

Three armies (65, 24 and 21) were assigned to destroy the surrounding group in the western part (the main blow), in the southern part two armies (57 and 64). In the north-eastern part acted 66 A, and in the eastern part of the city - 62 A. Operational line up DF was in one echelon (*History of Military Art, 1963: 222*).

In the direction of the main strike, 33% of rifle divisions, 50% of artillery, 57% of the Guards mortar and 75% of the tank regiments were concentrated. This allowed us to create a significant density of forces and means¹⁹. The combat and numerical strength of the DF on January 10, 1943 was: the personnel - 281 158 people; mortar - 6,247 units; Field guns - 1,702 (*CAMD RF, vol. 206, op. 262, pp. 189, p. 102*).

January 8, 1943, the Soviet command brought the ultimatum with the proposal to surrender the German troops, surrounded at Stalingrad. But Colonel-General F. Paulus rejected the ultimatum after talks with OKX and on the orders of Hitler.

On the morning of January 10, the troops of the DF went on a decisive offensive to destroy the surrounding enemy group. By the end of the day, on a number of sites, the enemy's defense had been broken to a depth of 6-8 km.

Already the first days of the offensive turned into heavy losses for the DF tank troops. At 22:00 on January 12, the presence of tanks in tank parts was 120 units. (*CAMD RF, 206, op. 262, issue 173, pp. 13*). And at 22.00 on January 9,

¹⁶ 17, 18, 24, 25 tank and 1 gv. mechanized, which had in its structure 750 cars.

there were 264 (CAMD RF, fax 206, op. 262, issue 173, pp. 11).

The troops of the DF, having conducted a regrouping of forces during January 13 and 14, resumed the offensive on the morning of January 15 and until the middle of the day the defense was overthrown. Remains 6 A began to retreat to the ruins of Stalingrad. By January 16, the territory of the neighborhood of 6A was reduced to the size of less than a third of the original. But the success was not easy. The losses of troops of the DF during the first five days of the offensive amounted to 22 043 (excluding 64 A) (CAMD RF, No. 206, op. 262, No. 189, pp. 131).

After defeating part of the adversary, the troops of the DF until the end of January 17 went to the Great Rossoshka, Gonchar, Voroponovo, where they met the desperate resistance of the enemy on the old Soviet fortifications on the approaches to the city. On the strengthening of the armored forces of the front on January 16, 48th separate Guards Tank Regiment was sent on Mk.IV tanks "Churchill".

The German group persistently maintained the strengthening of the internal defense zone, but after the crushing strikes of the Soviet artillery, the enemy's defense was broken and on January 25, Soviet troops broke into Stalingrad from the west. By the end of January 26, troops 21 and 62 A united in the area of Mamayev Kurgan, and dismembered the enemy's group into two parts: the southern part was clamped in the central part of the city and the northern region, surrounded by the Tractor Plant and the Barricade Factory (*Operation SAS, 1958: 77-78*). From January 27, battles on the elimination of dismembered groups began. At the same time, the enemy still did not stop the resistance. In the southern sector, a particularly stubborn struggle went beyond the elevator, the bakery, the Stalingrad II station, the Dagoria church and the buildings adjacent to them. The troops of 64, 57 and 21 A from the southwest and northwest compressed the circle surrounding the southern group of the enemy. On the night of January 28th to 29th, the left flank connection of 64 A, overcoming the river Tsaritsa, went to the central part of the city. The enemy was demoralized. "Imprisonment has taken a massive character. In just three days, from 27 to 29.1.43, parts of 64 A captured 15 thousand soldiers and officers" (*War-Historical Journal, 1959, No. 2. p. 88*).

By January 31, the resistance of the enemy troopers in the southern part of the city was finally broken and capitulated. Headquarters 6 A headed by Commander General-Field Marshal F. Paulus on that day were captured.

An enemy group of 11 ak, surrounded by the northern part of the city, continued to fight. For its defeat, an unprecedented density was created - up to 300 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. It was almost 5 times more than during the transition to a counterattack (*History of the Second World War, 1961: 62*). Having not sustained the fire strike of such force, 11 ak also capitulated. And on Feb. 2, 1943, the historic victory at Stalingrad ended.

In total, during the Operation "Ring", more than 2,500 officers and 24 generals of 6 A, more than 91 thousand soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht were taken into captivity. The trophies of the Soviet troops from January 10 to February 2, 1943, according to the report of the headquarters of the DF were 5762 guns, 1312 mortars, 12701 machine guns, 156 987 guns, 10 722 guns, 744 aircraft, 1666 tanks, 261 armored vehicles, 80438 motor vehicles, 10679 motorcycles, 240 tractors, 571 tractor, 3 armored trains, etc. (*Isaev, 2008: 419*).

Discussion

For the first time in the domestic historiography, on the basis of a comparative analysis of archival documents,

memoirs, general and special works of both warring parties on the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation, the author made an attempt to reveal its course, results, consequences and peculiarities of the combat use of the tank army of the mixed warehouse and tank, mechanized corps in the operation on the encirclement. As a result of the study, a number of conclusions were drawn different from the previous conclusions of the predecessors, all the new ones were analyzed in terms of operative art and tactics during its conduct regarding the use of tank armies; an objective assessment was made of the significance of the Stalingrad Strategic Offensive Operation for the Development of Military Arts in Operations with the surrounding and destruction of large groups of the enemy.

New to the study is that the author attempted to assess the role of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation, not only in the development of Soviet military art, but also in the art of war opposing the warring side. Particular attention is drawn to the actions of the German command to create a stable defense of the surrounding troops, ensuring high moral and psychological stability of the personnel in extremely difficult conditions, decisive attempts to release the surrounded group, the organization of measures for the comprehensive provision of the surrounded group.

The obtained results of the research can be used for further military-historical scientific developments, research works on the problems of the Second World War, the study of the issues of the development of military arts in the use of large tank associations. The provisions and conclusions of scientific work can be introduced into the educational process of cadets and students of the Second World War of Ukraine through their use in conducting studies on military-historical disciplines, as well as the basic material in contemporary military-theoretical discussions about the role and principles of the use of tank armies in modern the stage of development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Their study by military experts will contribute to the expansion of the horizons, the development of creative thinking.

Promising areas of further research can be: a comprehensive study of the development of Soviet military art in conducting operations on the enemy's environment on the territory of Ukraine, studying the experience of the German command to release and withdraw from the environment of its troops.

Conclusion

The author made a theoretical generalization and solved a scientific objective to determine the role, place, characteristics and features of the use of the Red Army armored troops in the Stalingrad Strategic Offensive as one of the outstanding operations on the encirclement during the Second World War and to develop recommendations for using the experience in modern warfare. theory and practice.

Despite the large number of historical and special works devoted to this operation, a number of issues remain unresolved for the time being: the particular features of the use of tank armies in operations on the environment under extremely difficult operational conditions. These issues require a thorough historical study involving the source base of both warring parties.

The author used well-known general scientific and special methods of historical research, among which the main place belongs to historical and logical methods, analysis, comparison, generalization, statistical method, system approach.

The article analyzes the conditions and factors that exerted a significant influence on the preparation, course and results of the Stalingrad Strategic Offensive Operation,

on the use of the tank army of mixed warehouses and tank and mechanized buildings. Armored troop contributed the main strike force in the operation.

Operative art in the counterattack at Stalingrad was characterized by a large scale of front and army offensive operations conducted in accordance with the strategic plan.

Operative line up of the fronts was in one echelon, and the armies were usually in two echelons. The armies advancing towards the main strike had in their second echelon, except for 1-2 infantry divisions, 1-3 tank (mechanized) corps.

Armored and mechanized troops were used in accordance with the requirements of the order of the PCD No. 325 of October 16, 1942. Tank brigades and regiments were used as direct support infantry tanks. But the density of tanks was still not enough for a rapid breakthrough in advance prepared enemy defense.

In a counterattack at Stalingrad, tank armies of the mixed composition, tank and mechanized corps were successfully used. Tank and mechanized hulls were used to develop success in the direction of the main strike and operations at operational depths. At the first stage of the counterattack, they carried out the surroundings of a large group of opponents. At the same time, the overwhelming number was involved in completing the breakthrough of the tactical zone of the enemy's defense, which significantly weakened the forces of mobile units before the start of their main task.

Inclusion of tank and mechanized units was supported by all of the first echelon artillery and by long range army group. To secure the actions of tank and mechanized corps in the enemy lines each one was accompanied by one-two anti-tank units and one of anti-air units.

Thus, battle experience gained in the battle on Volga served as a basis for future development of military excellence of Red Army. Based on this experience they learned the art of surrounding with consecutive annihilation of enemy troops.

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СТАЛІНГРАДСЬКА СТРАТЕГІЧНА НАСТУПАЛЬНА ОПЕРАЦІЯ (19.11.1942 - 02.02.1943): ФАКТОРИ УСПІХУ ТАНКОВИХ ВІЙСЬК З ОТОЧЕННЯ І ЗНИЩЕННЯ КРУПНОГО УГРУПОВАННЯ ПРОТИВНИКА

Автором здійснено теоретичне узагальнення і вирішено наукову задачу з визначення ролі, місця, характерних рис і особливостей застосування танкових військ Червоної армії у Сталінградській стратегічній наступальній операції як однієї з видатних операцій на оточення в роки Другої світової війни та вироблення рекомендацій щодо використання дослідженого досвіду у сучасній військовій теорії та практиці. Незважаючи на велику кількість історичних і спеціальних праць, присвячених цій операції, на сьогодні до кінця не вирішеними залишаються ціла низка питань: особливості застосування танкових військ в операції на оточення за вкрай складних оперативних умов. Автором були застосовані відомі загальнонаукові та спеціальні методи історичного дослідження, серед яких головне місце належить історичному та логічному методам, аналізу, порівнянню, узагальненню, статистичному методу, системному підходу. У статті проаналізовані умови і фактори, які справили суттєвий вплив на підготовку, хід і результати Сталінградської стратегічної наступальної операції, на застосування у ній танкової армії змішаного складу і танкових, механізованих корпусів. Уперше у вітчизняній історіографії на основі порівняльного аналізу архівних документів, мемуарів, загальних та спеціальних праць обох воюючих сторін щодо Сталінградської стратегічної наступальної операції здійснено спробу з максимальною достовірністю розкрити її хід, результати, наслідки та особливості бойового застосування танкової армії змішаного складу і танкових, механізованих корпусів в операції на оточення. Зроблена спроба оцінити роль Сталінградської стратегічної наступальної операції не тільки в розвитку радянського воєнного мистецтва, а й воєнного мистецтва протилежної воюючої сторони. Особливо акцентовано на заходах німецького командування по створенню стійкої оборони оточених військ, забезпеченню високої морально-психологічної стійкості особового складу за надзвичайно складних умов, рішучі спроби деблокування оточеного угруповання, організації заходів всебічного забезпечення оточеного угруповання.

Ключові слова: Сталінградська стратегічна наступальна операція; фронт; танковий корпус.

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DIGITAL BROADCASTING IN NIGERIA BY THE EYES OF ITS USERS: HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATE

The article reproduces some aspects of history of implementation of digital broadcasting in Nigeria, also it contains the evaluation of its current state. The theoretical and methodological base of its conduction was the "diffusional" theory of innovations, which allowed determining the true situation of readiness of Nigeria for digitalization of national mass media. As part of this research the interviewing (the survey) of 184 digital broadcasting journalists from 150 media companies of three Nigerian provinces (Enugu, Ebonyi and Anambra) was conducted. Its results indicates that main obstacles to the development of digital broadcasting in Nigeria are limited funding, unsatisfactory state of mass media digitalization, lack of qualified specialists and required equipment and lack of political will. Relating to this, there is every reason to affirm that modern level of digitalization of broadcasting in Nigeria is quite low and does not correspond to the development requirements of country at the current stage. At the same time, the results allow to claim that the great majority of respondents has a high level of personal awareness of digital broadcasting. Most of them revealed their readiness to become the first users of the digital broadcasting after its full implementation in country. Before that time, Nigeria has made insignificant progress in the digital broadcasting area, its further development requires the solution of complicated tasks connected with digitalization of the television media by the government of Nigeria. The Nigerian government should solve the issues of funding for ensuring the development of digital broadcasting in Nigeria, as well as propose the strategy of its implementation, provide the education of staff and find an opportunity to install modern technical equipment. The expanding of the area and geography of the further researches on this subject with the aim of coverage of all country's provinces for better understanding of the problem.

Key words: adaptation; electronic mass media; broadcasting; digitization; journalists.

Introduction

One of the characteristics of the 21st century is the dominance of technology. New technologies have continued to evolve, thus, affecting almost every facet of the society. The media industry has often been driven by new technologies. As technologies evolve, so does the media considering the prominent role of the media in any society. Defleur and Dennis (1991: 229) corroborate that technology has often been an instrument for change in the media industry. Defleur and Dennis recalled that as far back as Gutenberg, it was technology: the movable type that spurred change. Later, fast printing presses, the telegraph, zinc engraving, modern photography, radio, television, fibre optics, and other technologies heralded new developments for media and their audience. The trend regarding the influential role of new technologies on the performance of the media industry has continued to play out, affecting all media genre-broadcast and print media.

Advancements in technology have also led to changes in broadcasting. The broadcast industry has dramatically changed even as recent as twenty years ago and at the

heart of these changes are new technologies. Nyekwere (2009) corroborates that the invention of new media technologies has always been a catalyst for change in the broadcast industry. Nyekwere adds that the advancement in media technologies has cut the barrier of time and space in the broadcast industry; it has also made communication easier and more democratic and the creation and distribution of media content easier. As technology continues to evolve, the phases in technological advancements have led to what is called analogue, and digital technology with the latter considered as most sophisticated, more user-friendly and with better features. Hence, the issue of digital broadcasting.

Digital broadcasting is an improved way of transmitting broadcast signals to the target receivers. It works by translating sound and picture into digital data rather than analogue waveforms. There has been increased clamour for the adoption of digital broadcasting because of the perceived benefits inherent in it. Plum (2014) argues that digital broadcasting offers an increase in the capacity of broadcast transmission networks by improving spectrum

efficiency (i.e. more data can be transmitted per unit bandwidth); provision of better signal quality which increases robustness to interference and picture degradation; a potential reduction in transmission network energy usage; the implementation of single frequency networks (SFNs) instead of the independent parallel networks which are common in analogue broadcasting, among others. Suffice it to say that digital broadcasting offers better programme contents than analogue, it then means that it should be integrated into the broadcasting system of countries by way of full adoption.

Two issues are critical to the adoption of digital broadcast. The first is that transmission from analogue to digital and the second is that of the audience acceptance of digital contents. These two issues are essential to the discourse on digital broadcasting because they determine the success or failure of digital broadcasting. For Nigeria, these issues are essential because of the country's raising poverty rate, low media literacy, low technological advancements as well as lack of political will (*Kombol, 2013*). Digitization is championed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). ITU, at its Regional Radio communications Conference, RRC held in 2006, set a deadline for a total switchover of all broadcast channels from analogue to digital. The body set June 17, 2015, for all UHF channels to have gone digital. It equally set the digitization of all VHF channels for 2020 (*Aihe, 2008*).

Nigeria has had challenges meeting the deadlines for transmission from analogue to digital broadcasting. For example. The International Telecommunication Union, ITU, set 2015 for the entire broadcasting stations in the world to go digital. Nigeria set June 17, 2012, for broadcast stations in the country to be digitized. That deadline was not met. Again, June 17, 2015, was chosen, but Nigeria still could not meet up with the deadline. Nigeria, again, chose June 17, 2017, for the completion of the digital switchover process, but still could not cover 95 per cent digital access across the country, as at June 17, 2017, even though the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), the government agency responsible for driving digital switchover in Nigeria, is insisting that so much have been achieved in the entire process of digital switchover since 2016 (*Limmer, 2017*). Apart from the problem of switching over to digital broadcasting, there lies the problem of the audience. The broadcast audience is critical stakeholders in the switch over process. The audience are the consumers of broadcast contents. Therefore, just like in a typical production chain, broadcasting is not complete until broadcast messages get to the receivers. Therefore, this study examined the adoption of digital broadcasting in Nigeria with focus on challenges, level of progress as well as broadcast audience readiness for adoption.

Statement of the Problem

Digital broadcasting is considered as critical evidence of technological advancements. Digital broadcast contents are regarded as having superior quality in addition to other advantages that come with digital broadcasting. It is perhaps, to promote better broadcast contents that the International Telecommunications Union's (ITU) Regional Radio-communication Conference (RRC-06) in Geneva, Switzerland in June 2006, made a case for switching from analogue to digital broadcasting. Since then, issues concerning digital broadcasting have continued to be attractive to researchers. While researchers from developed countries like the United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, among others, may be concerned with other is-

ues beyond adopted and switch over, the case is different with less developed countries like Nigeria. Although studies (e.g. *Alalibo, 2017; Eze, Orekyeh & Ezeanwu, 2017; Obot & Inwang, 2017*) have been conducted on digital broadcasting in Nigeria, few of such studies combine issues relating to challenges, progress level as well as readiness for adoption among the broadcast audience, hence the need for this study.

Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study is to examine the adoption of digital broadcasting in Nigeria. Specifically, the study sought to achieve the following:

1. Ascertain the challenges of digitization in Nigeria.
2. Examine the progress made in the digitization drive in Nigeria.
3. To examine the level of awareness of digitization among the broadcast audience in Nigeria.
4. To ascertain the extent of readiness to adopt digitization among broadcast media audience in Nigeria.

Research Question

This study sought answers to the following questions:

1. What are the challenges of digitization in Nigeria?
2. What is the progress level of digitization broadcasting in Nigeria?
3. What is the level of awareness of digitization among broadcast media audience in Nigeria?
4. What is the extent of readiness to adopt digital broadcast among the broadcast audience in Nigeria?

Technological advancements and Digital Migration

The 21st century has witnessed and continued to witness advancements in technology. New technologies are being invented almost on a daily basis. Technology has continued to evolve from time immemorial. Zewail (2002) argues that since the beginning of human civilization technology has progressed in a continuous process. Zewail notes further that fire must have been an exciting new technology for the first humans. Changes in technologies are greatly affecting the twenty-first-century society in different areas-politics, business, education, media, among others. Thiebaud (2010) corroborates that since the appearance of technology, human beings have neglected each other and themselves. Technology, together with commerce, has slowly robbed humans of their innate abilities and amputated them of their capacities. One of the areas that has been affected by technology is broadcasting. Following the advancements in technology, there has been agitations for the migration from analogue to digital broadcasting. Different countries have been making efforts since the Geneva conference of 2006 when the migration to digital broadcasting began.

Although not all countries are signatories to ITU's digitization treaty as evidenced in South/Latin America and Asia (*APC/Balancing Act, 2011*), it has become a general trend in broadcasting (*Mbatha & Lesame, 2014*). Migrating to digital broadcasting entails the complete shift from analogue to broadcasting format in which data, graphics, sounds and images are converted into a digital binary language (zeroes and ones) for computer use (*Suarez-Candel, 2007*). According to Berger, (2010), digital migration is the transition from analogue to digital broadcasting. Njogu (2016) reveals that digital broadcasting is transmitted on radio frequencies through terrestrial space just like the standard analogue television, with the main difference being the use of multiplex transmitters to allow reception of multiple channels on a single frequency range (such as a UHF or VHF channel) known as sub channels. Unlike analogue coding method which transforms images

and sounds into an electric signal in a proportional way to their natural physical characteristics. Digitization is currently considered as the most effective and efficient way of delivering broadcast contents to receivers and digital migration is considered as a critical issue that must be a topmost issue to all people and governments. This partly explains why digital migration has received the attention of successive governments in Nigeria.

Nigeria's Quest for Digital Broadcasting

Since the Geneva conference of 2006, Nigeria has been making efforts to migrate to digital broadcasting. For example, in 2007, a year after the conference, the then Nigeria's President, Umaru Yar'Adua (now late), approved the kick off of the digitization of the broadcast industry in Nigeria (Ocholi, 2009). Following the Presidential approval the then Minister of Information and Communication, Mr. John Odey inaugurated the Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) on the transition from analogue to digital broadcasting on 31st October, 2008 to come up with a blueprint on how to achieve digital broadcasting Nigeria (Olalere, Oyeyinka, Lateef, Olakunle, Kenneth, Rauf, & Nancy, 2013). Membership of the committee included representatives from the Ministry of Information and Communications, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Environment, National Broadcasting Commission (broadcasting regulator), Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) - Government-owned National TV Broadcaster, Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) - Government-owned National Radio Broadcaster, National Film and Video Censors Board (NFVCB), Consumer Protection Council (CPC), Nigerian Communications Satellite Ltd (NIGCOMSAT), Nigerian Film Corporation, Nigerian Communications Commission, Nigerian Copyright Commission and a host of Private broadcasting stations (Olalere et al., 2013). The committee was headed by Engr. Isaac Wakombo, a former Director of Engineering at NTA. The terms of reference of the committee were: to recommend appropriate regulatory mechanism, draft a national broadcasting model, assess the effect of digitization on consumers and recommend possible government intervention, among other issues relating to digital migration (Olalere et al., 2013). Despite this, Nigeria did not meet up with the June 2012 deadline. In December 2012, the federal government, under the regime of Goodluck Jonathan, inaugurated a 14-man team tagged "Digiteam Nigeria", with Mr. Edward Amana as the Chairman to drive the process of digital migration. (Olalere et al., 2013). Again, the Digiteam did not actualize the task (Okonji, 2017). Also, Nigeria did not meet up with the 17th June 2015, deadline. As a result, ITU set June 2017 deadline for Nigeria to switch-off analogue broadcasting (Okonji, 2017). The administration of President Muhammadu Buhari has commenced the digitization process in Nigeria but in phases. The first phase was on April 30, 2016, when Nigeria commenced the pilot launch of digital broadcasting in Jos, the Plateau State Capital (Okonji, 2017). As at the time of this study Nigeria is yet to commence full digitization in the country.

Empirical Review

In this segment of the study, the researcher reviewed previous studies that are related to the current one in content and design. Eze, Orekyeh and Ezeanwu (2017) assessed the level of awareness of digital migration process among TV consumers in Enugu metropolis. The survey method was used for the study with the questionnaire as the instrument for data collection. Using multi-stage sampling technique, the research was guided by

three research objectives and research questions respectively. The study found a low level of awareness of digital migration process among residents of Enugu metropolis. The result also showed that because of discontent with the current TV viewing experience, the respondents showed a favourable disposition to digital migration and expressed willingness to explore new TV viewing experience it presents.

Alalibo (2017) investigated the opinion of broadcast professionals to determine the feasibility of the migration of broadcasting after several shifts in dates and the level of preparedness of the stations. Survey research and the purposive sampling technique with frequency tables and simple percentages were adopted to collate and analyze the results. The result showed that although most of the respondents expressed preference for the digitization only few of the professionals thought migration before the deadline was possible.

Obot and Inwang (2017) studied the level of awareness of the incoming digitization project among communication educators, the level of preparedness of the communication practitioners for the transition to digital broadcasting and the possible implications of full digitization on communication education in Nigeria. The population of this study comprised all the communication practitioners in television stations in Uyo, Nigeria who work in the news, programming and engineering departments. Communication educators who teach communication courses in tertiary institutions in Uyo also constituted the population of the study. The survey method was adopted for this study. The research instrument was the questionnaire. The result showed that communication educators in Uyo are aware of the digitization process in the broadcast industry and are already teaching the subject of digitization in tertiary institutions in Uyo, Nigeria in courses including trends in media technology, information and communication technology, among others. The result showed that the challenges of digital broadcasting include: lack of skilled manpower, lack of equipment needed to be procured and installed computer illiteracy, funding, poor power supply and lack of quality programme content.

Obisi and Rem (2016) examined the impact of human capital development on digitization process in the media industry in Nigeria. A total of 250 respondents took part in the study. The descriptive survey was used for the study. Data were collected through administration of questionnaires to the sample size drawn from the population. Data analysis was conducted using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), while 5 point Liker scale was adopted for response rating. The study found that digitization would bring about employees productivity. It is important to add here that among all the studies reviewed, no single study paid attention to challenges, readiness for adoption, awareness and progress made. This is the gap that the current studied examined.

Theoretical Framework

The diffusion of innovation theory was used for this study. The theory was propounded by Everett Rogers in 1962 to describe the introduction of innovations as being communicated through particular channels over a period and within a certain social system (Rogers, 1995). The theory focuses on how innovations are taken up in a population. Innovation is an idea that is perceived as new by its audience. The adoption of innovation takes place in stages as shown below:

Innovators: The adoption process begins with a tiny number of visionary, imaginative innovators. They often

lavish great time, energy and creativity in developing new ideas and gadgets. Here, digital broadcasting

Early adopters: As soon as the advantages of the innovation start to manifest, early adopters leap in. They are on the lookout for a strategic leap forward in their lives or businesses and are quick to make connections between clever innovations and their personal needs.

Early majority: Assuming the product or behaviour leaps the chasm; it may eventually reach majority audiences. Early majorities are pragmatists, comfortable with moderately progressive ideas, but won't act without solid proof of benefits. They are followers who are influenced by mainstream fashions and wary of fads. They want to hear "industry standard" and "endorsed by normal, respectable folks". Majorities are cost sensitive and risk-averse. They are looking for simple, proven, better ways of doing what they already do.

Late majority: They are conservative pragmatists who hate risk and are uncomfortable about new ideas. Practically their only driver is the fear of not fitting in; hence they will follow mainstream fashions and established standards. They are often influenced by the fears and opinions of laggards.

Laggards: Meanwhile laggards hold out to the bitter end. They are people who see a high risk in adopting a particular product or behaviour. Some of them are so worried they stay awake all night, tossing and turning, thinking up arguments against it. This theory has been found useful for studies focusing on digital broadcasting because digital broadcasting is an innovation that needs to be diffused into the Nigerian society.

Methodology

Participants

A total of 184 registered journalists from Enugu State (67), Anambra State (64) and Ebonyi State (54) took part in the study. Three criteria were used to select the respondents. First, they were from broadcast media stations. Two, they must be registered with the Nigerian Union of

Journalists and three, must be practising broadcasting for a minimum of five years. Also, a total of 150 broadcast audience 50 each from Enugu, Anambra Ebonyi States were selected for the study. To arrive at the broadcast media audience, a preliminary study was conducted to determine the broadcast media consumption of the respondents. Only those who reported consuming broadcast media daily for a minimum duration of three hours were eventually selected.

Data collection

The researcher collected data for this study with the use of a self-developed questionnaire. The questionnaire had two parts. The first part was meant for broadcast media journalists while the second was meant for the broadcast media audience. The instrument was subjected to face validity by three communication experts. Its reliability was ascertained using test-retest approach, and this yielded Pearson's Correlational coefficient of 0.074 which was considered high reliability. A total of three trained researcher assistants administered the instrument in Ebonyi and Anambra states while the researcher administered in Enugu. The instrument was administered face-to-face and collected immediately.

Data Analysis

In the analysis of data for the study, the researcher used mean and standard deviation to answer the research questions. All analyses were done with the use of SPSS version 22. The bench mark for accepting or rejecting a statement was 2.5 considering that it was a four-point scale. The results were presented in tables.

Results

Out of the 184 copies of the questionnaire and 150 administered to broadcast journalists and broadcast audience respective, 173 copies representing 94% and 145 representing 97% were returned. This gave a mean percentage of 96% returned rate. The result of this study is presented in the following tables:

Table 1: The challenges of digitization in Nigeria

S/N		(n-173)		
		Mean	SD	RE
1	Lack of fund	2.7	0.96	Accepted
2	Lack of skilled man power	2.6	0.68	Accepted
3	Lack of political will	2.5	0.78	Accepted
4	Lack of equipment	2.7	0.99	Accepted
5	Poor public knowledge	2.6	0.55	Accepted
6	Poor staff motivation	1.5	0.87	Rejected
7	Poor attitudes to work on the part of journalists	1.5	0.79	Rejected
8	Poor policy implementation	2.5	0.89	Rejected

Source: Field survey, 2018.

The result from the table above showed that the respondents accepted six out of either item presented in the table above as the challenges against digital broadcasting in Nigeria. The respondents rejected poor attitudes to work on the part of the staff and poor staff motivation as challenges against digital broadcasting in Nigeria. The respondents were asked to assess the level of progress made in digitization of broadcasting in Nigeria. The result is presented in the following table:

Table 2: Level of Progress made in digitizing broadcasting in Nigeria

	Journalists (n-173)		Audience (n=145)	
	X	SD	X	SD
High extent	1.2	0.93	1.2	0.76
Moderate extent	1.2	0.67	2.2	0.61
Low extent	2.6	0.93	2.9	0.87

Source: Field survey, 2018.

The result from the table above revealed that most of the respondents reported that the progress level of broadcast media digitization is low. This view was expressed by both broadcast journalists and broadcast media audience. To determine the level of awareness of digitization among broadcast media audience, the following table was computed.

Table 3: Level of awareness of digital broadcasting

SN	Level of awareness	Response	Percentage
1	High level	77	53%
2	Moderate level	35	24%
3	Low level	33	23
Total		145	100

Source: Field survey, 2018.

The result from the table above showed that most of the respondents reported high awareness of digital broadcasting. This could be because the quest for digital broadcast led to an intense debate on it. The argument on digital broadcast has been ongoing for over a decade, and this could be why the public has high awareness of it. However, awareness, does not equal readiness to embrace digital broadcasting. The next table showed data on the readiness of broadcast media to embrace digital broadcasting.

Table 4: Level of readiness of digital broadcasting

SN	Level of awareness	Response	Percentage
1	Early adopters	60	41%
2	Early majority	33	23%
3	Late majority	31	21%
4	Laggards	21	14%
Total		145	100

Source: Field survey, 2018.

The result from the table above used variables from diffusion of innovation theory to determine the readiness to adopt digital broadcasting among the broadcast audience. The result showed that most of the respondents fell into the early adopter's category with only a few falling into the laggards category. This implies that should Nigeria fully migrate to digital broadcasting; the audience will be willing to embrace the digital broadcasting.

Discussion of Findings

This study investigated the adoption of digital broadcasting in Nigeria. The result revealed that challenges to digital broadcasting in Nigeria include: lack of finance, poor policy implementation, lack of skilled manpower, lack of equipment and lack of political will. The result of this study is consistent with that of Obot and Inwang (2017) who reported that finance, lack of equipment and skilled manpower are responsible for the inability of Nigeria to fully implement digital broadcasting in the country. This result, however, extended the challenges to include lack of political will as Obot and Inwang could not find lack of political will as a challenge against digital broadcasting in Nigeria.

The result of this study also showed that the progress level so far made in the digitization of broadcasting in Nigeria is low. This is because most of the respondents reported that digitization is still at a very low level in Nigeria. This result is consistent with the situation on the ground as Nigeria has missed several deadlines for the switched over to digital broadcasting (Ojalere, Oyeyinka, Lateef, Olakunle, Kenneth, Rauf, & Nancy, 2013; Ochoji, 2009). The country only began the first phase of the pilot implementation on April 30, 2016, with the digital switch over in Jos, Plateau State.

The findings also showed that most of the respondents reported a high level of awareness of digital broadcasting. This result is contrary to those of Eze, Orekyeh and Ezeanwu (2017) who assessed the level of awareness of digital broadcasting and reported low awareness among

the broadcast audience. The difference between the findings of the current study and that of Eze, Orekyeh and Ezeanwu could be as result of the times both studies were conducted and the scope. For example, while Eze, Orekyeh and Ezeanwu covered only Enugu metro, the current study covered three states namely Enugu, Ebonyi and Anambra.

Finally, the result of this study revealed that most of the respondents said that they are ready to be early adopters of digital broadcasting as soon as it is fully implemented in the country. This aspect of the findings is a practical test of the diffusion of innovation theory postulated by Everett Rogers in 1962. Rogers had called the early adopters respectable, the early majority deliberate, the late majority as sceptical and the laggards as traditional. Therefore, this result has implications on the diffusion of innovation theory because it has shown that the broadcast audience will go through the stages of adoption of new technologies and ideas as postulated by the theory.

Conclusion/Recommendations

Based on the result of this study, the researcher concludes that digitization in Nigeria is faced with many challenges that are hampering the smooth and complete switch over to digital broadcasting in Nigeria. The researcher also concludes that so far, Nigeria has made low progress concerning digital broadcasting. However, there is a high awareness on the part of the broadcast audience concerning digital broadcasting. The basic contribution of this study is that it has provided specific evidence on the current level of digital broadcasting in Nigeria. By providing evidence on the challenges facing digital broadcasting in Nigeria, the study has provided evidenced-based understanding concerning interventions vis-à-vis digital broadcasting in Nigeria. Also, this study has theoretical implications. This is because the study used variables from diffusion of innovation theory to examine the adoption readiness of digital broadcasting. This study, thus, makes the following recommendations. First, the Nigeria government should address the issue of

funding to ensure the smooth take-off of digital broadcasting in Nigeria. Other issues to be addressed include policy implementation, manpower training and equipment supply. Also, further studies should be expanded to cover more areas for better understanding.

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ЦИФРОВЕ МОВЛЕННЯ В НІГЕРІЇ ОЧИМА ЙОГО КОРИСТУВАЧІВ: ІСТОРІЯ РОЗВИТКУ ТА СУЧАСНИЙ СТАН

У статті відтворено деякі аспекти з історії впровадження цифрового мовлення в Нігерії, а також міститься оцінка його сучасного стану. Теоретико-методологічною основою для його проведення стала "дифузійна" теорія інновацій, що дозволило встановити дійсний стан готовності Нігерії до цифровізації національних мас-медіа. У рамках цього дослідження було здійснено інтерв'ювання (опитування) 184 журналістів цифрового мовлення зі 150 медійних компаній трьох провінцій (Енугу, Ебоні та Анамбра) Нігерії. Їх результати засвідчили, що основними перешкодами для розвитку цифрового мовлення в Нігерії є обмеженість фінансування, незадовільний стан цифровізації мас-медіа, брак кваліфікованих спеціалістів та потрібного для цього обладнання та відсутність політичної волі. З огляду на це існують всі підстави стверджувати, що нинішній рівень цифровізації мовлення в Нігерії є доволі низьким, і на загал не відповідним потребам розвитку країни на сучасному етапі. Водночас результати дослідження дозволяють стверджувати, що переважна більшість респондентів має високий рівень власної поінформованості про цифрове мовлення. Більша їх частина виявила свою готовність стати першими користувачами цифрового мовлення, як тільки воно буде повністю впроваджене в країні. До цього часу Нігерія досягла незначного прогресу в галузі цифрового мовлення, а подальший його розвиток вимагає вирішення урядом Нігерії низки складних завдань, пов'язаних з цифровізацією телевізійних ЗМІ. По-перше, уряд Нігерії має вирішити питання фінансування для забезпечення розвитку цифрового мовлення в Нігерії, а також запропонувати стратегію його впровадження, забезпечити навчання персоналу та знайти можливість для встановлення сучасного технічного обладнання. Важливим видається й розширення тематики та географії подальших досліджень з цієї проблематики з метою охоплення всіх провінцій країни задля кращого розуміння суті проблеми.

Ключові слова: адаптація; електронні мас-медіа; мовлення; оцифровка; журналісти.

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GEORGIA'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION POLICY DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF M. SAKASHVILI AND AFTER THE CHANGE OF POWER OCTOBER 1, 2012

The article analysis foreign policy of Georgia towards EU integration since 2003. Georgia's EU integration policy was activated after the "Rose Revolution". New President of Georgia M. Saakashvili enjoyed strong support of the West, but Russia-Georgia war in 2008, unsuccessful reforms, high level of unemployment made his policy unpopular within Georgians and in October 2012, people voted against the ruling party. Defeat in parliamentary elections was a negative turning point for Saakashvili and his supporters. They started discreditation of the new coalition government policy (especially foreign policy) claiming that aim of Georgia's foreign policy is not European and Euro-Atlantic integration anymore, that representatives of the new government are agents of the Kremlin. An analysis of Georgia's foreign policy in the context of EU integration shows that the priorities of Georgia's foreign policy are unchanged. The goal of Georgia's foreign policy is membership of the EU.

Key words: Georgia; Foreign Policy of Georgia; European integration of Georgia.

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia, like other post-Soviet states, faced with the need to build its own foreign policy, determine the goals and priorities of foreign policy, the strategy of relations with leading powers and international organizations (Leushkin, Sukhiashvili, 2019: 38).

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the foreign policy of Georgia in the field of European integration during the presidency of M. Saakashvili and after the 2012 parliamentary elections. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that, despite the change of power in 2012, in spite of the discrediting of the foreign policy of the new government by the former president and his supporters, official Tbilisi continues to pursue foreign policy oriented on further EU integration. Changing political orientation of Georgian government is impossible as in a political life of Georgia dominates only one - pro-Western political force, which is currently represented with two political parties: "United National Movement", "Georgian Dream" and with the variety satellites of these parties. Such a political conjuncture creates the illusion of political pluralism, in reality West controls the whole political spectrum of Georgia.

Georgia, which locates at the crossroads of two continents - Europe and Asia, between West and East has always stood and now faces need of choice of its political orientation (Sukhiashvili, 2012: 18). In the early years of independence, Georgia's foreign policy shifted from anti-Russian (anti-Soviet) sentiments that existed under Z. Gamsakhurdia (1991) to building more or less balanced relations with Russia and the West during the era of President E. Shevardnadze (1995-2003) (Melikyan, 2014: 78).

Shevardnadze created a semi-democratic state with a high level of corruption and unemployment, which was the cause of high labor migration. Shevardnadze's government took advantage of the fact that there was no competition

within the political system of Georgia. It provided stability, but not reforms. Shevardnadze's political team cared about its own profits, but did not understand how to contribute to long-term economic growth. Reforms were purely superficial (Lucas, 2009: 253).

The pro-Western foreign policy and "reforms" conducted by the Georgian authorities in the 90s were declarative because the fulfillment of EU requirements threatened the internal power of the ruling elites of Georgia. The point is that for some ruling elites, internal losses from the implementation of the EU rules were much higher than for other (Vachudova, 2009: 94) (for example political elites of some Central European states).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea and South Caucasus region has become the focus of considerable international attention, primarily because it is one of the oldest and potentially the richest oil and gas producing areas in the world. Surrounded by the three powers Iran, Russia, and Turkey and located on the crossroads of Europe and Asia, the South Caucasus has also been at the center of post-cold war geopolitical rivalries (Kakachia, 2011: 15).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a need to form new agreements on cooperation with the new independent states of the region. In January 1992, the EC made a proposal to the Council to replace the Trade and Cooperation Agreement which was signed in 1989 with the Soviet Union, for agreements that would take into account new political and economic realities, including the process of democratization and the transition to a market economy (Копііка, 2008: 248-249).

It should be noted that the foreign relations of Georgia and the European Union was based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Georgia and the European Communities on the one hand and their member states on the other hand (Association agreement which

was signed in 2014 replaced the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement). Document was signed in April 1996 in Luxembourg (Luxembourg). The agreement came into force on July 1, 1999, after its ratification by the Parliament of Georgia, the European Parliament and national parliaments of the EU member states. The agreement contains a preamble, 105 articles, five applications and a protocol. The PCA is a framework agreement that laid the foundation for the development of a dialogue between the parties on political, economic and cultural issues at the beginning of the 21st century. The agreement is basic and contains general provisions on cooperation between the European Union and Georgia.

Materials and Methods

Such methods as system analysis, normative-value methodology, and content analysis were used to implement purposes of the research. The system analysis as the basic methodological approach promotes the disclosure of the internal organizational structure, environment and dynamics, which occur at the present stage at the Georgian political space about European integration processes. The normative-value method gives an opportunity to figure out the significance of political phenomena for the society and the individual. Traditional (qualitative) and formalized (content analysis) types of analysis were used for analysis of documents on the research topic, what provided an opportunity for determining the Georgia's policy on the European Union. Comparative method, essential for comparing similar phenomena of life, different variations of social and political development, was widely used in order to identify their common features and specifics, to search for the best ways of solving the problems of foreign policy for Georgia in the context of its European integration. This method was also used to study the experience gained by other countries to achieve geopolitical goals, which allowed avoiding unacceptable failures in determining the foreign policy strategy of Georgia at the present stage of the process of its "promotion" to Europe, involvement in the European political process, development of its current foreign policy strategy.

Results and Discussion

Foreign Policy of M. Saakashvili's government in the context of EU integration

European integration policy of Georgia was intensified after the "Rose revolution". Former president of Georgia - Saakashvili enjoyed huge support of Western governments. Saakashvili's presidency coincides with the period when the EU begins a new phase of enlargement policy in the East. EU enlargement at the expense of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe puts on the agenda the need for policy development for neighboring countries.

In 2003-2004 the Commission put forward a proposal for a new EU foreign policy - the European Neighborhood Policy. Neighborhood Policy aimed at creating a basis for relations with new neighbors, which at the intermediate stage did not mean the prospect of EU membership for these states. Words of former president of EU Commission - R. Prodi helps us to understand better the aim of the Neighborhood Policy: "The goal of the Neighborhood Policy is to create a circle of true friends, with whom the European Union proposes to share their own values and wellbeing". The aim of the Neighborhood Policy was not only to share values and wellbeing of EU countries, but also to have influence and control of political processes in neighboring regions.

One of the main effects of the "Rose Revolution" for Georgia was the inclusion on its own initiative in the

European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, along with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Saakashvili declared European and Euro-Atlantic integration top priority of Georgia's foreign policy. This position was enshrined in the documents defining Georgia's foreign policy.

In 2005, for the first time, Georgia adopted the most important document defining the state's foreign and security policy: National Security Concept of Georgia. The National Security Concept of Georgia is the keystone document that presents a vision of secure development of the state and of fundamental national values and interests. It describes threats, risks and challenges to national security and sets major directions of national security policy. The National Security Concept of Georgia underlines the aspiration of Georgians to achieve full-fledged integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and to contribute to the security of the Black Sea region as a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic security system (*National Security Concept of Georgia, 2005*).

One of the provisions of the National Security Concept of Georgia declared that, integration into European and Euro-Atlantic political, economic and security systems is the firm will of Georgian people. Georgia welcomed NATO and EU enlargement and believed that integration of the Black Sea states into NATO and the EU will significantly reinforce the security of the Black Sea region as the South-Eastern border of Europe. Integration to NATO and the EU represents a top priority of Georgian foreign and security policy (*National Security Concept of Georgia, 2005*).

One year later was adopted Georgian Foreign Policy Strategy for the years 2006 - 2009. A separate paragraph was dedicated to European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. The aim of foreign policy during the period 2006-2009 was declared establish of Georgia's place in the common European family by deepening integration with the EU and joining NATO (*Foreign Policy Strategy of Georgia, 2006-2009*).

The reading and analysis of these documents leave no doubt that the main priority of Georgia's foreign policy under President Saakashvili was deep and long-term European and Euro-Atlantic integration (*Leushkin, Sukhishvili, 2019: 39*).

Saakashvili's foreign policy was supported by controlled media and as a result most Georgians believed in the need of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Confirmation of this fact is the results of the plebiscite, which took place in early 2008 and according to which 77% of Georgian's expressed support to Euro-Atlantic integration policy.

In 2004 and 2007 the European Union was enlarged by the entry of the states from Central and Eastern Europe. Due to the enlargement, the European Union's Eastern border was extended and pushed aside on the East. For new member countries of the EU from Central and Eastern Europe it has become vital to establish a close relationship with their Eastern neighbors.

In order to strengthen cooperation with new neighbors on the East in 2008 the EU approved implementation of a new initiative - Eastern Partnership. This project was an initiative of Poland and Sweden. It provided a framework for a more ambitious partnership between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

The Russian-Georgia war in 2008 accelerated adoption of the Eastern Partnership, as the EU was forced to react to the spread of instability in the region. After the 2008 war, the European Parliament called on the European Commission to present a new initiative earlier than it was

expected. As the development of the Eastern Partnership was intensified after the 2008 war, Moscow assessed it as anti-Russian initiative. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the Eastern Partnership initiative was an attempt by the EU to create a new sphere of influence in the region.

It is difficult not to agree with the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. New initiative of the EU was important and expression of real support for Saakashvili's regime. After five-day clash between Russian and Georgia he needed such kind of support in order to prove, that war with Russia happened because Moscow was against of European path of Georgia's foreign policy.

In 2009, Georgia adopted a new foreign policy strategy for 2009-2012. According to the document, European and Euro-Atlantic integration remained the priority of Georgia's foreign policy. European orientation of Georgia's foreign policy was declared especially important after the 2008 war.

In 2011 Georgia published a new National Security Concept. Georgian government declares, that stage-by-stage integration into the European Union represents one of the most important directions of the nation's political and economic development... Broadening institutional frameworks of cooperation with the EU is important for Georgia. Georgia strives to achieve the Four Freedoms (free movement of people, goods, services, and capital) with the EU. Georgia considers the European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership as important factors contributing to Georgia's integration into the EU (*National Security Concept of Georgia, 2011*).

The National Security Concept also underlines the aspiration of the Georgian people to achieve fully fledged integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU, and to contribute to the security of the Black Sea region as a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic security system (*Kakachia, 2013: 2*).

Saakashvili's liberal reforms, which aimed at overcoming poverty and unemployment in the country, did not bring results. The problems with refugees and the trade embargo with Russia further exacerbated the situation. Gradually was growing discontent in society. The opposition was without effective leadership. The government systematically used state resources against the opposition and representatives of uncontrolled media. Despite all this, foreign advisers either could not or did not wanted to criticize. Some, such as American Matthew Bryza, became paid lobbyists (in Brussels and Washington, the Georgian government hired expensive lobbyists) (*Rayfield, 2017: 502*).

The western governments have also realized that they already supported unpopular authoritarian regime of Saakashvili. It was also growing aggression of society against the "United National Movement" (UNM) was founded in October 2001 by Mikheil Saakashvili). Western curators of Saakashvili's regime came to the conclusion that in order to maintain influence over the political processes in Georgia, it is necessary to bring another player to the political arena (otherwise, outraged people could be go out into the streets and the processes could become uncontrollable). In elections 2012, Western curators supported coalition "Georgian Dream". It is not a secret to anyone that without the support of Western curators it is impossible in Georgia even to take part in the elections, not to mention winning this election. Thus, the victory in the 2012 elections by the Georgian Dream coalition was secured by the West.

Victory of the Georgian Dream became a negative turning point for Saakashvili and his supporters. He began to discredit the coalition and the leader of this coalition by

any means. The main argument against B. Ivanishvili was, that once he lived in Russia, he is an agent of the kremlin. With such an accusation against Ivanishvili, Saakashvili tried to explain his defeat in parliamentary elections. Saakashvili did not recognize his own mistakes, which really caused the failure.

The Georgian Dream's Foreign Policy in the context of EU integration

In the process of analyzing the foreign policy of the Georgian Dream coalition must be remembered, that the foundation of this policy was laid during the presidency of M. Saakashvili.

The policies of the coalition government led by Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili's party, Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia (GD), are often described by its political opponents as the antithesis of the previous policies of the governments under Mikheil Saakashvili... However, in fact the new government has not slowed the pace of dialogue on an Association Agreement between Georgia and the EU (*Zasztołt, 2013*).

In condition of constant attacks from the oppositions (representatives of the UNM) in March 2013 new coalition government was forced to adopt a document: "Resolution on Basic Directions of Georgia's Foreign Policy". It was done by Prime Minister Ivanishvili for the one hand in order to calm done political opponents and for the other hand to prove political lobbyists of Saakashvili in Western countries that he is not going to change basic directions of Georgia's foreign policy. The resolution reflected the attempt of Ivanishvili not to shake such a fragile situation in Georgia.

Third point of the resolution once again emphasizes, that the main priority of Georgia's foreign policy course is integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. For the purpose of achieving strategic priority and gaining membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Georgia will take further steps for building and strengthening democratic institutions; establishing a governance system based on the principle of the rule of law and supremacy of human rights; and ensuring their reversibility of sustainable economic development. Georgia will not join such international organizations, whose policies contradict these priorities (*Resolution on Basic Directions of Georgia's Foreign Policy, 2013*).

The next point of the resolution emphasizes, that Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy course, first and foremost, serves sustainable democratic development and the country security and is not directed against another state. This is an attempt by official Tbilisi to make sure officials in Russia that the European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy of Georgia does not contradict the security policy of Russia. It can be interpreted as an attempt of Ivanishvili to obtain some concessions in trade with the Russian government (for example to be allowed Georgian wine and mineral water in Russian market). Besides, normalization relation with Russia was his pre-election promise, but in this path he did as much as was allowed by Western curators.

Relations with the EU were further advanced by the signing of an Association Agreement on June 27 2014 that includes creating a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The same rhetoric of "belonging to Europe" continued to feature in official discourse. Though the agreement doesn't guarantee Georgia's EU membership in foreseeable future, it recognized the ambition and aspirations of Georgian people to one day become a member of the European family. As Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Garibashvili stated at the signing ceremony of the Association Agreement: "today Georgia is given a historic chance to return to its natural environment, Europe, its

political, economic, social and cultural space". President Giorgi Margvelashvili also made similar claims: "as an individual, a Georgian national is European in terms of self-awareness and an integral part of Western civilization by nature" (*Kakachia, Minesashvili, 2015: 175*).

For most Georgians signing of an Association Agreement with the EU and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area was really perceived as breakthrough of Georgia's foreign policy. Most of them believed that Georgia's membership in the EU automatically means that this is the shortest way to achieve a high standards of life (for example to live as well as Germans in Germany). Poor socio-economic situation in Georgia forced many to go abroad and for those who still wished to move abroad, achieved visa-free regime was perceived as an opportunity to start a new life in European cities. But soon it became clear to all, that a visa-free regime meant to stay and freely travel across Europe for no more than 90 days during any 180-day period. For most of them, this was a big disappointment.

Most peasants were also very disappointed. They expressed the hope that after the signing of an agreement with the EU on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, their products will be in demand in the European market, and this will give them the opportunity to earn more money. But it didn't happen. Europeans are not ready to open wide the door to manufacturers of Georgian wines, fruits and vegetables, honey etc. Main consumers of Georgian products still are people in post-Soviet countries.

Economic, trade and market determines foreign policy orientation of Georgians. Rapid European integration of Georgia is not any more associated with wellbeing of population. None of the political leaders were able to solve problems of the society. During thirty years Georgians vote for the promised better future, but the situation is getting worse every year. Growing number of people wish to start a dialogue and provide a new foreign policy towards Russia Federation. In April 2019 Transparency International published a result of a survey, according to which 44% of interviewed wish normalisation relations with Russia (*Transparency International, URL...*).

On the contrary to such sentiments in society Coalition government of Georgian Dream made an unprecedented step and in 2017 for the first time included in the Constitution of Georgia, that EU and NATO integration is the intact choice and will of the country and all the agencies and Governmental institutions shall ensure achievement of this ultimate goal (*Constitution of Georgia, URL...*). The government of the Georgian Dream coalition has done more to strengthen Georgia's foreign policy course conceptually than the Saakashvili regime. The strengthening of Georgia's foreign policy towards European integration was achieved only in official documents, because during the ruling of Georgian Dream more and more Georgians doubt that the policy being pursued reflects the national interests of our society.

In 2019 Georgian government adopted a new Foreign Policy Strategy of Georgia 2019-2022. EU membership of Georgia is strategic aim of foreign policy, which fully reflects wish of Georgian society to become a worthy and full right member of the community. Significant efforts will be made, in order to recognizing the prospect of the EU membership. Active work will be carried out to effectively use existing formats and to for new proposals and initiatives (*Foreign Policy Strategy of Georgia, 2019-2022*).

Conclusion

Having considered the European vector of Georgia's foreign policy we can claim that since 2003 Georgia

conducts a foreign policy aimed to become an integral part of the EU. There is no reason to blame representative of the coalition government, that since 2012 they do less than Saakashvili's government for the EU integration of Georgia.

During last 2-3 decades, in a political life of Georgia dominates only one - pro-Western political force, which is currently represented with two political parties: "United National Movement", "Georgian Dream" and with the variety satellites of these parties. Such a political conjuncture creates the illusion of political pluralism, in reality West controls the whole political spectrum of Georgia.

From the analysis above, it can be deduced that even after the change of power in Georgia, the European integration vector of the country's foreign policy has not changed. The ruling party's foreign policy is supported by the parliamentary opposition and the majority of the young population of Georgia. Representatives of the Georgian government pursue a foreign policy aimed EU membership, it is one of the successful state of the Eastern Partnership program, but the future of Georgia's integration into the EU depends on many different factors.

Georgia's future EU integration also depends on the processes which take place within the EU states. There is a noticeable rapid change in attitudes within the EU towards future enlargement in the East. EU member states have their own challenges (socio-economic problems, immigration, trade disagreements with the United States of America, sanctions policy against Russia etc.), that effects on the position of future enlargement. At present, Georgia has reached the maximum possible effect on the path of rapprochement and EU integration. In short and medium term, Georgia's membership in the EU seems unattainable.

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ПОРІВНЯЛЬНИЙ АНАЛІЗ ЄВРОІНТЕГРАЦІЙНОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ ГРУЗІЇ ПІД ЧАС ПРЕЗИДЕНТСТВА М. СААКАШВІЛІ І ПІСЛЯ ЗМІНИ ВЛАДИ 1 жовтня 2012 року

У статті аналізується зовнішня політика Грузії щодо інтеграції в ЄС з 2003 року. Політика інтеграції Грузії в ЄС була активізована після "революції троянд". Новий президент Грузії М. Саакашвілі користувався сильною підтримкою Заходу, але російсько-грузинська війна в 2008 році, невдалі реформи, високий рівень безробіття зробили його непопулярним серед грузин, а в жовтні 2012 року люди проголосували проти правлячої партії. Поразка на парламентських виборах в 2012 р стала величезним ударом для Саакашвілі та його прихильників. Вони почали дискредитувати політику нового коаліційного уряду (особливо зовнішньої політики), стверджуючи, що метою зовнішньої політики Грузії більше не є європейська і євроатлантична інтеграція, й що представники нового уряду є агентами Кремля. Аналіз зовнішньої політики Грузії в контексті інтеграції в ЄС показує, що пріоритети зовнішньої політики Грузії не змінилися. Метою зовнішньої політики Грузії й надалі залишається подальша інтеграція в ЄС.

Ключові слова: Грузія; зовнішня політика Грузії; європейська інтеграція Грузії.

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ORIENTAL TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PRODUCTION OF CAULDRONS OF LATE BRONZE AGE

The cultures of "valykova" ceramics occurred in the Great Eurasian Steppe during late Bronze Age. Its signature is a torus on the areola or the throat of clayey vessel. It is found on the crockery of the different cultures from Northern Balkans and Danube region to Altai. Scientists connect the spreading of this decorative element as well as some forms of metal products with Balkan-Carpathian influence. Such type of metalware as cauldrons are of particular interest, since they always and everywhere characterize the level of metalworking of cultures, workshops and masters. Since cauldrons were usually found outside the complexes, according to which chronology and cultural affiliation could be established. Therefore, until recently, they were not included in studies of metal products of cultures of the "valykova" community. But with the increase in the number of these products (40 copies are already known today), and the appearance of new finds of cauldrons in East Kazakhstan in the dated complexes of the Andronovo cultural community, provided scientists with an opportunity to study intercultural relations in the late Bronze Age. It should be noted that all metalware is a complex object for research. In addition to the morphological similarity of forged cauldrons to the forms of pottery in the cultures of the Late Bronze Age, it is necessary to take into account their production technology. The study of the shape of products, their manufacturing technology and ornamentation allowed us to trace the exchange of new ideas in the manufacture of cauldrons. As a result of detailed studying the individual technological methods used by the masters, it is possible to outline the direction of innovation and identify two impulses from east to west. The first is earlier. It began with the production of small cauldrons among the Sintashta and Petrovskaya (Early-Andronovo) cultures of East Kazakhstan, that is, before the addition of the cultures of "valykova" ceramics. It is characterized by the technology of connecting the frame to the pallet, called shrink-fitting, bottom insertion, smoothly processed surface and, sometimes, the absence of handles. Knowledge of this technology is observed from East Kazakhstan through the Volga region and the Don region, and then to the Right-Bank Ukraine. The second is later. This technology originated in the Volga region and spread to the west - through the Don region to the Right-Bank Ukraine. At this stage, the processing technology of the surface of its frame changes, the pallets are attached with rivets, and cast parts appear.

Key words: *the Great Steppe; Late Bronze Age; cauldrons; technology exchange.*

Introduction

On the lands of the Great Steppe, also known as the Eurasian Steppe on the edge of III-II millennium BC the Eurasian Metallurgical Province (EAMP) started to occur. It existed until XII/XI-IX/VIII century BC. It is divided into several chronological periods: an early phase (edge of III-II millennium BC), forming of Zrubna-Andronovo cultural block (XVI-XV/XIV century BC), development of the community of "valykova" ceramics cultures (KVK) (XV/XIV-XII/XI century BC), ending of Bronze Age (XII/XI-IX/VIII century BC) (Chernykh, 1983, p. 97-98; 1984, p. 255-256; Chernykh et al., 2002).

The main signature of "valykova" ceramics cultures is a torus ("valyk") on the area or the throat of clay vessel, which is found on the crockery of the different cultures from Northern Balkans and Danube region to Altai. Scientists connect the spreading of this decorative element as well as some forms of metal products with Balkan-Carpathian (western) influence.

For a long time such type of metal dinnerware as cauldrons was not found among metal products of roller society cultures, since they were often found outside complexes, that would have allowed to establish the chronology and so - cultural affiliation. Therefore studying the cauldrons have been a separate school for many years. Only findings of the cauldrons in Eastern Kazakhstan in dated complexes of Andronovo cultural society (instead of accidental finds) allowed to include cauldrons into studying intercultural connections of late Bronze Age.

Methods

The information about 40 cauldrons, both undamaged and fragmented is presented in a 2018 joint monograph (Hoshko, Agapov and Otroschenko, 2018). The technology of creating each of them is described in details. It is important to note, that studying metal products, without examining the technology, which is fully depends on the specifics of material handling, can lead to a false con-

clusions. That is what happened during the creation of the classification by the scientists (*Leskov, 1975; Bochkarev, 1972, p. 63-68; 2010, p. 185-208; Demydenko, 2005, p. 93-103; Otroschenko, 1997, p. 16-17; Otroschenko and Tupchienko, 2005, p. 177*), even though they had included some technological moments. However, it is important to understand what could have led the master during the creation of a cauldron, which accessible technologies could have existed at that time.

Results

As the result of attentive studying of forms and technologies of creating cauldrons we managed to discover the specifics of the cauldrons from Eastern Kazakhstan to Ukrainian territories and see an exchange of the new ideas on the lands of Great Steppe. We found that some technological actions mark the direction of innovative creation of the cauldrons. In this article only those artefacts are presented, which would allow to follow this path.

The birth of the technologies, which slowly spread up to Western Ukraine, occurred in Eastern Kazakhstan on the edge of III-II millennium BC - on the early phase of EAMP creation. Here on the artefacts of Petrovska culture and early Alakul period of Andronovo culture, small cooper cauldrons are found. Some of them have handles, some do not, some have pallets and some - flat bottom. We are interested only those with pallets, since they have a specific technology of connecting the pallets to the frame without rivets. Also they do not have handles (fig. 1, 1-2). It is a cauldron from the burial №1, kurgan 4 of Ashchisu grave, which is located 80 km to the east from Karaganda city (*Kukushyn, 2011, p. 103-109; 2012, p. 63-80*). Another was found in burial №2 of the fence №5 on the Nurataldy-I grave, in Shet district of Karaganda oblast (*Kukushyn et al., 2015, p. 135-141; Kukushyn et al., 2016, p. 85-92*). Their form resembles ceramic sharp-edged pots on the pallets of Sintashta and Petrovska culture.

What is the difference between said cauldrons and the rest? The special technology of connecting the frame to the pallet, called shrink-fitting. It is a connection of details inserted one into the other, with a compulsory engagement, which prevents mutual movement. It is gained by temperature deformation of details which have cylindrical or conic surfaces with small difference in the diameters. The heated detail covers cold one. The "sintering" occurs, therefore the connection becomes irreversible. No rivets needed for such connection. So, in that time masters were familiar with the quality of metal to expand at high temperatures and to squeeze at low.

With the formation of a community of cultures with "valykov" ceramics, as the connections became most active all around their area of spreading, this technology occurred in Volga region. Two cauldrons are known from there: lower part of unknown origin from Bulgar (fig. 1, 3) on the Middle Volga (*Chlenova, 1978, p. 133-136; Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 82-88, fig. V. 1-6*) and on the Lower Volga, found in burial 16 near Komsomolskyi village in Astrakhan oblast, Krasnoyarsk district (fig. 1, 4) (*Boroffka and Sava, 1998, p. 17-113; Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 144-148, fig. 1*). Komsomolsky cauldron, as well as Kazakhstan, has no handles. The burial near the cauldron in Komsomolsky is dated approximately XV/XIV-XIII/XII centuries BC (*Otroschenko, 1997, p. 16-17; Otroschenko and Tupchienko, 2003, p. 116; Bochkarev, 2010, p. 207*).

To the west, in the Don region in Borisoglebsk local museum of Voronezh oblast the small cauldron is located. Its photography, posted on the site of local museum, has

bad quality. However, in the area of joining frame with the pallet rivets cannot be seen (fig. 1, 5). Therefore, as I assume, the shrink-fitting was used here as well (*Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 81, fig. IV, 1*).

Moving further to the west, similar technology can be found on the left shore of Dnipro, on the cauldron from Poltava oblast (fig. 1, 6) (*Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 315, fig. XL, 1*).

The next dinnerware was accidentally found during field oration in the Lower Dnipro region on the edge of Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts. It is the right coast of the Dnipro. Unfortunately, I do not have either photography or the drawing. Gladly I had an opportunity to examine and to describe it. The cauldron had no handlings (remember Ashchisu, Nurataldy and Komsomolsky). The connection of pallet with the frame - by shrink-fitting (*Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 313*).

The most western cauldron with such connection technology of pallet is found in Ukrainian Forrest steppe (*Węgrzynowicz, 1999-2001, p. 31-46*) (fig. 1, 7). Generally it is connected to the Podillia village in Halych district of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast (*Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 254-256*).

The Volga region can be considered as a contact zone, since here, apart from inserting the pallet by shrink-fitting, other new technological methods appear, such as inserting an additional bottom in the cauldron from Bulgar (*Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, fig. V, 4, 6*). Furthermore, in the cauldron from Podillia we have, though not additional, but inserted bottom, installed without rivets (*Węgrzynowicz, 1999-2001, p. 31-46*).

Characteristic signs of this group:

- The cauldrons are made of copper. The surface is leveled by wooden hammer.
- Shrink-fitting of the pallet (Ashchisu, Nurataldy and Komsomolsky, Bulgar, Podillia, from Poltava oblast and from the edge of Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts);
- Insertion of an additional bottom (Bulgar);
- Inserted bottom without rivets (Podilya);
- No handlings (Ashchisu, Nurataldy and Komsomolsky, the edge of Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts).

Another new technology of cauldron frame processing also occurs in Volga region. Initially we see it on the cauldron from Domashka (fig. 2, 1). It can be noticed due to traces of smith tools with narrow working edge, mostly vertical. Such processing allowed to stretch upwards casted ring workpiece. In this case, the diameter of the ring did not become much larger. The cauldron from Domashka was found in cultivated kurgan (*Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 105*), therefore it is hard to determine its cultural affiliation. According to villagers words, under the pallet the small clay "cup" was found, which was approximately 20 cm in diameter, with an ornament under the circlet, similar to the ornament under the cauldron circlet. From the excavation, set on the finding location, three jar-like ceramics dinnerware with the admixture of chamotte and white crumb (*Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 119, VIII, 12*). However, there is no certainty that these dinnerwares have direct connection to the cauldron. But ornamental motives on the cauldron are similar to those on ceramics dinnerware of Zrubna culture (*Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 108, fig. VIII, 1; p. 118, fig. VIII, 11*). Because of this, we consider Domashka cauldron simultaneous to Bulgar and Komsomolsky (XV-XIV century BC). Therefore we link this date to the invention of the new technology of ring forming, which the frame consisted of, and its moving to the west.

At the North Caucasus, the cauldron known as Ivanivskiy, was found near Ivanovo-Shamshevo Kagalitskiy





Fig. 1. Cauldrons with pallets, which are attached with shrink-fitting:

- 1 - Aschysu;
- 2 - Nurataldy;
- 3 - Bulgar;
- 4 - Komsomolskyi;
- 5 - Borysohlibskyi;
- 6 - from the Poltava region;
- 7 - Podillia.

Fig. 2. Cauldrons with vertical tracks on the body from blacksmith's tools:

- 1 - Domashka;
- 2 - Ivanivskiy;
- 3 - Matskova Luchka;
- 4 - Mykhailivka;
- 5 - Pokrovka;
- 6 - Novopavlivka;
- 7 - Mykolaiv regional museum.



district of Rostov oblast (*Ilukov, 2007, p. 117-122; Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 128-136, fig. X, 1-7*). The whole surface of its frame is covered by the vertical traces, more visible, than of Domashka cauldron (fig. 2, 2). I consider Ivanivskiy cauldron to be more late, then the former, since during its creation the casting was used - handles and, presumably, rivets.

Furthermore, we find this technology in the Dnipro region. Here we see an active development of different forms. The cauldrons made both with pallets and without. Starting from Ivanivskiy cauldron, the technology develops from the creation of individual parts - handles, rivets, pallets, to casting workpieces of whole rings with handles.

The cauldron from Matskova Luchka Lubny district of Poltava oblast (middle stream of Dnipro left coast) (*Klochko and Kozyomenko, 2017, p. 146-147; Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 186-195, fig. XVII, 1-6*) appears superior to Ivanivskiy, however handles, as the former, were casted on the circler according to the wax model and vertical traces of the forging are clearly seen on the rings (accept the first). Rivets with casted discs are inserted between first and second rings and the bottom part and the pallet (fig. 2, 3).

The transition from casting handles to founding them with upper ring is seen on the cauldron from Mykhailivka village Novovorontsovska district of Kherson oblast (fig. 2, 4) on the Dnipro left coast (*Agapov and Hoshko, 2018,*

p. 210-216, fig. XX, 1-5). Its whole frame is covered by deep clear vertical signs of smith tool, which seem to imitate "races" on the surface of ceramics pots (Otroshenko and Tupchienko, 2005, p. 177).

This technological detail makes it similar to two cauldrons on the Dnipro right coast from Kirovohrad oblast - from Pokrovka village Kirovohrad district (Otroshenko and Tupchienko, 2005, p. 176-184; Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 260-271 fig. XXVIII 1-10) and from Novopavlivka village Mala Vyska district (fig. 2, 5-6 respectfully) (Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 229-236, fig. XXIII, 1-6).

The last cauldron is from Mykolaiv Regional Museum (MRM) (fig. 2, 7). The technology of frame processing is similar to cauldrons from Mykhailivka, Pokrovka and Novopavlivka (Agapov and Hoshko, 2018, p. 198-209, fig. XIX, 1-10). Therefore such frame processing is clearly seen from east to west, from Volga region to middle Dnipro left coast and Dnipro right coast. We see gradual development of the technology of final frame processing with vertical narrow traces-"races", which is probably due to transferring from copper to another metal (Domashka) to bronzes (Matskova Luchka, Novopavlivka, Pokrovka, Mykolaiv regional museum). However I do not disregard the assumption of imitation of the ornaments in the ceramics as "races".

Some cauldrons are produced without pallets (Novopavlivka, Pokrovka, Mykhailivka).

Characteristic signs of this group:

- casting with forming forging of upper ring and handles;
- stretching upwards rings with hammer with narrow working surface, which results in "races" on the surface;
- casting handles according to wax models and adding by casting on the circlets;
- casting pallets;
- casing rivets.

Discussion

In the following table cauldrons are posted regarding their dating, made by authors of publishing new findings and already known dinnerwares from previous studying with respect to their creation technologies. The purpose of creating such table was to demonstrate spatial spreading of technological ideas of creating metal cauldrons, which moved from east to west, in the hands of stepper cultures of "valykova" ceramics community (tab. 1).

Thus, the attempted technological study of cauldrons, traces on their surface and other details adds additional opportunities to the traditional study of archaeological material.

Date	Kazakhstan	Nadvolzhya	Lower Don	Left bank of the Dnipro	Right bank of the Dnipro
XXI-XVII BC					
XV-XIV BC					
XIV-XIII BC					

Table 1. Spreading of technologies and ideas in the creation of cauldrons
Remarks: Arrows indicate the direction of technology movement

Conclusions

To sum up this research, I remind that the creation of cauldrons on the steppe (partly forest steppe) areas of North Eurasia began on the east on the early phase of the Eurasian Metallurgical Province forming, in the areas of Petrovska and Andronovo cultures of Kazakhstan. In the

Volga region not only east technologies were applied, but also local ideas of cauldron creation were generated and later passed further to the west (fig. 3). The technology of cauldron creation was mastered by all cultures of "valykova" ceramics community, since their form correlates with the design of main types of local ceramics dinnerware.




Fig. 3. Map of technology movement from east to west

1 - Aschysu; 2 - Nurataldy; 3 - Bulgar; 4 - Komsomolskiy; 5 - Borysohlibskiy; 6 - from the Poltava region; 7 - from the border of Mykolaiv and Kherson region; 8 - Podillia; 9 - Domashka; 10 - Ivanivskiy; 11 - Matskova Luchka; 12 - Novopavlivka; 13 - Pokrovka; 14 - Mykhailivka; 15 - Mykolaiv regional museum.

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СХІДНІ ТЕХНОЛОГІЇ У ВИРОБНИЦТВІ КАЗАНІВ ДОБИ ПІЗНЬОЇ БРОНЗИ

Історія дослідження казанів розпочалася ще в кінці XIX століття. Майже одразу ця тема виділилася в окремих напрямках в археології через те, що їх найчастіше знаходять поза комплексами, за якими можна було б встановити хронологію і, відповідно, культурну приналежність. Але зі збільшенням кількості цих виробів (на сьогодні їх відомо вже 40 примірників), і особливо з появою нових знахідок у Східному Казахстані найбільш ранні казанів в датованих комплексах андронівської культурної спільності, дозволили залучити казані, відомі на величезному просторі Великого Степу, від Східного Казахстану до Молдови, до вивчення міжкультурних зв'язків пізнього бронзового віку. Взагалі металевий посуд це складний об'єкт, що вимагає спеціального технологічного дослідження. Тому крім морфологічної схожості кованих казанів із деякими формами керамічного посуду культур доби пізньої бронзи, необхідно враховувати й технологію їхнього виробництва. Для пропонованої статті вибрані лише окремі казани, бо дослідження форми й технології їхнього виготовлення дозволяє простежити обмін новими ідеями між майстрами культур валикової кераміки. В результаті детального вивчення окремих технологічних прийомів, які застосовували майстри, можна намітити напрямки руху інновацій у формуванні казанів та виділити два імпульси, які йшли зі сходу на захід. Перший - більш ранній. Початок йому поклало виробництво невеликих казанків в середовищі синташтинської та петровської (ранньо-андронівської) культурах Східного Казахстану, тобто, ще до складання спільності культур валикової кераміки. Для них характерна специфічна технологія з'єднання корпусу казана із піддоном без заклепок, гладко оброблена поверхня корпусу та, часом відсутність ручок. Пізніше, ця технологія фіксується вже в Надволжжі й Донщині. Далі, просуваючись в західному напрямку, вона з'являється на Дніпровському Лівобережжі, а потім і на Правобережжі. Матеріалом для казанів на цьому етапі служила мідь. У міру просування у західному напрямку (в Надволжжі) виникає нова технологія - вставка дна, закріпленого без заклепок. Другий імпульс, більш пізній - із Надволжжя через Донщину на Лівобережжю й Правобережжю України. Казани виготовляються з бронзи. У зв'язку з цим змінюється й технологія формування корпусу, яка відстежується по вертикальних слідах від ковальських знарядь, піддони прикріплюються заклепками. Поступово з'являються відлиті деталі, як-то заклепки, ручки, піддони, а потім і цілі кільця з ручками.

Ключові слова: Великий Степ; доба пізньої бронзи; казани; обмін технологіями.

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UKRAINIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL SPACE OF THE 1920s: NATIONAL CONTEXT AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL NAVIGATION

The article deals with an analysis of educational aspects of the Ukrainian national context of Ukrainization of the 1920s from the perspective of studying the historiography of the issue. The author focuses on historiographical sources and scientific statements of historical, historico-pedagogical and cultural studies of the prerequisites, content, features and civilizational dimension of the educational aspect of Ukrainization as a broad policy in relation to the institutionalization and development of education, Ukrainian by nature and content. The article draws attention to coverage by historians of reforming problems of school education of that time, their analysis of ways for providing schools with required Ukrainian literature. It is pointed out that historians put an emphasis on the fact that despite its ideological foundations (efforts to implant Bolshevik power) the results of Ukrainization were related to building up the nation and state. It is stated that the current historiographical process looking into the educational dimension of Ukrainization is represented by a wide spectrum of scientific works which range of subject interests allows to highlight Ukrainization of educational space of that time as a holistic and system process which content was underpinned by objective conditions and was well thought-out and logical. The article outlines some prospects of examining the educational dimension of Ukrainization and draws attention to the value of its implementation experience in the context of the development of the modern education system of Ukraine.

Key words: *Ukrainization; indigenization; historiography; education; schools; Ukrainian language; building up of state; building up of nation.*

Introduction

Examination of education as a strategic condition for the security of nation and state is one of the concepts of its present-day educational-philosophical understanding. The goals and content of the educational process govern the development content and nature of national, state and civil identities. Today the issue of protection, preservation and development of national, in particular linguistic, identities gains in relevance, which makes for a keener interest of both state and society as well as scientists in comprehension and interpretation of historical experience of implementing a broad movement for Ukrainization of national, political and socio-cultural space. Moreover, the current development stage of Ukraine and its focus on European experience which essential feature is highlighting of a national component in all spheres of life, contribute to a variety of transformations in different sectors of social activity. It is education that is designed to yield such results which would meet development goals of both individuals and society as a whole. In addition, education is a powerful factor of social development and the foundation of culture of society, the basis for building up its values and meanings. Education has a direct impact on the formation of worldview, internal culture and language priorities of the entire nation, especially the younger generation which, in turn, determines development directions of the country as a whole. Historical experience of Ukrainization of school education in the 1920s is therefore of great theoretical and cognitive as well as practical and

state building-up importance for development of both modern educational practice and educational-philosophical understanding of the Ukrainian context of educational space.

Ukrainization of education in the 1920s was a subject of historiographical research of many scientists. Among the works covering some aspects of Ukrainization of the early 20th century, worthy of mention are monographs and research of such scientists as V. Danylenko (1992), S. Kulchytsky (2005), Ya. Dashkevych (1990), O. Voinalovych (1992), I. Klitsakov (1997), Yu. Shapoval (1994) et al. In addition, there is a separate cohort of scientists who examined peculiarities of Ukrainization of the educational sphere in the context of school education: L. Berezivska (2008), V. Borysov (1999), I. Nikolina (2008), T. Antonyuk (2005), M. Kuzmenko (2004), O. Sukhomlynska (2002) et al. The studies of V. Lozytsky (1989), O. Ryabchenko (1998), S. Siropolko (2001) show the content of the Ukrainization process in the light of socio-cultural changes of society as well as in the context of specific aspects of the formation of Ukrainian national education. The ways of Ukrainization of Ukrainian school, trends, patterns and historical importance of that process were a subject of interest of such scientists as A. Borovyk (2008), T. Kulish (2010), I. Telehuz (2012), M. Mazurenok (2013), O. Lavrut (2011) and O. Kuts (2006). Some aspects of Ukrainization and its regional dimension are presented in works of such scientists as A. Korzh (2004), I. Dzyuba (2004), L. Nahorna (2005), A. Pohribnyy (2003) et al. However, despite the fact that

there is a significant array of scientific, popular science and local history works dedicated to Ukrainization of education in the 1920s, many of its aspects are still underresearched. What is specifically meant here is the historiographical aspect of the issue and comprehension of the subject matter of available scientific works dealing with a single subject of research - Ukrainization of Ukrainian education in the 1920s.

According to the author, the purpose of this article is to examine some aspects of the national context of Ukrainization of education in the 1920s, analyze thematic historiographical sources and generalize historians' experience in studying Ukrainization of national education of Ukraine as a part of the Bolshevik indigenization policy.

Methods

Supporting the opinion of the contemporary theorist of historiographical knowledge Ya. Kalakura that historiographical research holds a prominent place in the structure of historical science as a special form of historical memory and its model is being updated with theorization of historical knowledge (Kalakura, 2016: 19), we consider it necessary to refer to works of some historians and researchers of Ukrainian education, who have made a significant contribution to studying the specificity of Ukrainization of educational space, and analyze the key aspects of Ukrainization of education on their basis. Considering the fact that historiography sorts the gained experience in its own way, identifies all its positive aspects accumulated at a particular development stage and deserves critical assimilation, creative use and multiplication as well as does not evade negative aspects, which has to become a lesson and a warning for avoiding mistakes in the future (Kalakura, 2016: 20), we will rely on methods of historical and logical cognition, principles of scientific periodization, historiographical dialogue and a critical historiographical analysis during the processing of the material and summarization of scientific statements.

Research results and their discussion

Analyzing the content of Ukrainization of education in the 1920s, its features and patterns, it is worth paying attention to objective causes of and prerequisites for pursuing that policy, which V. Danylenko (Danylenko, 1992; 2003) proposed to look into. The scientist pointed out that the February bourgeois-democratic revolution had contributed to the creation of a number of independent states in the territory of the former Empire and accelerated the process of national and cultural revival (Danylenko, 1992: 80). In his opinion, the October socialist revolution which proclaimed equality and sovereignty of nations and their right to self-determination had to become a new impetus for national revival. In spite of the above, the underestimation of the national issue by Bolsheviks during the civil war, their hope for an imminent victory of the proletariat across the globe and revolutionary euphoria resulted in significant complications. The situation was also aggravated by the fact that Ukrainian cities were predominantly Russified under the pressure of the policy of social and national oppression whereas rural areas continued preserving their national traditions, culture and language. The above created formidable difficulties in the formation of an adequate national and national-cultural policy of the Communist Party which was mainly supported by urban population. Although Ukraine had a significant stratum of the working class, the Republic still remained 85% peasant. It was therefore useless to count on success in economic construction

without winning great masses of rural population and national intelligentsia round (Danylenko, 1992: 80). A benchmark and impetus for a national and cultural revival which was called "Ukrainization" in history, was Lenin's resolution adopted on November 29, 1919 by the Plenum of the Central Committee and then approved by the VIIIth All-Russian Party Conference.

In modern understanding of Ukrainization scientists pay special attention to its essence, causes and prerequisites. Thus, describing a number of objective causes of Ukrainization in the 1920s, the authors of the collective study "Ukrainization" of the 1920-1930s: Background, Achievements and Lessons" (2003), point out the difficulties that were associated with political motivations of the revival of Ukrainian language and culture in 1920-1922. They suggested the following causes of the above: firstly, the complexity of the military-political and economic situation both in the Republic and throughout the country; secondly, the unpreparedness of numerous Communists for pursuing a radically new course in national policy (indigenization), a favorable attitude of many to the idea of centralism and the vitality of the great-power tradition (Danylenko et al., 2003). For those and other reasons, during the period under review the Party and the country had heated discussions about further ways of building-up nation and state, developing international relations as well as national languages and cultures.

Historiographical facts show that the above problems were widely discussed at the November (1920) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U (Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine), the 1st All-Ukrainian Meeting of the CP(b)U (1921), the February and October Plenums of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U (1922). The February Plenum, in particular, once again confirmed the need for public servants to know the Ukrainian language whereas the October one summarized and supplemented the resolution of the February Plenum, adopting it as a Nationalities Issue Directive (Danylenko, 1992: 80-81). V. Danylenko emphasized the importance of the latter since it was that document which indicated the inadmissibility of departing from the previous Party line in respect of the development of Ukrainian national culture. In addition, it outlined some actions for the development of Ukrainian language, culture, schools and publishing. There was also a provision entered regarding the necessity of introducing compulsory study of Ukrainian in Russian-language schools and Russian in Ukrainian-language schools (Danylenko, 1992: 81).

Historians consider the resolution "On Use of the Ukrainian Language on a Par with the Russian Language in All Institutions" of the VUTsVK (All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee), approved in February 1920, as a benchmark of Ukrainization. It resolved to use Ukrainian on equal terms with Russian in the whole territory of Ukraine, in all civil and military institutions, which meant that the Russian language had no advantages. The following facts indicate that seven months after the VUTsVK resolution, on 21 September 1920, the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine adopted a decree on the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools and government institutions. According to its statements, the People's Commissar of the Republic was to develop a plan for bringing the concept of Ukrainization of education into effect, specifically, to publish a sufficient number of required textbooks. Concurrently, government officials were to learn the Ukrainian language in evening schools, the heads of institutions ensuring the recruitment of those employees

who knew the language and could meet relevant requirements of the population.

Historiographical discourse shows that the adoption of such decisions was facilitated by the fact that a significant part of Communist leaders of Ukraine still defended the idea of the need for a free development of Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian language. However, there were opponents of that point of view. The notorious theory of "struggle between two cultures" spread across the Republic, its essence coming to setting off "proletarian Russia" against "peasant Ukraine". Based on the above, it was concluded that Ukrainization was unnecessary because Ukrainian rural culture would eventually be defeated by urban Russian culture (*Danylenko, 1992: 82*). In order to strengthen the foundations of the Soviet Federation and bring broad strata of national intelligentsia and peasantry on side of Soviet power, it was therefore necessary to offer to the peoples of Russia, united in a single, essentially unitary state, a kind of "compensation" in the form of "cultural and national autonomy" and expand opportunities for development of their national cultures and languages. It was from such perspective that Soviet authorities considered the issue of inter-ethnic relations. That issue was discussed at the XIIth Congress of the RCP(b) (Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks). Under its resolution, authorities were to punish violators of national rights and especially the rights of national minorities with all revolutionary severity.

According to many researchers, since its appearance in Soviet history, the indigenization policy was aimed at organization of a network of schools of all levels, cultural institutions, publication of newspapers and magazines as well as setting up book publishing in indigenous languages (*Dzyuba, 2004: 3*). As a result of the measures taken in the following years, there was some progress made in the Ukrainization process. The printed media, records management, cultural and educational work, general education and special schools as well as higher educational institutions were actively Ukrainized. In the 1920s there significantly evolved Ukrainian poetry and prose, a number of works on linguistics and history of Ukraine published. At the same time, culture of smaller peoples of Ukraine was also developing. During those years famous scientists and writers returned to Ukraine from emigration (*Danylenko, 1992: 83*).

In historians' opinion, the specificity of Ukrainization in that context was its ever increasing shift from the field of culture to that of ideology. Under the growing ideological pressure there was literary discussion held in Ukraine in 1925-1928. The finishing touch was the Ukrainization shift to the sphere of ideological and political struggle which eventually ended up tragically for many of its participants.

A substantial contribution to exploration of the educational dimension of Ukrainization, specifically its historiographical aspects, was made by the contemporary researcher L. Berezivska. Her interest area included the reforming of school education in Ukraine of the 20th century. Based on historians' criteria of fields for analyzing the Ukrainization policy, the researcher developed her own periodization of history of examining that process, singling out six provisional stages: the first one - 1900-1917; the second - 1917-1920; the third - 1920 - the early 1930s; the fourth - the 1930s - the middle 1950s; the fifth - the second half of the 1950s - the 1980s and the sixth - 1990 - to date (*Berezivska, 2008: 15*). Of special interest within our research is an analysis of the first three stages of the formation and development of the Ukrainization mainstream.

According to Berezivska's conclusions, the first historiographical stage (1900-1917) is associated with endeavors of contemporaries of the reforms to not only comprehend the latter but also and primarily inform general public about their causes, specificity of their progress and consequences (*Berezivska, 2008: 15*). In particular, the Russian teacher and historian of education S. Rozhdestvenskii described the progress and directions of the school reform of 1899-1901; the historian S. Stepanov analyzed draft reforms of secondary education of the early 20th century; Ye. Zviagintsev examined ministerial projects for folk schools; V. Charnoluskyi, M. Demkov, P. Kapterev and P. Blonskyi indicated theoretical foundations of the educational reforming. Further, the national development context of the educational environment interested S. Rusova and Ya. Chapiga; S. Cherkasenko and O. Lototskyi examined the specificity of the social movement for Ukrainian school in the context of government legislation; a draft school reform was a subject of scientific interest of P. Ignatiev and V. Naumenko; consequences of "Bogolepov's Reform" were set forth in the *Vestnik Vospitaniia* (Educational Bulletin) Journal (*Berezivska, 2008: 16*). We can agree with the opinion of L. Berezivska who believes that the then pedagogical literature and periodical press covered the school educational status, the government educational policy, the reforming process of the educational sector, ministerial and alternative to government projects for the development of education, which played a significant role in the formation of pedagogical worldview of teachers.

In the estimation of L. Berezivska, the second historiographical stage (1917-1920) was related to accumulation of various knowledge regarding the UPDR (the Ukrainian People's Democratic Republic) period. Thus, according to the systematization of the researcher, the educational policy of the autocratic government, the causes, course and results of the reform of 1917-1920 were described by such participants of the latter as O. Muzychenko, G. Ivanytsia, K. Lebedintsev and others (*Berezivska, 2008: 16*). There were however very few works covering the effective reform. Despite the above, scientific papers of both the first and the second historiographical stages are still important owing to their meaning content. Conclusions and scientific statements of some individual works are valuable through their descriptive and informative nature as to different changes in school education. In this respect, it is important to mention scholarly works of such researchers and public figures as G. Ivanytsia, O. Lototskyi, O. Muzychenko, V. Naumenko, S. Rusova, Ya. Chepiga and others, which have laid a stable foundation for the formation of the Ukrainian historical and pedagogical historiography and continue to be valuable sources today for studying the reforming processes in Ukraine in the early 20th century (*Berezivska, 2008: 16*).

The third historiographical stage identified by L. Berezivska covers a period between 1920 and the early 1930s. Researchers, namely G. Grynko, Ya. Riappo, M. Avdienko and M. Skrypnyk, focused on the school education reforming in the UkSSR (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) in the 1920s. Relatively freely, considering ideological realities of the time, all the scholars covered the progress of the reform, particularly brought up the issue of a social effect of the government policy of Ukrainization, proved the effectiveness of the Ukrainian education system, showed its difference from the Russian one and discussed the content of the main educational documents (*Berezivska, 2008: 17*). It is worth pointing out that educational activities of the previous governments were presented in those

studies in critical and negative dimensions or were not mentioned at all. Likewise important is L. Berezivska's generalization that with Soviet power established and consolidated in Ukraine, there was gaining ground a stereotype of a decisive role of the Bolshevik Party in the development of education while pedagogical thought regarding the school reforming was increasingly acquiring ideological overtones (*Berezivska, 2008: 17*).

Continuing the historiographical review, it should be noted that some historians focused on the significance of general education school as an important factor in strengthening national consciousness of the Ukrainian population (*Lavrut, 2011: 109*). Taking into account the realities of political and socio-cultural life of that time, T. Antonyuk emphasizes that the right to get general education as well as the right to a free choice of educational institutions by students and their parents were violated. In the end, the development of educational institutions was confined to a strict social framework (*Antonyuk, 2005: 17*).

A significant contribution to the enrichment of historiographical research into issues of Ukrainization and its impact on general education schools was made by I. Nikolina. The scientist studied the growth dynamics of Ukrainian-language general education schools, identified the main fields of activity of the UkSSR NGOs and came to the conclusion on positive results of that process. I. Nikolina found a strong connection between the regional factor and the formation of national education. In her opinion, Ukrainization of schools in the Donbass took longer than in other provinces where the task on Ukrainization of school was performed within the fixed 2-year term. In addition, the scientist analyzed the causes that slowed down Ukrainization of school education: shortage of highly qualified personnel who spoke the Ukrainian language; lack of required literature in educational institutions; strict control of party and decision-making bodies over the learning and teaching process, which in the early 1930s led to artificial discredit to those teachers who supported the Ukrainization policy. According to I. Nikolina, the development of national school education was important because it contributed to the growth of literacy and culture of representatives of different nationalities who lived in the territory of the UkSSR (*Nicolina, 2008: 16*).

Further, many researchers dealt with school polytechnization in their works. According to historiographical sources, in the course of the polytechnization process students were acquainted with the basics of industrial and agricultural production as well as acquired skills of handling the simplest tools (*Lavrut, 2011; Nicolina, 2008*). A well-known fact in historiography is that the main principles of vocational labor education were formed in 1921-1930. Thus N. Ivantsova identified some types of institutions that belonged to the system of vocational in-service education, described their tasks in the context of vocational labor training and stated their compliance with the then political and economic situation in the UkSSR (*Ivantsova, 2008: 2-3*).

Historians were also focused on the role, characteristics and specific features of various social and professional groups, in particular intellectuals and young people, in a broad Ukrainization context (*Lavrut, 2011*). A special place in the narrative of such studies was taken by research of a status and specifics of the existence of intelligentsia. Those topics were extensively covered by G. Alekseieva, D. Bachynskyi, G. Kasianov, V., Masnenko, I. Nevinchana, F. Sokolova, M. Shypovych and others. The researchers pointed out that the term "intelligentsia" had been borrowed

from Soviet historiography where it was divided into a number of groups: scientific-pedagogical, intellectual and creative, each group having its own original and unique features. Moreover, scientists asserted that intelligentsia had been a special socio-cultural group of society and for a long time had been in the status of an object rather than a subject of socio-political relations (*Lavrut, 2011: 113*).

Analyzing historiographical dialogues on the educational content of Ukrainization, O. Lavrut points out that a significant contribution to exploration of the subject matter was made by O. Osmolovska. The scientist ascertained an influence of results of the higher education reform in the early 1920s on the situation with highly qualified pedagogical personnel as well as identified quantitative and qualitative changes felt by professional and teaching staff in the formation process of Soviet society. Concurrently, researchers emphasize that the attitude of the totalitarian state to intelligentsia was controversial: on the one hand - attention, improvement of quality and training forms of new personnel, some improvement of living conditions, wage growth, strengthening of the material and technical base of higher educational institutions etc.; on the other hand - ideological control, restraint of freedom of creativity and political terror, which resulted in physical destruction of the best representatives of scientific elite (*Lavrut, 2011: 113*).

Some works of many scientists, exploring the peculiarities of Ukrainization, dealt with functioning problems of the Ukrainian language during the above period. It is worth mentioning scientific works by S. Savoyska, I. Ohiyenko, G. Pivtorak, A. Korzh and others who analyzed and described the anti-Ukrainian language and educational policy which was introduced by the dominant imperial political regimes for a long time (*Savoyska, 2007; Ohiyenko, 2004; Pivtorak, 2004; Korzh, 2004*). L. Nagorna (2005) looked into problems of the language policy and the dynamics of that process. Scientists not only covered the revival processes of the Ukrainian language and historical memory but also paid attention to reforming problems of higher education in Ukraine. The vast majority of researchers pointed out that there had been languages of representatives of different ethnic groups used to develop almost the entire system of education, build up and improve their "own" cultural infrastructure as well as their "own" cultural and intellectual space in the regions. In that way the prestige of non-Russian languages and cultures was enhanced (*Kuras, 2004; Lavrut, 2011; Ohiyenko, 2004*).

Present-day historical discourse on problems of the educational and pedagogical context of Ukrainization is represented by thematization of such issues as causes, problems and ways of school Ukrainization in the 1920s, the socio-cultural and civilizational dimension of Ukrainization as well as its regional and everyday dimensions. Thus the contemporary researcher T. Kulish points out that implementation of the Ukrainization policy had a positive impact on the development of a network of general education institutions and primarily Ukrainian-language schools. In addition, schools of Ukraine started organizing classes with different languages of instruction: Ukrainian, Ukrainian-Russian, Russian and others. An important component of Ukrainization of the educational field was the development of and provision of the educational process with textbooks and teaching aids published in the Ukrainian language, which total circulation was constantly growing during the period under review (*Kulish, 2010: 4*). Another scientist A. Borovyk devoted his monograph to examination of the Ukrainization process of general

education schools during the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1920, where he paid special attention to activities of politicians, aimed at the implementation of Ukrainization, reforming of teacher training as well as providing schools with textbooks and other means (Borovyk, 2008).

Common features of Ukrainization of education in the context of the national regeneration of Ukraine were also analyzed by such contemporary scientists as Y. Hrytsak, T. Matseykiv, T. Anpilohova (Hrytsak, 1996; Matseykiv, 2012; Anpilohova, 2008). Specificity of Ukrainization, the dynamics of its course and an impact on spiritual life of the Ukrainians are covered by S. Plakhotnyuk, M. Mazurenok, O. Kutz (Plakhotnyuk, 2001; Mazurenok, 2013; Kutz, 2000). A separate niche is occupied by scientific works addressing the Ukrainization process in certain regions. Specifically, A. Ratsilevych studied the cultural and educational movement in Volhynia in 1917, and the Ukrainization policy in education of Podolia in 1920s was explored by A. Surovyy (Ratsilevych, 2004; Surovyy, 2013). A separate topic related to Ukrainization of school education is development of school textbooks in Soviet Ukraine in 1921-1934 (research by I. Telehuz, 2015).

Conclusions

The historiographical review of the exploration status of Ukrainization of education in the 1920s affords ground for asserting that that process was a significant success and played a civilizational role in the development of linguistic identity and Ukrainian mentality in Ukraine of the time. In their studies historians draw attention to the fact that introduction of the Ukrainian language in the educational process, an increase in the number of students in educational institutions and publication of Ukrainian-language textbooks, teaching aids etc. became an important component of Ukrainization of education. Scientists share the opinion that despite its short duration and some shortcomings, Ukrainization had an exceptionally positive impact on the development of the national education system and the improvement of new cadre of Ukrainian intelligentsia. Moreover, according to historians, the phenomenon of Ukrainization left a deep mark in Ukrainian society, secured those state building up strides which had been started yet in the 19th century, proved the viability and infinite capabilities of the Ukrainian people, its language and culture. Further still, the idea that Ukrainization of education contributed to an uplift of spiritual life of the Ukrainians and their awareness of national identity sounds as historiographical polylogue. In spite of a large array of studies available, dealing with the cultural development history of Ukrainian Soviet society in the 1920s-1930s, this issue still remains underexplored and therefore requires new searches and new views of present-day researchers. As to research prospects, we should primarily mention exploration of Ukrainization of education in the context of the socio-cultural and synergetic methodology, description of an everyday progress of Ukrainization and its so called 'verbal historic' studies.

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УКРАЇНІЗАЦІЯ ОСВІТЬОГО ПРОСТОРУ 20-х років ХХ століття: НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ КОНТЕКСТ ТА ІСТОРІОГРАФІЧНА НАВІГАЦІЯ

Сучасне освітнє обличчя України, розвиток національних, мовних і громадянських ідентичностей українців багато в чому визначається історичними умовами та історичним поступом. Визнання державного статусу української мови та її легітимація в суспільстві як мови титульної нації значною мірою обумовлено історичною політикою у мовній сфері. Українська історія знає як позитивні, так і негативні приклади, які або звеличували українську, або ж шовіністично заперечували. Політика українізації 20-х років ХХ століття значно послужила виясненню української мови, яка тривалий час функціонувала як імпліцитний, прихований, заперечений панівними режимами складник українства. У такій проблематизації аргументовано актуальність запропонованої студії. Статтю присвячено аналізу освітніх аспектів українського національного контексту українізації 20-х років ХХ століття під кутом зору вивчення історіографії проблеми. У центрі уваги автора - історіографічні джерела, наукові положення історичних, історико-педагогічних та культурознавчих досліджень щодо передумов, змісту, особливостей та цивілізаційного виміру освітнього напрямку українізації як широкої політики щодо інституціонування та розвитку української за характером і змістом освіти. У статті звернено увагу на висвітлення істориками проблем тогочасного реформування шкільної освіти, на їхній аналіз шляхів забезпечення шкіл необхідною українською літературою. Підкреслено, що історики наголошують на тому, що попри ідеологічні основи українізації (прагнення укорінити більшовицьку владу), її результати лежали у націє- та державотворчій площині. Констатовано, що сучасний історіографічний процес з теми освітнього виміру українізації представлений широким спектром наукових праць, діапазон предметних зацікавлень яких дає змогу висвітлити українізацію тогочасного освітнього простору як цілісний та системний процес, зміст якого був підготовлений об'єктивними умовами, добре продуманим та логічним. Окреслено перспективи вивчення освітнього виміру українізації, звернено увагу на цінність досвіду її реалізації у контексті розбудови сучасної освітньої системи України.

Ключові слова: українізація; коренізація; історіографія; освіта; школи; українська мова; державотворення; націєтворення.

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